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Almost 40 years ago, Edward E. Leamer (1983) criticized the state of applied econo-
metrics at that time: "Hardly anyone takes data analysis seriously. Or perhaps more
accurately, hardly anyone takes anyone else’s data analysis seriously." (p.37). He urged
applied economists to "take the con out of econometrics" and suggested to conduct more
sensitivity analyses, which would test the robustness of the results when deviating from the
preferred specification or functional form - an element that can be found in every applied
paper today.
Nowadays, however, it seems that Leamer’s critique is no longer justified as applied econo-
metrics has experienced a credibility revolution over the last three decades (Angrist and
Pischke, 2010). More emphasis on the quality of research designs has been the driving fac-
tor for the credibility revolution and the improved standards in the discipline as a whole.
Identifying and estimating causal and policy-relevant parameters has been the bread-and-
butter business of applied economists ever since. For more than 30 years, the potential
outcome approach, sometimes referred to as the Rubin Causal Model, has been the stan-
dard framework to analyze causal problems in economics (Holland, 1986, Imbens, 2020).1
For a while, experiments with random assignment (randomized controlled trials) seemed
to be the only viable option for causal inference. However, randomized experiments are
problematic or entirely not feasible in many instances, may it be due to financial, political,
or ethical considerations (Athey and Imbens, 2017). For this reason, applied economists
developed quasi-experimental designs since the late 1980s and have exploited natural ex-
periments that allow to draw causal inference from observational data. Instead of relying
on randomization through experiments, researchers need to find exogenous variation in
the treatment variable, which is often induced by institutional rules (Van der Klaauw,
2014). Typical identification strategies to estimate causal effects in natural experiments
are instrumental variables, differences-in-differences, and regression-discontinuity designs,
amongst others. The change in empirical research was accompanied by an increase in the
requirements on data. It is not only crucial to know the source of the exogenous variation
but also to have a large enough sample of individuals affected by the natural experiment
- requirements that are often not met by traditional surveys.
The credibility revolution would not have been possible with another contemporaneous
transformation, namely a data revolution. Economic research has generally become much
more empirical over the last decades. The share of published papers that are purely the-
oretical has been in decline, whereas papers that exploit self-collected data have been
increasing (Hamermesh, 2013, Angrist et al., 2017). Researchers have opened up new
1An alternative central framework for causal inference uses the work on directed acyclic graphs, which
has received much attention in other disciplines, such as computer science, epidemiology, and other social
sciences but not so much in economics (Imbens, 2020).
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data sources, such as text data, private sector data, and administrative data (Gentzkow
et al., 2019, Langedijk et al., 2019). Particularly important for estimating causal effects
in the setting of natural experiments has been the improved access to large-scale admin-
istrative data, which offers substantial benefits (Einav and Levin, 2014). The (almost)
universal population coverage allows that quasi-experimental designs can be applied in
the first place. This is owed to the fact that quasi-experimental designs often investigate
effects for populations at the margin of the natural experiment (e.g. birth cutoff rules).
Furthermore, with detailed and accurate information, researchers can construct consistent
indices to track outcomes over long periods of time. Lastly, in comparison to traditional
surveys, administrative data does not suffer from selection problems or issues with missing
data, such as attrition and non-response. Recently, there have been numerous advance-
ments in the econometric literature to solve policy problems in large data sets with the
help of machine learning methods (Mullainathan and Spiess, 2017, Athey, 2018, Huber,
2019). Promising applications in this respect are: estimating treatment effect heterogene-
ity, flexible modeling of treatment effects, and selecting from a high dimensional set of
covariates.
This thesis exploits modern econometric techniques and unique large-scale data sets to
identify and estimate causal and policy-relevant parameters. The first chapter investigates
the causal impact of an expansion in post-natal maternity leave coverage on children’s
health outcomes in the long-run. The second chapter analyses the causal effects of pro-
fessional football games on violent behavior. The third chapter examines the relationship
between local strike participation in climate strikes and electoral outcomes.2 The three
chapters are self-contained and can be read independently. A consolidated bibliography
can be found at the end of this thesis. The remainder of this section contains a brief
summary of each chapter and a discussion on common features shared by the individual
projects.
Chapter 1, Maternity Leave and Children’s Health Outcomes in the Long-Term3, assesses
the impact of the length of maternity leave on children’s health outcomes in the long-
run. Previous literature examining the effects of leave schemes has focused on either
short-run health or long-run educational attainment and labor market outcomes of chil-
dren. This chapter aims to fill the gap in existing literature by investigating the causal
effect of the length of maternity leave on children’s long-run health outcomes. My quasi-
experimental design evaluates an expansion in post-natal maternity leave coverage from
two to six months, which occurred in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1979. The expan-
sion came into effect after a sharp cutoff date and significantly increased the time working
mothers stayed at home with their newborns during the first six months after childbirth.
To establish causality, I leverage this cutoff date as a source of exogenous variation and
employ a difference-in-differences approach to account for seasonal birth effects. In the
analysis, I exploit German hospital registry data, which contains detailed information on
the universe of inpatients’ diagnoses from 1995-2014. By tracking the health of treated and
control children from age 16 up to age 35, this study provides new insights into the trajec-
tory of health differentials over the life-cycle. I find that the legislative change generated
positive long-term health effects: My intention-to-treat estimates show that children born
after the implementation of the reform experience fewer hospital admissions and are less
likely to be diagnosed with mental and behavioral disorders - the most frequent diagnosis
2In contrast to the first two chapters, chapter 3 does not claim causality. The identification of causal
effects is still work in progress at the time of submission.
3A version of this chapter has been published in the Journal of Health Economics (Fabel, 2021).
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type for individuals in the observed age group. The results are driven by fewer hospital-
izations among men and are more pronounced for individuals in their late 20s and after.
Furthermore, exploiting the fine granularity of the diagnoses codes, the results show that
treated males experience fewer mental and behavioral disorders due to the use of psychoac-
tive substances and fewer incidences of schizophrenia. The results imply substantial annual
health cost savings of about 6.6 million euros per birth cohort, just for the reduction in
mental and behavioral diseases alone. The chapter suggests that economically significant
benefits of maternity leave may be realized with quite a lag and in different areas than
what policymakers had in mind initially. Consequently, cost-benefit analyses could come
to wrong conclusions if the vast effects on children’s long-run health outcomes are not
accounted for.
Chapter 2, Crime Externalities from Football Games in Germany, investigates the causal
impact of professional football games on physical violence in Germany. I employ a gen-
eralized difference-in-differences strategy that exploits the variation in the timing of the
football games. I compare the number of assaults on days with and without football
matches while controlling for date heterogeneity, weather, and holidays. To examine the
effect of football games on assaults, I match geo-coded information on almost 4,500 games
with comprehensive crime registry data for the period 2011-2015. My results suggest that
a home game leads to a 21.5 percent increase in the assault rate. The effects are primarily
driven by male victims who do not know the perpetrator and decrease with the victims’
age. When investigating channels, I do not find evidence that emotional cues from un-
expected or unsettling events during the game would unleash physical violence. In fact,
there is suggestive evidence for other potential channels: spectators mimic the behavior
displayed on the field, violent viewers self-select into specific matches, and a pure agglom-
eration effect coming from spectators. My results show that the external effects of football
games on violent behavior are large in magnitude and economically relevant. To be precise,
professional football games explain almost 18 percent of all assault reports in the affected
regions and generate annual social costs of 95 million euros. By quantifying the criminal
externalities in the setting of professional football in Germany, this paper contributes to the
widely noticed debate on the reimbursement of costs associated with high-risk professional
football games.
Chapter 3, The Power of Youth: School Strikes for Climate and Electoral Outcomes, which
is joint work with Helmut Rainer and Maria Waldinger, analyses the relationship between
local participation rates in climate strikes, also known as Fridays for Future, and electoral
results from four elections in Germany in 2019. In that year, large crowds of protesters,
primarily students, gathered for weekly climate strikes to demand far-reaching, rapid, and
effective measures to mitigate climate change. Alone during the Global Week of Climate
Action in September 2019, more than 1.4 million people demonstrated in 550 places across
Germany. In the first part of the empirical analysis, we propose a local measure of strike
participation using cell phone-based tracking data. With the help of a rich fixed-effects
model, we remove the predictable variation in the number of journeys between origin-
destination pairs. The residualized journeys are matched with geo-coded locations of more
than 2,300 strikes and indicate how many participants attend a strike and where they come
from. In the second part of the empirical analysis, we investigate the relationship between
climate strike participation levels and electoral outcomes. Using a first-differences specifi-
cation, we show that municipalities with higher strike participation rates are more likely
to vote for the Green Party. Additionally, voter turnout is increasing with increasing levels
of strike participation. Our results are robust to alternative measurements of strike partic-
4 Preface
ipation. In economics, an extensive literature studies the intergenerational transmission of
values and political beliefs from parents to children. The results of this study suggest that
there may be a reverse transmission mechanism, namely that children have an impact on
their parent’s environmental awareness and preference for green politics.
The three chapters are the result of distinct research projects that I carried out during my
time as a Ph.D. student and, as such, differ along many dimensions. However, there are
common characteristics that are shared by all chapters throughout the dissertation, such
as the exploitation of novel large-scale data sets and clean identification strategies. To be
precise, the first chapter uses 20 years of hospital administrative data covering the universe
of inpatient cases in Germany. The empirical approach compares health outcomes of chil-
dren born around a cutoff date in the reform year to the outcomes of unaffected children
born around the same threshold but one year before the reform. The control group serves
the purpose of netting out seasonal effects and represents the counterfactual scenario, i.e.
what difference in health outcome would be expected around the threshold in absence of
the reform. This chapter benefits particularly from the aforementioned advantages asso-
ciated with administrative data. The local identification aspect requires a large number
of observations at the margin of the natural experiment (i.e. individuals born around the
cutoff date), which the hospital administrative data can easily provide with 20 million
observations per cross-section. Furthermore, the consistent coding of diseases according
to the World Health Organization’s classification system (ICD) allowed the tracking of
health differentials over two decades. The second chapter draws on crime register data
from the Federal Criminal Police Office, which contains more than 4.8 million individu-
als that became victims of crimes against their legally protected personal rights over the
five-year sample period. I enrich the register data containing precise information on the
time and the location of offenses with self-collected data from the web. I went to great
lengths to scrape information on detailed game statistics and pre-game betting odds for
almost 4,500 matches. After merging the data sources, I identify the causal impact of a
football game by employing a generalized difference-in-differences strategy. The counter-
factual rate of physical violence is obtained using the local assault rate in weeks where no
game is scheduled. The third chapter utilizes cell phone-based tracking data to measure
local climate strike participation rates. The data is obtained from the private sector and
translates mobile signals from customers of one of the largest carriers in Germany into a
daily number of journeys between two geographies. In a rich fixed effects model, we use 64
billion trips to remove the predictable variation in the number of journeys between origins
and destinations.
In the spirit of the credibility and the data revolution, this dissertation presents results us-
ing exciting novel data sets and transparent empirical strategies to address policy-relevant
research questions. I hope this dissertation will spark more debate and research on the
topics covered in the three chapters.
Chapter 1
Maternity Leave and Children’s
Health Outcomes in the Long-Term∗
1.1 Introduction
Over the last decades, family leave programs have been strongly promoted in large parts of
the Western hemisphere. The average length of paid maternity and parental leave across
all OECD countries rose from 14.0 weeks in 1970 to 55.4 weeks in 2016 (OECD, 2020).
Leave policies allow parents to take a break from work and focus on child care. These
leave schemes are based on evidence showing that the first year in a child’s life is essential
for subsequent child development (Currie and Almond, 2011). The impact of family leave
schemes goes beyond protecting against job dismissal and compensating income losses.
They have gained significant momentum as a policy tool in encouraging female employment
(Blau and Kahn, 2013) and fertility (Lalive and Zweimüller, 2009), advocating for gender
equality (Kotsadam and Finseraas, 2011), and safeguarding the well-being of mother and
child (Bütikofer et al., forthcoming). To achieve these goals, the German Federal Ministry
of Family Affairs is expected to pay 7.25 billion euros for parental leave in 2020.1 Previous
literature examining the effects of leave schemes has focused on either short-run health or
long-run educational attainment and labor market outcomes. However, evidence on the
effect of family leave policies on children’s health outcomes in the long-run remains scarce.
In this paper, I aim to fill the gap in existing literature by assessing the impact of the length
of maternity leave (ML) on children’s long-run health outcomes. My quasi-experimental de-
sign evaluates an unexpected expansion in post-natal ML coverage from two to six months,
which occurred in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1979. The expansion came into ef-
fect after a sharp cutoff date and significantly increased the time working mothers stayed
at home with their children during the first six months after childbirth. To estimate the
causal effect of the length of ML on child health outcomes, I exploit the exogenous variation
stemming from the reform, which provides a treatment assignment that is plausibly ran-
dom. All previously employed women who gave birth on or after May 1, 1979 were eligible
for six months of ML after childbirth. On the contrary, mothers who delivered their baby
∗A version of this chapter has been published in the Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 76, 102431, in
March 2021, doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2021.102431.
1This amount corresponds to just above 2% of the entire 2020 federal government budget (Federal
Ministry of Finance, 2020).
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before the cutoff date were entitled to only two months of job-protected ML. In order to
account for potential seasonal birth effects, I employ the following difference-in-differences
approach: I compare health differentials between children born in the months before and
after the implementation of the reform, with health differentials between children born in
the same calendar months but in the previous year, when no legislative change took place.
I exploit German hospital registry data containing detailed information about the universe
of inpatient cases for the years 1995 to 2014. By tracking health outcomes of individuals
aged 16-35 who, as children, were (or were not) exposed to the reform, I find significant
and robust evidence that the ML expansion improves children’s health over the life-cycle.
Children subject to the more generous leave scheme are on average 1.7 percent less likely
to be hospitalized. The results are driven by fewer hospital admissions among men and
are stronger for individuals in their late 20s and after. Additionally, using the diagnoses
codes of hospitalizations, the results show that the largest driver for the decline in hospital
admissions comes from a reduction in mental and behavioral disorders (MBDs). The
effects on MBDs mirror the overall results well, particularly with respect to age and gender
differences. MBDs not only bear the largest relative contribution in the reduction of
hospitalizations but they also resemble the most frequent diagnosis type for individuals in
the age group that are observed.2 Because of that importance in terms of effect size and
prevalence, I exploit the fine granularity of the diagnoses codes and study the effect of the
1979 ML reform on subcategories of MBDs. I find that treated males experience fewer
MBDs due to the use of psychoactive substances and fewer incidences of schizophrenia.
These results are consistent with Canetti et al. (1997) and Enns et al. (2002) who show
that parental bonding, in particular with the mother, is linked to the development of
mental disorders later in life.3 The results are robust to alternative specifications of the
dependent variable and the level of aggregation, different estimation approaches, and also
various placebo tests.
In order to elicit the possible underlying channels of the relationship between the ML
expansion and children’s long-run health outcomes, I compare the impact of the reform on
children’s health outcomes in rural and urban areas, as mothers in urban areas had a higher
propensity to work in 1979. The results show that the overall effects on hospitalization
and MBDs are driven mainly by urban areas. A greater labor force participation implies
that more mothers were eligible for ML and as a consequence, more children were affected
by the reduction of maternal labor supply. Taken together, the results suggest that the
reform had a larger impact on children’s health outcomes in regions where there was a
stronger reaction to the 1979 ML reform.
The notion that later-life outcomes originate from early childhood is not novel. Barker
(1990) postulated that conditions in-utero and during infancy have long-lasting effects on
later life health. Early experiences may influence adult physical and mental health in two
ways (Shonkoff et al., 2009). On the one hand, there is a cumulative process at play, in
which early experiences trigger a repetitive provocation of neurobiological responses that
may become pathogenic. On the other hand, the environment during key developmen-
tal stages is biologically embedded into regulatory physiological systems such that it can
impact adult disease and risk factors latently. In these sensitive periods, the developing
2Over the entire time frame, MBDs account for one-third of the hospital reductions. For individuals
aged 32-35, almost 50% of the reduction in hospitalizations is stemming from the decline in MBDs.
3Enns et al. (2002) show that "experiences with one’s mother were more consistently associated with
adult mental disorders [...] However, there appeared to be some unique effects for externalizing disorders
(substance use disorders and antisocial personality disorder) in males".
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brain’s architecture is modified considerably and is particularly sensitive to environmental
stimuli. In both cases, the effects of experiences made in early life may be latent initially
until the onset of a particular condition.
My results show that the 1979 ML expansion entails benefits that were not at the heart of
policy debates that surrounded its implementation. Yet, back-of-the-envelope calculations
based on my estimates indicate that the health effects of the ML expansion are substantial.
For instance, the reform leads, on average, to 370 fewer diagnoses of MBDs for one birth
cohort per year. This implies health cost savings of about 6.6 million euros per birth
cohort per annum, based on an estimated cost of 17,850 euros per MBD diagnosis.4 The
effects on MBDs are particularly interesting as this disease category is the most prevalent
among the age group under consideration (15-35 years). In addition, MBD inpatients have
on average the longest length of stay in comparison with other disease types.5 For these
reasons, MBDs are among the most expensive disease categories.
This paper complements various strands of the literature. At a very general level, it
relates to studies that try to explain the role of early childhood experiences in later life
outcomes.6 The majority of studies investigating the long-run impacts of ML, however,
focus on human capital accumulation and labor market outcomes and typically have two
common findings: positive effects of leave duration on child outcomes, or no effects at all.7
For instance, it has been documented that extending leave leads to higher cognitive skills
(Albagli and Rau, 2018), better PISA test scores (Danzer and Lavy, 2017), lower drop-
out rates from high school, and higher earnings of individuals when aged 30 (Carneiro
et al., 2015). On the other hand, some studies have found no effects on children’s test
scores and the propensity to graduate from high school (Dahl et al., 2016), or on children’s
years of schooling, wages, and the likelihood of full-time employment (Dustmann and
Schönberg, 2012). Second, this article relates to the literature on the impact of ML on
short-run health outcomes. In contrast to the previous literature field, the results in this
strand of the literature are less ambiguous. Expanding leave mandates have been shown
to have a positive impact on children’s health in the short-run.8 ML extensions improve
infants’ overall health and reduce asthma rates (Bullinger, 2019), decrease the incidence of
emotional disorders (Sayour, 2019), reduce the likelihood of early-term birth, and increase
newborns’ birth weights (Stearns, 2015).
This paper aims at combining the above-mentioned two strands of literature by provid-
ing causal estimates of the length of ML on child health outcomes in the long-run. Two
studies relate closely to this paper. First, Danzer et al. (forthcoming) evaluate an Aus-
trian reform from 1990 that increased paid and job-protected parental leave from 12 to 24
months. They find positive effects on children’s disability status up to age 23 and fitness
4The estimated social cost of 17,850 euros per MBD diagnosis is obtained by using data on the cost of
illnesses by disease for the age group 15-45 in 2015, as provided by Federal Statistical Office (2015).
5The average length of stay for MBD diagnoses is 20.1 days in comparison to a general average of 7.6
days (Federal Statistical Office, 2012, p. 5).
6Currie and Almond (2011) and Almond et al. (2018) offer detailed summaries of recent work in this
strand of research.
7Other studies investigate different features of leave schemes such as the benefit levels. For instance,
Ginja et al. (2020) find in the Swedish context that higher levels of parental leave benefits improve children’s
educational outcomes.
8The results of Beuchert et al. (2016) are a notable exception. They exploit a reform of the parental
leave scheme in Denmark and find null effects on children’s health outcomes in the first three years after
birth. The Danish reform increased post-birth ML by, on average, 32 days. The length of paid leave was
increased from 24 weeks (14 weeks maternity and 10 weeks of joint leave) to 46 weeks (14 ML + 32 joint).
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for military service (males only). Yet, they do not observe any effects of the Austrian
reform on children’s labor market outcomes. The authors also show effect heterogeneity
by counterfactual mode of care. Their analysis demonstrates that the positive effects are
driven by regions with no nurseries, i.e. regions where informal care is substituted with
maternal care. Second, Ahammer et al. (2020) examine an Austrian reform from 1974,
which expanded prenatal ML from six to eight weeks. They find no effect on outpatient
expenses and hospital days for individuals in Upper Austria when aged 25-40.
The empirical analysis in this paper expands previous literature on several dimensions. In
contrast to previous literature, this study is able to investigate the effect of a ML expansion
on an unusually broad range of health outcomes. Using the universe of inpatient cases
that were discharged from a hospital or rehabilitation facility, I examine the effects of the
1979 ML reform on the patients’ main diagnosis, which is coded according to the WHO’s
classification catalog. This way, I can investigate the effect of a ML expansion on many
relevant disease categories. Moreover, the institutional setting of Germany and the data
allow me to trace out the trajectory of health differentials across 20 years of children’s
adulthood (from age 16 up to age 35). The longitudinal structure of the data permits a
long-run perspective as children and hence, differentials are allowed to develop over time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides information
about the 1979 ML reform. Section 1.3 explains the data and variables. Section 1.4
discusses the empirical design. Section 1.5 reports results. Section 1.6 contains a discussion
of the conceptual framework and mechanisms. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Institutional Set-Up
In contrast to the United States, ML laws have been in existence much longer in Germany.9
Since the mid-1950s, employed mothers held the right to a paid protection period of six
weeks before and eight weeks after childbirth, during which they were not allowed to
work.10 During this so-called ‘mother protection period’, women were protected from
being dismissed and upon their return to work they had the right to be placed to a job
comparable to their prior assignment. The benefits in this period corresponded to a 100%
replacement rate and was equivalent to women’s average income over the three months
before childbirth.11 This pre-reform setting is to some extent comparable to the current
maximum of 12 weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave in the US (under the FMLA) and the
minimum of 14 weeks of paid, job-protected leave in the EU.12
9The following facts about ML and benefit legislation are based on information by Ondrich et al. (2002),
Schönberg and Ludsteck (2014), Dustmann and Schönberg (2012), and Zmarzlik et al. (1999). The leave
scheme described here does not correspond to the current system, which has been in place since 2007.
Kluve and Tamm (2013) offer a good overview of the present leave regulations.
10Before another reform took place in 1986, only mothers were eligible for job-protected leave.
11The payment was co-funded by public health insurance funds (750 Deutschmarks (DM) per month),
the federal government (400 DM, one-time payment) and employers (the remainder).
12Since the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), mothers in the US have been entitled to
leave if they worked for at least one year with their employer, accumulated a minimum of 1250 working
hours during that year, and if they worked for an employer with at least 50 employees (Baum, 2003).
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In 1979, the socio-liberal coalition of chancellor Helmut Schmidt passed a reform bill,
which introduced four extra months after the end of the mother protection period. In
other words, the total length of ML after childbirth (job protection and benefits) increased
from eight weeks to six months (see Appendix Figure A.4).13 The federal government
wanted primarily to safeguard maternal health after childbirth with the reform. However,
positive spill-over effects on the child were acknowledged.14 While the initial benefits of the
period from six weeks before and eight weeks after childbirth did not change, the payments
were equal to 750 DM from the third month after delivery. This amount corresponded to
approximately 44% of average pre-birth earnings in 1979 (Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014).
Although eligibility for ML was universal among working women, the approximated take-
up rate was low where only about 45% of mothers took advantage of the ML reform in
1979 (Dustmann and Schönberg, 2012).
The reform was initiated by a draft bill on January 5, 1979. The final law was ratified by
the German Bundesrat (the Upper House of the German Parliament) on May 19 and by the
German Bundestag (the Lower House) on June 22, 1979. All previously employed women
who gave birth on or after May 1, 1979 were eligible for six months of ML after childbirth.
In contrast, mothers who delivered their baby before the cutoff date were entitled to the
‘common’ two months of job-protected ML. It is noteworthy that strategic conceptions
were impossible due to the short period between the draft bill and when the reform took
effect. This implies that families in the sample of analysis could not adjust their fertility
behavior in response to the reform and the 1979 ML extension can and should therefore
be seen as a quasi-experiment. This issue is discussed in great detail in the Appendix.
1.2.2 Female Labor Force Participation and Childcare Situation
In April 1979, around 38% of the German labor force was comprised of women and almost
every second woman aged 15 to 65 years (49.7%) was active in the labor market (Federal
Statistical Office, 1981).15 Yet, there was pronounced heterogeneity in female labor force
participation rates. For instance, female labor market attachment was at 62.4% for singles,
45.2% for married, 32.5% for widowed, and 76.5% for divorced women. Additionally, there
was a strong gradient with respect to age. While 69.2% of all women aged between 20 and
25 years participated in the labor force, the share was 55.0% for women in the 30-35-year-
old age bracket.16 The high numbers for younger and single women indicate that a high
share of mothers-to-be was an active part of the labor force and thus eligible for ML.
Nevertheless, in addition to the female labor force participation rate, the counterfactual
mode of care had an impact on how the reform can alter children’s outcomes. Danzer et al.
(forthcoming) show that the 1990 parental leave expansion in Austria had a positive effect
on children in regions where there was no formal childcare. In other words, there were only
positive effects of the reform in cases when informal child care was substituted with parental
care. Hank and Kreyenfeld (2001) describe the childcare situation in West Germany in the
13Refer to: ‘Gesetz zur Einführung eines Mutterschutzurlaubes’ (Maternity leave law), Bundesgesetzblatt
(Federal law gazette), Part I, Nr. 32, p.797-802, 30.06.1979.
14Refer to: ‘Gesetzesentwurf der Bundesregierung’ (Draft bill), Drucksache 8/2613.
15As a comparison, 50.9% of all women (16+) in the US participated in the labor market at the same
time (see US Bureau of Labor Statistics).
1684% of all children were delivered by women aged 20 to 35 (Federal Statistical Office, 1981). In this
context, it is therefore relevant for the study to focus on this age group.
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late 1970s as a ‘patchwork [of ] childcare arrangements’, meaning that parents had to rely
on a broad range of care types, such as parental care, daycare centers, social networks, and
private childminders. The different forms of childcare, however, varied greatly in cost and
quality. In 1980, only 1.5% of children attended a public ‘Krippe’ (nursery for children
aged 0-3) (Konsortium Bildungsberichterstattung, 2006, p. 34).17 Since public daycare was
virtually non-existent, parents had to rely almost exclusively on informal care, apart from
parental care. Thus, the situation in the Federal Republic of Germany in the late 1970s
allowed for a substitution from informal arrangements to maternal care.
1.2.3 What We Already Know about the 1979 Maternity Leave Reform
To date, two studies by Dustmann and Schönberg (2012) and Schönberg and Ludsteck
(2014) have examined the effects of the 1979 ML reform.18 Overall, both papers show
that the reform had a large impact on mothers’ labor market outcomes, particularly in the
short-run.
First, many mothers adjusted their labor supply downwards during the four months of
extra leave and returned to the labor market as soon as the leave period terminated.
The long-run maternal labor supply (the time period beyond six months after childbirth),
however, was less affected. For instance, while the reform decreased the share of mothers
who returned to the labor market by the third month after childbirth by 30.5 percentage
points, the corresponding reduction at the 52nd month after childbirth is around one
percentage point. In total, the change of postnatal ML from two to six months caused
mothers to postpone their return to work by, on average, 0.835 months.19 Approximately
two-thirds of the decline in short-run female labor force participation was the result of a
contraction in full-time work.
Second, the ML expansion led to changes in mothers’ income. The overall increase in aver-
age cumulative total income was 1,700 DM.20 There were two effects on average available
income. On the one hand, there was a decline in available income as mothers returned to
work later because of the reform and received 750 DM, which corresponded to only 55%
of mothers’ average post-birth wage. On the other hand, there was an increase in avail-
able income for mothers who would have stayed at home even without the reform. The
second effect, which is a crowding out of unpaid leave, dominates the first one, such that
there is an overall increase in available income. The impact of the reform on cumulative
income varied substantially, depending on the position in the wage distribution: Mothers
in the lowest tercile of the wage distribution had 2,850 DM of additional income, while the
increase for women in the highest tercile amounted to 1,050 DM.
17In the 1970s, the provision of part-time care for pre-schoolers (4-6 years) was established. However,
parents did not have the legal entitlement to a slot in a public ‘Kindergarten’ until 1996. For toddlers (1-3
years), parents had a legal claim to a care slot in a ‘Krippe’ since 2013.
18Both, Dustmann and Schönberg (2012) and Schönberg and Ludsteck (2014) analyze the impact of the
ML expansion on maternal labor market outcomes. While the former study evaluates additionally changes
in child outcomes due to the reform, the latter focuses on maternal labor market outcomes and elicits more
in-depth results.
19This number corresponds to the number of months away from work in the first 40 months since
childbirth.
20Maternal cumulative total income is defined as the accumulated total income up to the point when the
child is 40 months old. It consists of monthly earnings when the mother is working, equals to the benefits
when she is on leave, and is zero otherwise.
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Although there were distinct effects on maternal labor market outcomes, particularly in
the short-run, Dustmann and Schönberg (2012) do not find evidence that the reform had
an impact on children’s educational attainment and labor market outcomes. There was no
effect of the reform on years of education, wages, or the share of individuals in full-time
employment.
1.3 Data
I use hospital register data spanning the period from 1995 to 2014, provided by the Research
Data Centers of the Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder.21
The register contains information on the universe of German inpatient cases; in the 2014
cross-section this amounts to 19.6 million observations. The administrative data covers
all patients that were discharged from any hospital or medical prevention/rehabilitation
facility in Germany in each reporting year.22 Unless otherwise noted, I restrict the sam-
ple to individuals belonging to either treatment or control cohort, defined as individuals
born between Nov 1978–Oct 1979 and Nov 1977–Oct 1978, respectively (see section 1.4 for
details). The data includes the patient’s main diagnosis, the length of stay, whether the pa-
tient died or underwent surgery, and in which medicating specialist department the patient
stayed the longest. Furthermore, the register contains socio-demographic characteristics
such as month and year of birth, gender, and postal code of the place of residence.
The main diagnosis indicates the major reason for the patient’s hospital admission. It is
coded according to the guidelines of the ‘International Statistical Classification of Diseases
and Related Health Problems’ (ICD), which are maintained by the World Health Organiza-
tion (WHO).23 Up to and including 1999, the coding had followed the ICD-9 classification,
since 2000 the ICD-10 system has been in place.24 Table A.2 in the Appendix provides a
summary of the frequencies of diagnosis categories. These categories are called chapters
and together constitute the hospitalization variable.25 In the pooled sample, "Injury, poi-
soning and certain other consequences of external causes" are the most frequent diagnosis
types, followed closely by MBDs, and diseases of the digestive system. A similar pattern
is observed in the cross-section: Appendix Figure A.5 gives an overview of the five most
common diseases and health problems across age brackets in 2014. For the age group
observed in the sample of analysis who are people between 15 and 35 years, MBDs are
the most common diagnoses (357 thousand diagnoses), followed by injuries (310 thousand
diagnoses), and diseases of the digestive system (260 thousand diagnoses).
Figure 1.1 illustrates trends in hospital admissions for the treatment and control cohort
from age 17 through 35. Panel A shows an S-shaped line for the number of admissions. The
rate of hospitalization increases until age 19 (35,000 cases per year), and then decreases
21Due to data confidentiality regulations, data access was provided on-site at the research data center.
22The data does not cover hospitals of the penal system and police hospitals. Military hospitals are
included to the extent to which they offer services to civilians. Medical prevention/rehabilitation centers
have been included since 2003 if they have more than 100 beds.
23Please note that the data exploits a German modification that is issued by the German Institute of
Medical Documentation (DIMDI) - a subordinate authority of the Federal Ministry of Health.
24The numbers of the ICD classification refer to the revision, which is in place at the year of reporting.
The ICD-9 classification is a 3 digit numeric code, whereas ICD-10 uses a 4 digit alphanumeric code.
25I exclude diagnoses related to "pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium" and others that occur
infrequently.
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Figure 1.1. Hospital admissions
Notes: The figure depicts the evolution of key variables for the treatment and control cohort (only pre-
threshold months, i.e. for individuals born between November 1977 and April 1978 as well as November
1978 and April 1979, respectively) over the ages from 17 to 35. The dark lines correspond to the treatment
cohorts, whereas control units are marked by light dashed lines. Hospital admissions are defined as the
sum of all diagnosis chapters listed in Panel A of Table A.2.
up to the age of 26 after which the number of admissions grows again (in 2014, there are
40,500 admissions). In panel B, it can be seen that the share of women decreases from
around 55% with the age of 17 to below 48% when aged 35. Panel C shows a reduction
in the average length of stay from 7.7 days to 6 days from the beginning to the end of the
observation period. Panel D shows a hump-shaped evolution of surgeries that are related
to hospitalizations. The share of surgeries increases up to the age of 22, and then declines
until the age of 26. After that age, the share of inpatients with a surgery remains constant
at around 35%.
For the analysis, I aggregate the number of diagnoses per chapter by birth month, birth
year, and reporting year, and define the outcomes as the number of diagnoses per 1,000 in-
dividuals.26 I use all hospitalizations of treatment and control individuals who reside in the
area of the former Federal Republic of Germany.27 The DiD baseline specification is there-
for made up of a pseudo-panel with 2×12×20 = 480 (cohorts×months-of-birth×reporting
years) observations. In order to abate any confounding effects that might be triggered by
26In my baseline specification, I use the monthly number of births in the denominator (based on Federal
vital statistics). In the robustness section, I present results with the approximated number of current
inhabitants on different regional levels. The advantage of using the original number of births is twofold.
First, it allows the tracing out of differentials over a longer period since the population data is only
available from 2003 onwards. Second, I avoid inducing measurement error in the dependent variable as
there is only information on the number of individuals aged x years. In order to obtain an approximate
number of persons per birth-month, I multiply the number of people per birth-year with month-of-birth
weights coming from either the German Micro Census or the original fertility distribution.
27Since Berlin cannot be assigned to either FRG or GDR unambiguously, it is dropped from the analysis.
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differential maturity between treatment and control group, I compare the two birth cohorts
at the same age. To achieve this, a control observation is shifted from period t to period
t + 1, which decreases the number of effective observations to 456. The shifting reduces
the number of observations at the beginning and the end of the observed time frame. For
instance, in 1995, the treatment (control) cohort is aged 16 (17). As there is no control
group that is aged 16, I drop these 12 months of the treatment group from the sample.
The control group that is already 17 years old is shifted to 1996. Analogously, I drop the
control cohort in 2014.
The data set has three main advantages. First, compared to survey data, the hospital
registry data covers the universe of German inpatient cases and is consequently not prone
to sampling errors or problems associated with attrition. Additionally, the large number
of patients provides sufficient statistical power to identify local effects. Second, due to
the longitudinal character of the data set, this study is able to trace out the trajectory of
children’s health differentials over 20 years of their adulthood. Third, measurement error
is unlikely to be present in the data on health outcomes. As the diagnosis code matters for
remuneration, the ICD code is of high quality. Moreover, in comparison with self-reported
survey data, administrative data does not suffer from issues related to social desirability
bias.
Nevertheless, the data set has various drawbacks. First, the source of data limits the
analysis to relatively severe health events, which are typically encountered in the context
of hospitals and medical prevention/rehabilitation centers. Yet, some health conditions,
which are diagnosed elsewhere, for instance at a general practitioner, could be more im-
pacted by the reform than the diagnoses observed. Second, although the registry data
is rich in both the number of cases and the quality of its entries, it contains only a few
socio-economic variables. This implies that apart from the average effects of the 1979 ML
reform, I am only able to perform heterogeneity analyses for selected subgroups. Lastly,
there is no information about the place of birth, implying that the region in which a pa-
tient is observed does not necessarily coincide with the patient’s place of birth. It would
be ideal to exclude individuals from the analysis whose mothers were not affected by the
reform, such as foreign-born children and children born in the German Democratic Re-
public (GDR). Yet, as I am unable to do so, the intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates are
reduced in size due to the infeasibility of separating unaffected from affected individuals.
The implicit assumption for unbiased estimates is that migration to the area of the former
FRG occurred at random with respect to the month-of-birth. To alleviate this concern
to some extent, I aggregate the baseline specification to the level of the former FRG and
GDR and use more disaggregated data only for the investigation of effect heterogeneity
and robustness tests. In doing so, I limit the impact of within region migration in the area
of the former FRG or GDR.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
In order to estimate the causal effect of the length of ML, I exploit the 1979 reform’s
eligibility rule, which is contingent on children’s birth date. Children born on/after the
specified birth cutoff date May 1, 1979 fell under the new regime, during which their
mothers were eligible for six months of ML after childbirth. Mothers of children born
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before the threshold were entitled to two months of postnatal leave. Assignment to one of
the two schemes is a deterministic function of the birth date of the child.
A regression discontinuity design (RDD) might constitute a first potential identification
strategy, in which one compares health outcomes of children born around the threshold.
The identifying assumption is that the children on both sides of the cutoff are on average
comparable, with the only notable exception that their mothers were entitled to different
lengths of ML. Table A.3 contains estimates from an RDD with a linear polynomial and
different slopes on both sides of the cutoff. Reassuringly, the direction and the magnitude
of the RDD estimates match the corresponding estimates from my preferred estimation
approach closely. However, the large standard errors illustrate the resulting precision
problem associated with discontinuity designs in this context. The lack of precision is
rooted in the fact that the birth date is only available at the monthly level.
The aggregation at the birth month level also entails other challenges. A large body
of literature suggests a strong relationship between season of birth (SOB), health, and
other socioeconomic outcomes.28 The estimated health differentials of children born before
and after the reform date could be biased if these SOB effects are not accounted for.
The estimated effect may be partly driven by the difference in health outcomes stemming
from the seasonality component rather than by the ML expansion itself. A difference-
in-discontinuities design could account for the SOB effects but suffers from the above-
mentioned precision problems. For this reason, I use the following difference-in-differences
(DiD) approach. Children born around May 1, 1979, the year of the reform, constitute the
treatment cohort, while children born around May 1, 1978 are part of the control cohort.29
I compare differences in health outcomes of treated children born before and after the
reform cutoff date to differences in health outcomes of control children born around the
same threshold, one year prior to the reform. This accounts for the seasonality component
while preserving the local identification aspect. The implicit identifying assumption is that
seasonality is time-invariant. In other words, treatment and control group share the same
SOB effects.
The main specification to estimate the effect of the length of ML on children’s health
outcomes corresponds to the following equation:30
Ymt = γ0 + γ1Treatm + γ2Afterm + γ3(Treatm ×Afterm) + ψm + ρt + εmt (1.1)
28The seasonality may come about due to reasons that are associated with either pre- or postnatal
factors. First, the seasonality might arise due to selective conception, i.e. the socioeconomic composition
of mothers varies over time (Buckles and Hungerman, 2013). Second, Currie and Schwandt (2013) argue
that SOB effects may come from seasonal patterns of in-utero disease prevalence (e.g. influenza) and
nutrition. Lastly, the seasonality with respect to time of birth may also be the result of postnatal social
factors such as age-based cutoff rules at school-entry (Black et al., 2011).
29Dustmann and Schönberg (2012) use in total three birth cohorts as control groups, two cohorts before
and one cohort after the treatment cohort: group 1 born 11/1976-10/1976, group 2 born 11/1977-10/1978,
and group 3 born 11/1979-10/1980. I choose individuals born one year before the reform as control group
for the main specification. This is done for two reasons. First, with more cohorts as control groups, it may
be less likely that the identifying assumption (time-invariance of seasonality) holds. Second, taking a birth
cohort in the year after the policy change as control group might invalidate the comparability between
treatment and control group, as parents might have had enough time to adjust their fertility behavior.
Nevertheless, I present results with the addition of more control cohorts in the robustness section.
30The estimation procedure can also be found in similar contexts in Lalive and Zweimüller (2009),
Dustmann and Schönberg (2012), Ekberg et al. (2013), Schönberg and Ludsteck (2014), Lalive et al.
(2014), Danzer and Lavy (2017), Avdic and Karimi (2018), and Huebener et al. (2019).
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where Ymt is the number of diagnoses per thousand individuals of the cohort born in month
m, at time t. The treatment cohort is represented by Treatm, a dichotomous variable equal
to one for groups that are born in the months before and after the legislation change, and
zero otherwise. The analysis presents results for different estimation windows around the
threshold date. In the widest specification, the treatment cohort includes children born
between November 1978 and October 1979, implying a bandwidth of half a year around
the cutoff. Afterm is a dummy variable that is equal to one if individuals are born in the
month of May and after, i.e. born in May-October in the widest specification, for both
treatment and control cohorts. ψm, ρt are month-of-birth and reporting year fixed effects,
respectively. Initially, Ymt corresponds to outcomes observed over the pooled time period
between 1995 and 2014. Subsequently, I break up the entire time frame in different age
groups and apply a life-course approach by running the regression for each year of life
separately. The parameter of interest is γ3, which captures the effect of the policy change
on health outcomes. As there is no information on whether the children’s mothers were on
leave, the identified parameter should be taken as the intention-to-treat effect.31
Standard errors are clustered at the birth month × birth year level to account for the likely
correlation of the error εmt over time for a given month of birth cohort.
The Appendix covers potential threats to the validity of the study design, both at the cutoff
date (self-selection into treatment) and across the distribution of birth months (seasonality
and age of school entry effects). An examination of the number of births around the
threshold reveals no evidence that parents strategically delayed births in the reform year,
which lends support to the use of the 1979 ML reform as a valid natural experiment.
Nonetheless, to rule out the possibility that strategic changes in fertility and delivery pose
a threat to the identification strategy, I test the robustness of the results by applying a
‘Donut’ specification, in which I exclude children who were born in the month before and
after the policy was implemented.
1.5 Results
1.5.1 Hospital Admissions
Table 1.1 reports DiD estimates of the impact of the ML expansion on hospital admissions,
using the specification in equation 1.1. The dependent variable is the hospitalization rate,
which is defined as the annual number of hospital admissions per 1,000 individuals.32 Panel
A presents ITT results based on the pooled data for the years 1995 to 2014 (age 17 to 35).
The baseline coefficient in column 1 suggests that the ML reform significantly reduces the
fraction of annual inpatient treatments in hospitals by an average of 2.1 cases per 1,000
31The ITT effect identifies the causal effect of being assigned to treatment, which is labeled as the
reduced form in an instrumental variables setting. To get to the local average treatment effect, the effect
on compliers, the ITT is divided by the first stage (Angrist and Pischke, 2009). To give the resulting
Wald estimand a causal interpretation, you need to assume, next to a standard monotonicity assumption,
that the 1979 ML reform affected all determinants of child development only through the reduction in
maternal employment (exclusion restriction) (Dustmann and Schönberg, 2012). In the concrete example,
you divide the ITT estimates by 0.45× 0.835 = 0.377 (share mothers taking ML × reduction in maternal
labor supply) to obtain the effect of spending one additional month away from work after childbirth on
children’s health outcomes.
32The dependent variables are defined on the level of the MOB cohort and aggregated to the area of the
former FRG.
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Table 1.1. ITT effects on hospital admission
Estimation window
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
6M 5M 4M 3M Donut
Panel A. Over entire length of the life-course
Overall -2.076∗∗ -1.872∗ -2.176∗ -2.214 -2.576∗∗∗
(0.772) (0.905) (1.126) (1.399) (0.813)
Dependent mean 121.1 121.0 121.5 123.3 121.9
Effect in SDs [%] 18.88 16.67 18.77 19.21 23.29
N (MOB × year) 456 380 304 228 380
Panel B. Age brackets
Age 17-21 -1.517 -0.590 -0.735 -1.095 -1.963∗∗
(0.946) (0.995) (1.198) (1.603) (0.931)
Age 22-26 -0.611 -0.613 -0.667 -0.735 -1.080
(0.937) (1.113) (1.412) (1.672) (1.012)
Age 27-31 -2.665∗∗∗ -3.015∗∗∗ -3.209∗∗ -2.546∗ -2.974∗∗∗
(0.826) (0.909) (1.132) (1.375) (0.949)
Age 32-35 -3.869∗∗∗ -3.619∗∗ -4.572∗∗∗ -5.045∗∗ -4.717∗∗∗
(1.083) (1.277) (1.460) (1.721) (1.191)
Notes: The table shows DiD estimates of the 1979 maternity leave reform on hospital
admission for different estimation windows around the cutoff. The ‘Donut’ specification uses
a bandwidth of half a year and excludes children born in April and May. Panel A shows the
effect for the entire pooled time frame and panel B reports estimates per age bracket. The
outcome variables are defined as the number of cases per thousand individuals. All regressions
control for year and month-of-birth fixed effects. The control group is comprised of children
that are born in the same months but one year before the reform (i.e. children born between
November 1977 and October 1978). In order to compare the two birth cohorts at the same age,
I shift the control cohort from wave t to wave t + 1. The dependent mean and the effect size
in standard deviation units correspond to pre-reform values of the treated group. Table A.4
contains the number of observations for the estimations per age bracket. Clustered standard
errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
individuals. This corresponds to a reduction of 1.7% from the pre-treatment mean. The
point estimate is robust to using narrower estimation windows, as shown in columns 2
- 4, and to excluding children born close to the cutoff, as presented in column 5. The
results obtained when using narrower bandwidths are less precisely estimated due to the
smaller sample sizes. However, the point estimates do not differ significantly across the
specifications. Panel B contains DiD estimates when dividing the pooled sample into four
age brackets and estimating the model for each group separately. Although all estimates
are negative, the coefficients for the age cohorts 17-21 as well as 22-26 are small and not
significantly different from zero. The average effect on hospitalizations for the age groups
27-31 and 32-35 on the other hand, is large and significant. Consequently, the results
indicate that the reform’s impact on hospitalization rates is increasing with children’s age.
In the next step, I explore whether these general findings hold similarly for men and
women. Table 1.2 shows the effect of the 1979 ML reform on hospital admissions for women



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































women.33 Furthermore, the effects for women are less robust to the choice of bandwidth
than the effects for men, which mirror the overall effects from Table 1.1 closely. The DiD
estimates suggest that men, whose mothers were eligible for extended leave duration, have
lower hospitalization rates, irrespective of the estimation window. In the pooled sample, I
find an average reduction of 2.4 fewer hospital admissions per 1,000 individuals. Moreover,
the effects for males increase in size the older men become.34
A finer granularity with respect to age helps to identify the periods when the effects of
the reform are particularly salient. The top panels of Figure 1.2 show year-by-year pre-
threshold means (born November-April) for the treatment (1978/79) and control (1977/78)
cohort (ranging from age 17 up to 35). Importantly for identification, they demonstrate
that hospitalization rates for children born before the cutoff in the treatment and control
year are parallel over the years. The bottom panels of Figure 1.2 display the trajectories of
yearly hospitalization differentials over the same time period.35 I estimate the specification
in equation 1.1 for each year and plot the DiD estimates across time. Column a) shows the
effect on all hospital admissions over the life-course. Overall, the average reform effect is
close to zero for younger ages, but grows in magnitude and becomes significantly different
from zero for older ages. This negative trend, which reflects a growing positive health
effect of the reform, is more pronounced for men (column c): The positive health impact
of the reform seems to increase with age. In contrast, the figure for women (column b)
does not reveal a similar and clear picture: While there are several significant reductions
in hospitalization rates for older ages, there is no significant effect of the reform at age 35.
1.5.2 Diagnosis Chapters
What is driving the significant reductions in hospitalization rates? I exploit the detailed
reporting on the main diagnosis related to each hospitalization case in the data and assess
the effect of extended ML on the components of hospitalizations. For clarification, the
dependent variables now refer to the number of specific diagnoses, grouped in 13 chapters,
per 1,000 individuals.36
Figure 1.3 plots DiD estimates of the policy effect on the incidence rate per diagnosis
chapter for all patients (panel A) as well as for women and men separately (panels B
and C). The estimates are based on the pooled sample and a bandwidth of six months. In
addition to the estimates, each panel shows the frequency distribution across chapters from
1995 to 2014. The results in panel A (all hospitalizations, irrespective of gender) illustrate
that almost all point estimates are either negative or not significantly different from zero.
This implies that it is unlikely the expansion has a detrimental effect on any long-run child
33Yet, the baseline means are not significantly different from each other.
34Table A.5 contains a robustness check when using the full sample and interactions of Treat × After
with the age brackets. The interaction of being born after the threshold in the treatment year with the
age groups addresses potential serial correlation of the errors for a given month of birth cohort. Compared
to the baseline results of having different regressions for each age group, the two key insights remain the
same. The largest effects are observed for men and in the oldest age bracket. In contrast to the baseline
effects, men show significant reductions in hospitalizations in the youngest age bracket, and women have
lower hospitalization rates in the oldest age bracket.
35I still control for any maturity effects and compare outcomes of treatment and control cohorts measured
at the same age. Year fixed effects ρt have to be omitted from the specification due to collinearity.
36Panel A of Table A.2 presents an overview of the diagnosis chapters.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.3. ITT effects on hospital admission and main diagnoses chapters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overall Age brackets [years]
17-21 22-26 27-31 32-35
Hospital -2.076∗∗ -1.517 -0.611 -2.665∗∗∗ -3.869∗∗∗
(0.772) (0.946) (0.937) (0.826) (1.083)
IPD -0.0763∗ 0.0130 -0.162 -0.126∗∗ -0.0197
(0.0379) (0.0680) (0.108) (0.0548) (0.111)
Neo 0.0221 -0.198 0.336∗∗ 0.121 -0.217
(0.0917) (0.155) (0.139) (0.102) (0.164)
MBD -0.621∗∗ 0.174 -0.00769 -1.000∗∗ -1.906∗∗∗
(0.242) (0.263) (0.420) (0.357) (0.372)
Ner 0.0444 -0.0919 0.238∗∗∗ 0.0374 -0.0190
(0.0564) (0.0558) (0.0751) (0.0963) (0.126)
Sen -0.170∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗ -0.0990∗ -0.172∗∗ -0.261∗∗
(0.0292) (0.0626) (0.0518) (0.0640) (0.0998)
Cir -0.0981 -0.0466 0.0311 -0.199∗ -0.198
(0.0632) (0.0782) (0.0812) (0.0994) (0.162)
Res -0.239∗∗∗ -0.369∗∗ -0.199∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗ -0.0842
(0.0736) (0.173) (0.0694) (0.107) (0.167)
Dig -0.441∗∗∗ -0.421∗∗ -0.485∗ -0.376 -0.494
(0.137) (0.177) (0.257) (0.227) (0.361)
SST 0.101∗∗ 0.0567 0.186∗∗ 0.152∗ -0.0149
(0.0385) (0.0947) (0.0721) (0.0882) (0.120)
Mus -0.0304 -0.0260 -0.155 -0.0562 0.152
(0.0619) (0.0884) (0.172) (0.141) (0.158)
Gen 0.0524 0.241 0.180 -0.194 -0.0356
(0.111) (0.159) (0.207) (0.235) (0.159)
Sym -0.0853 -0.175 0.112 -0.164∗∗ -0.122
(0.0704) (0.151) (0.0988) (0.0604) (0.103)
Ext -0.543∗∗∗ -0.460 -0.685∗∗∗ -0.429∗∗ -0.612∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.328) (0.230) (0.193) (0.135)
N (MOB × year) 456 120 120 120 96
Notes: This table reports DiD estimates across the main diagnosis chapters for the entire life-
course or per age bracket. Each row corresponds to a different estimation with the number of
diagnoses per 1,000 individuals. See Table 1.1 for additional details. Clustered standard errors
are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Legend: Infectious and parasitic diseases (IPD), neoplasms (Neo), mental and behavioral disor-
ders (MBD), diseases of the nervous system (Ner), diseases of the sense organs (Sen), diseases of
the circulatory system (Cir), diseases of the respiratory system (Res), diseases of the digestive
system (Dig), diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue (SST), diseases of the musculoskele-
tal system (Mus), diseases of the genitourinary system (Gen), symptoms, signs, and ill-defined
conditions (Sym), injury, poisoning and certain other consequences of external causes (Ext).
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health outcome, as represented by the chapters in use.37 Furthermore, the ML extension
has the largest impact on MBDs, followed by consequences of external causes (injuries),
diseases of the digestive system, and respiratory maladies. Comparing the results against
the frequency of diagnoses chapters, the strong effect on MBDs is striking as this diagnosis
chapter has a particularly high prevalence rate among this age group. When looking at
heterogeneous effects across genders, the largest impact for both women and men occur for
the chapter that is among the most frequently diagnosed. For women, the largest reduction
in hospitalizations is the result of fewer diagnoses of digestive diseases, whereas for males
the reduction stems from fewer diagnoses of MBDs.
Breaking up the analysis by age group generates additional insights. Table 1.3 contains
DiD estimates of the impact of the ML expansion on the main diagnosis chapters for all
inpatients. Column 1 reports the effect on the pooled sample and is equivalent to the
estimates in the graphical representation. Columns 2 to 5 list the impact of the expansion
on the main diagnosis chapter per age bracket.38 Some chapters exhibit increasing health
differentials as individuals grow older. This is especially the case for MBDs, which resemble
the overall effects of hospital admissions. In general, MBDs account for the largest relative
contribution in hospitalization reduction. In the pooled sample, MBDs account for one-
third of the reduction in hospitalizations, and in the last age bracket (32-35 years of age) the
importance of this diagnosis chapter for the drop in hospitalizations rises to almost 50%.
The effects on injuries are responsible for almost one-fourth of the reduction in hospital
admissions and are mostly constant across age groups. The estimates indicate that there
are, on average, between 0.4 and 0.7 fewer injuries per 1,000 individuals across age groups.
Other chapters display differentials that fade out with increasing age, such as diseases of
the digestive system (around 0.4 fewer diagnoses per 1,000 individuals, which corresponds
to 20 percent of the decline in hospitalizations) and respiratory maladies (0.2-0.4 fewer
diagnoses per 1,000 individuals; ∼ 11 percent of the decline in hospitalizations).
1.5.3 Mental and Behavioral Disorders
MBDs stand out in terms of importance for the overall effect of the ML reform on hos-
pitalizations and its prevalence in the age group under consideration. For this reason,
Table 1.4 presents more refined evidence by reporting DiD estimates for the effect of the
ML expansion on the diagnosis of MBDs for all inpatients. The coefficient of the pooled
sample in Panel A, column 1 suggests that over the entire time frame, there are on av-
erage 0.6 fewer diagnoses of MBDs per 1,000 individuals. This corresponds to a decline
of 3.2% from the pre-treatment mean. When looking at the effects per age bracket, as
shown in Panel B, no significant effects for younger cohorts and an increasing impact of
the ML expansion with children’s age are observed. Table 1.5 shows the effects for women
and men separately. While the estimates for women are close to zero and not statistically
significant from zero, the magnitude of the effects for men is large. In the pooled sample,
I find an average reduction of 1.2 MBD diagnoses per 1,000 individuals for men who were
born after the ML expansion. When considering the estimates per age bracket, there is
a similar pattern to hospitalization rates: Health differentials open up from the age of 27
37Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue are a notable exception. Their positive DiD estimate is,
albeit small in magnitude, statistically significant at the 5 percent level. As such, the unexpected positive
coefficient might be a statistical aberration, but it contravenes my hypothesis of favorable health effects.
38Appendix Figure A.8 shows the respective life-course figures for each diagnosis chapter.
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Table 1.4. ITT effects on mental & behavioral disorders
Estimation window
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
6M 5M 4M 3M Donut
Panel A. Over entire length of the life-course
Overall -0.621∗∗ -0.734∗∗ -0.853∗∗ -0.688 -0.789∗∗∗
(0.242) (0.272) (0.336) (0.423) (0.262)
Dependent mean 19.57 19.59 19.67 19.84 19.77
Effect in SDs [%] 12.44 14.39 16.43 13.07 15.92
N (MOB × year) 456 380 304 228 380
Panel B. Age brackets
Age 17-21 0.174 0.268 0.318 0.135 -0.0603
(0.263) (0.314) (0.387) (0.516) (0.239)
Age 22-26 -0.00769 -0.146 -0.172 0.343 -0.360
(0.420) (0.500) (0.607) (0.640) (0.454)
Age 27-31 -1.000∗∗ -1.301∗∗∗ -1.508∗∗∗ -1.258∗∗ -1.020∗∗
(0.357) (0.391) (0.478) (0.546) (0.433)
Age 32-35 -1.906∗∗∗ -2.015∗∗∗ -2.352∗∗∗ -2.293∗∗∗ -1.949∗∗∗
(0.372) (0.295) (0.305) (0.365) (0.439)
Notes: The table shows DiD estimates of the 1979 maternity leave reform on mental and
behavioral disorders for different estimation windows around the cutoff. The ‘Donut’ specifi-
cation uses a bandwidth of half a year and excludes children born in April and May. Panel A
shows the effect for the entire pooled time frame and panel B breaks the life-course up in age
brackets. The outcome variables are defined as the number of cases per thousand individuals.
All regressions control for year and month-of-birth fixed effects. The control group is comprised
of children that are born in the same months but one year before the reform (i.e. children born
between November 1977 and October 1978). In order to compare the two birth cohorts at the
same age, I shift the control cohort from wave t to wave t + 1. The dependent mean and the
effect size in standard deviation units correspond to pre-reform values of the treated group.
Table A.4 contains the number of observations for the estimations per age bracket. Clustered
standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
and further increase towards the end of the observed time span. The bottom panels of
Figure 1.4 shows the corresponding life-course graphs, which confirm the findings obtained
from the tables. Column a) shows DiD estimates on a yearly basis for all diagnoses related
to MBD. The life-course graph illustrates that at younger ages the effect of the legislation
change is close to zero and insignificant. Yet, the estimates grow in magnitude and become
statistically significant for older cohorts. Overall, the reduction in MBD diagnoses at older
ages appear to be driven by males. Their life-course graph exhibits even more pronounced
features than the corresponding one for all cases in panel a). In contrast, the differentials
for women do not appear to follow a visible trend. The top panels in Figure 1.4 show that
the parallel trends assumption holds as the difference in pre-threshold means of treatment
and control cohort is reasonably constant over time.
Next, I investigate the drivers for the reduction in MBDs in response to the 1979 ML
reform. To do so, I make use of the detailed coding in the ICD classification system and
investigate the effect on diseases that constitute the chapter of mental and behavioral




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































diseases (henceforth called subdiagnoses or subcategories).39 Appendix Figure A.6 shows
the temporal variation in the composition of mental and behavioral diseases. In 2014, the
endpoint of the sample, the five most frequent MBDs are (in descending order): mental
and behavioral disorders due to the use of psychoactive substances, schizophrenia, affective
disorders, neuroses, and finally personality disorders. These five subcategories constitute
more than 95% of all MBDs. Figure 1.5 shows DiD estimates of the legislation effect
and incidence rates of the subcategories of MBDs.40 Panel A shows that the reduction in
MBDs is the result of fewer diagnoses related to the use of psychoactive substances and
fewer incidences of schizophrenia. When considering effect heterogeneity by gender, it can
be seen that the reduction is driven by fewer diagnoses for males.
1.5.4 Robustness Tests
I perform several sensitivity and placebo tests to assess the robustness of the findings. The
results of these checks are reported in Table 1.6. Overall, the sensitivity tests demonstrate
that the main results are robust to alternative specifications and estimations, indicating
that the ML reform significantly reduces hospitalization rates between the ages 17 to 35,
and particularly for men.
Alternative Specifications.—First, I test whether the results are sensitive to an alter-
native specification of the dependent variable, namely the number of diagnoses per 1,000
individuals born in a specific month-year combination. Due to the lack of yearly popula-
tion figures on the level of month-of-birth in a given year-of-birth, I thus resort in the main
analysis to the number of births per birth month as denominator, which is time-invariant.
However, over time, this denominator might reflect the actual population size of a given
MOB cohort imperfectly (due to migration or death). Therefore, I construct an alternative
denominator using actual annual population figures by year of birth, weighted by the rel-
ative frequency of births across birth months in that particular year of birth.41 Column 2
in Table 1.6 shows that my results are robust to the use of this alternative denominator.42
Second, I show that the results are not sensitive to a different level of aggregation. For this
exercise, I spatially disaggregate the data and create a regional panel for 204 labor market
regions (LMR) in West Germany covering the years 2003 - 2014. Figure A.7 contains a map
with the LMR used in the analysis. The dependent variable is using the same denominator
specification as in the preceding robustness test, but on the regional level of the LMR. In
order to avoid potentially confounding effects, I include region fixed effects.43 Column 3
39For instance, the chapter of mental and behavioral diseases has codes starting with F00-F99. In this
exercise I go one level deeper and look at the effect of the reform on, for example, affective disorders, which
are grouped in the codes F30-F39. Panel B of Table A.2 in the Appendix defines the subcategories of the
mental and behavioral diseases chapter.
40Appendix Table A.6 presents results when dividing the pooled sample into four age brackets. The
reductions in the subcategories are experienced by the age cohorts 27-31 and 32-35, and tend to get larger
with increasing age.
41For instance, to get the number of people born in May 1979 who live in Germany in 2014, I use the
number of people born in 1979 (observed in 2014) and weigh them with the fraction births in May 1979births in 1979 .
42The number of observations is smaller since the statistics on annual population size by birth month
and year are only available since 2003.
43The corresponding regression specification is as follows (regions are weighted by population):
Ymrt = γ0 + γ1Treatm + γ2Afterm + γ3(Treatm ×Afterm) + ψm + φr + ρt + εmrt.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































presents estimates based on the regional panel data that are similar to the main results.
Alternative Estimations.—In the next step, I investigate the effect of changes in the
estimation approach. First, column 4 of Table 1.6 reports estimates based on a triple-
differences (DDD) approach. The additional control group is comprised of individuals
living on the territory of the former GDR (East Germany). The underlying idea is that
children (and their mothers) born in East Germany in 1979 were not affected by the West
German 1979 ML reform and should consequently resemble a valid comparison group,
conditional on the common trend assumption. Importantly, this specification allows me
to net out general time trends in the outcome variables that might affect the results. The
corresponding triple-differences model is as follows:
Ymt = β0 + β1Treatm + β2Afterm + β3FRGm
+ β4(Treatm ×Afterm) + β5(Treatm × FRGm) + β6(Afterm × FRGm)
+ β7(Treatm ×Afterm × FRGm) + ψm + ρt + εmt (1.2)
which now contains an additional dummy variable FRGm (West Germany) as well as
interactions of this group with the treatment cohort 1979 (Treatm), children born in/after
May (Afterm) and with the interaction term Treatm × Afterm. The parameter of interest
is β7, which captures the impact of the 1979 ML reform on health outcomes. Likewise, the
general pattern of the main results remains robust to this alternative estimation. While the
estimates become less precise, the point estimates increase slightly but not significantly.
Second, as a further sensitivity test, I re-estimate the main regression equation including
an additional control group next to the one defined in section 1.4. The additional control
group is comprised of children born in the months around the threshold month of May, but
two years before the reform took place (i.e. around May 1977). The advantage of including
another pre-reform West German birth cohort is that it may account better for systematic
month-of-birth patterns in hospitalization rates due to a larger sample size. The estimates
from this approach can be found in column 5. Once again, the results and pattern of the
baseline results hold when adding this additional control cohort.
A potential concern is that the 1979 ML reform had positive spillover effects on siblings of
treated children, which may be motivated by more time with the mother, better maternal
health, among other reasons (see discussion next section). Positive spillover effects would
imply a violation of the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) and the obtained
DiD estimates would represent a lower bound of the true effect. The baseline specification
uses the cohort born one year prior to the treatment cohort. On the one hand, this helps to
limit the possibility of spillover effects as they would only be present in case of very short
birth spacing. On the other hand, the close temporal proximity to the treatment cohort
may be problematic, as siblings close in age will benefit more from the ML expansion than
older siblings. The previous robustness check addresses this issue by including another
older control cohort. Figure A.10 goes one step further and presents suggestive evidence
supporting SUTVA. If spillovers were present, one would expect the estimates to vary in
magnitude, dependent on which control group is used. However, the DiD estimates of the
effect of the 1979 ML reform on hospitalizations are fairly stable and reflect the results
from the baseline specification well, irrespective of whether the control group is composed
of the cohort born one, two, three, or four years before the treatment group. The same is
true for the estimates by gender.
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Placebo Tests.—I perform two placebo tests to validate my identifying assumptions:
First, I run a temporal placebo and test whether the estimated effects are caused by chil-
dren eligible to the more generous ML regime and not by an underlying general time trend
affecting children born post-April. For this exercise, I use the two pre-reform birth cohorts
1978 and 1977, using May 1, 1978 as the placebo reform date. The estimates from this
placebo analysis can be found in column 6. Second, I run a spatial placebo analysis and re-
estimate the baseline DiD specification but substitute it with the sample of East German
individuals who were not affected by the reform. Column 7 shows the estimates of this
placebo analysis. In support of the internal validity of the main estimates, both placebo
tests yield insignificant effects, further suggesting that the West German ML reform caused
a reduction in hospital admissions.
Mental and Behavioral Disorders.—Since this diagnosis chapter plays a central role
in this analysis, I run the same set of sensitivity test as for hospital admissions. The results
are presented in Table A.7 in the Appendix, and show that the main estimates are robust
to the different specifications and estimation procedures.
1.6 Discussion
1.6.1 Conceptual Framework for Long-Run Health Effects
The notion that later-life outcomes originate from early childhood is not novel. In 1990,
Barker postulated that conditions in-utero and during infancy have long-lasting effects on
later life health. In the study by Shonkoff et al. (2009), adult physical and mental well-
being was found to be influenced by early experiences, both good and bad, in at least two
ways.
On the one hand, early experiences operate via a cumulative process, in which physically
and psychologically stressful events are experienced repetitively. The persistent experience
of stressful events subsequently causes a constant provocation of neurobiological responses,
which may precipitate chronic health impairments. Under normal circumstances, however,
these responses are healthy and protective because they help to cope with stress.44 Yet,
due to the repetitive activation, the neurobiological reactions may become pathogenic.
On the other hand, the environment at critical developmental stages is biologically embedded
into regulatory physiological systems such that it can impact adult disease and risk factors
latently. During these sensitive periods, the developing brain’s architecture is modified
considerably and is particularly susceptible to environmental stimuli. The process in which
experiences are ‘programmed’ into the brain’s architecture starts in the embryonic state
and culminates in the first years of life (Räikkönen et al., 2012). As not all brain circuits
develop at the same time, the timing of the experience is crucial.45 A stimulus has the
highest impact on the region of the brain that is undergoing the most changes.46 During
44The neurobiological reactions can include the release of stress hormones, higher blood pressure and
heart rate, and the protective mobilization of nutrients, among others. See for example McEwen (1998)
and Shonkoff et al. (2009).
45See the ‘life-cycle’ model of stress (Lupien et al., 2009).
46The effects on later life health impairment are not only determined by the timing but also by the type
of the experience (Räikkönen et al., 2012).
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infancy, the period of life that is affected by the reform, the hippocampus is the area
of the brain that matures most rapidly and is consequently more vulnerable to stimuli
than during other stages. This region has been documented to regulate emotions, social
behavior, stress responsiveness, and ultimately mental health (Center on the Developing
Child at Harvard University, 2016, Shonkoff et al., 2009).
Irrespective of the mechanism at play (the cumulative exposure and the biological embed-
ding), the effects of experiences made in early life may be latent at first until the onset of
a particular condition (Almond and Currie, 2011). The time lag could be many years, or
even decades (Shonkoff et al., 2009).
1.6.2 Potential Mechanisms
How did the 1979 ML reform affect children’s health outcomes in the long-run? After
demonstrating that the reform had a higher impact in areas where potentially more women
were eligible, I provide a short theoretic discussion on how the 1979 ML reform may have
altered the child’s environment.
As previously discussed, working mothers postponed their return to work in response to the
reform (Dustmann and Schönberg, 2012, Schönberg and Ludsteck, 2014), which allowed
more maternal time and family income during a crucial period in a child’s development. In
the following, I present suggestive evidence for these mechanisms by leveraging heteroge-
neous eligibility for ML. In particular, I assess whether the reform has a different impact on
children’s health in rural and urban areas. One reason why I might estimate a differential
impact of the reform is that mothers in urban and rural regions differed in their propensity
to work. Female labor force participation rates have traditionally been higher in urban
areas (Bender and Hirschenauer, 1993), which imply a higher share of eligible mothers in
these regions (as only working mothers were eligible for ML). With relatively more children
affected by the reform, I expect the ITT estimates to be larger in urban areas. To shed light
on maternal return to work behavior as a potential mechanism, I use the regional panel on
inpatient cases, as defined by the first set of robustness sets - see column 3 in Table 1.6.
Table 1.7 contains DiD estimates for the effect of the ML expansion on health outcomes
for inpatients living in rural and urban areas. I label labor market regions as urban if their
population density exceeds the median value of all regions.47 Panel A presents the impact
on hospital admissions. Although the estimates have roughly the same size, the standard
errors in the urban sample are considerably smaller. Similarly, Panel B shows that urban
areas drive the effect on MBDs. The impact of the reform on MBDs in rural areas is not
significantly different from zero, whereas the effects in urban areas are large in magnitude
and statistically significant.
Taken together, the finding that urban areas drive the overall effects is consistent with
the idea that the reform had a larger impact on regions where there were higher female
labor force participation rates and hence more women were eligible for ML in 1979. In
the next step, I discuss potential mechanisms through which the reform could affect child
health outcomes. For this purpose, I consider differences in care quality, parental health
differentials, and changes in family income as potential pathways.
47Appendix Figure A.7 shows the spatial variation of population density across German labor market
regions.
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Panel A: Hospital admissions
DiD estimate -1.654 -1.799∗∗∗
(1.096) (0.598)
Dependent mean 101.3 96.50
Effect in SDs [%] 3.880 5.600
N 24,287 29,568
Panel B: Mental and behavioral disorders
DiD estimate -0.241 -0.986∗∗∗
(0.564) (0.196)
Dependent mean 17.00 18.61
Effect in SDs [%] 1.310 7.100
N 24,287 29,568
MOB fixed effects X X
Year fixed effects X X
Region fixed effects X X
Notes: The table shows DiD estimates of the 1979 maternity leave reform on
hospital admission for rural and urban areas. The DiD estimates stem from
weighted regression (by population) over the entire pooled time frame, and a
bandwidth of half a year around the cutoff. The effects in rural and urban areas
are not significantly different from each other. The level of analysis is on Labor
Market Regions. Figure A.7 shows a map of Germany with the regions marked
as rural/urban.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
First, the reform induced mothers to postpone their return to the labor market and al-
lowed more maternal time during a crucial time period of a child’s development. With
longer ML duration, mothers are more likely to breastfeed and they do so for an extended
period (Baker and Milligan, 2008, Albagli and Rau, 2018).48 The advantages for children
that were breastfed range from reduced incidence or severity of asthma, allergies, diarrhea,
mortality, morbidity and chronic conditions in the short run, to lower prevalence rates of
overweight as well as obesity, and type II diabetes in adulthood (Ruhm, 2000, Victora
et al., 2016).49 Moreover, correlational evidence suggests that the length of breastfeeding
is negatively associated with mental health problems and adverse health behavior, such
48Baker and Milligan (2008) exploit a ML expansion in Canada, which increased benefit entitlement
and job protection from 6 months to a year. Albagli and Rau (2018) investigate an expansion in Chile, in
which paid leave was raised from 12 to 24 weeks.
49The German Health Interview and Examination Survey for Children and Adolescents (KiGGS) offers
representative data on breastfeeding rates from 1986 onwards (Lange et al., 2007). From the West-German
1986 cohort born, around 75% of children were breastfed at least once and the share of children who was
breastfed exclusively for half a year is roughly 38%.
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as drinking (Oddy et al., 2010, Falk and Kosse, 2016).50 Apart from these direct health
effects, there are also indirect effects of breastfeeding via third outcomes, which in turn
may affect health. For example, breastfeeding exhibits a positive effect on cognitive devel-
opment (Albagli and Rau, 2018), educational attainment and income (Victora et al., 2015),
the formation of preferences (Falk and Kosse, 2016), and the quality of mother-child in-
teractions (Papp, 2014). In addition to reduced breastfeeding, early maternal employment
impedes the monitoring of children’s health status. Berger et al. (2005) present associations
of early maternal employment and a decrease in the use of preventive health care services
(immunizations and ‘well-baby’ visits), while at the same time problems with externalizing
behavior exacerbate. According to Morrill’s (2011) instrumental variable estimates, ma-
ternal employment leads to a higher likelihood that children suffer from an adverse health
event, such as overnight hospitalization, asthma episode, or injury/poisoning.
Second, another mechanism through which the reform might impacted child health out-
comes are changes in maternal health outcomes, which could successively affect the ability
to nurture.51 There is correlational evidence indicating that higher maternal employment
is related to lower levels of maternal mental well-being as well as self-rated overall health,
and a higher frequency of depressive symptoms and problems with parenting stress (Chat-
terji and Markowitz, 2005, Chatterji et al., 2013). Besides this evidence, there exists a
large body of quasi-experimental literature. Beuchert et al. (2016) exploit a reform of the
parental leave scheme in Denmark and find positive effects on health outcomes of mothers
and siblings with more considerable gains for low-resource families. Bütikofer et al. (forth-
coming) exploit the 1977 ML reform in Norway in order to demonstrate how the legislation
change enhances a battery of mid- and long-term maternal health outcomes, such as BMI,
blood pressure, pain as well as mental health, and more favorable health behavior, such
as physical exercise and smoking abstinence.52 Albagli and Rau (2018) show that mothers
who give birth under a more generous leave regime have lower stress indices as compared
to mothers who are shorter on leave. All in all, these studies suggest that extending ML
enhances maternal health, which may benefit parents’ ability to nurture and ultimately
children’s health outcomes in adulthood. For instance, maternal postnatal depression is
associated with long-term impairment of mother-child bonding (Tronick and Reck, 2009),
which the psychological literature links to the development of mental disorders later in life
(Canetti et al., 1997).53 Even the detailed results concerning gender differences and types
of affected mental disorders obtained in this study are consistent with the literature. Enns
et al. (2002) find adult mental health consistently associated with parenting experiences
made with one’s mother. Although the effects of parenting are diagnostically non-specific,
there appear unique effects among men in externalizing disorders, such as substance use
and antisocial personality disorder. The generally higher incidence rate of externalizing dis-
orders for males may also explain why the results found in this study are more pronounced
50Higher breastfeeding rates may explain next to the decline in MBDs, also the reductions in injuries,
digestive diseases, and respiratory illnesses. Falk and Kosse (2016) show that more prolonged breastfeeding
is associated with lower willingness to take risks, which may rationalize the findings on injuries. There is
also some evidence that breastfeeding may be protective for developing chronic respiratory illnesses such
as asthma (Lodge et al., 2015, Friedman and Zeiger, 2005) and inflammatory bowel disease later in life
(Le Huërou-Luron et al., 2010).
51See for instance Patel et al. (2004) or Frech and Kimbro (2011).
52The pre-reform scheme of 12 weeks of unpaid leave was changed to 4 months of paid and 12 months
of unpaid leave.
53Gender differences in parent-child bonding may rationalize the greater effects on MBDs for males.
Murphy et al. (2010) document that daughters report higher levels of maternal affection and lower maternal
overprotection, which lead to a lower incidence of MBDs in adulthood.
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for men. Women, in contrast, are more likely to suffer from internalizing disorders, such as
depression and anxiety, and thus may be less likely to end up being hospitalized (Federal
Statistical Office, 2012). Furthermore, female prevalence rates of internalizing problems
increase, but only at ages beyond the scope of this study.
Third, the increase in household income is another potential pathway for how the reform
might affect child health outcomes. Whether ML expansions impact family income de-
pends on the concrete context. In schemes with complete income replacements and no
crowding out of unpaid leave, there is no effect on household resources when extending
paid leave (Carneiro et al., 2015, Dahl et al., 2016, Bütikofer et al., forthcoming). In con-
trast, a decrease in the amount of unpaid leave increases women’s total earnings. This
scenario is comparable with the ML expansion covered in this study. The 1979 ML reform
raised mothers’ average cumulative total income by 1,700 DM, with larger increases for
women at the bottom of the wage distribution (see section 1.2). A considerable amount
of research examines the positive impact of family income on children’s cognitive achieve-
ment and health outcomes.54 The underlying idea is that parents may invest more in their
children because of the budget constraint’s relaxation. Dahl and Lochner (2012) leverage
changes in the earned income tax credit (EITC) and find that an increase in family income
raises math and reading test scores, benefiting children from low socioeconomic statuses
the most. Likewise, Hoynes et al. (2015) exploit expansions in the EITC and document
that an increase in household income is accompanied by a reduced likelihood of low birth
weight, which is induced by more prenatal care and less adverse health behavior such as
smoking. Milligan and Stabile (2011) use variation in child tax benefits in Canada to in-
vestigate their impact on children’s health outcomes in the Canadian context. They show
quasi-experimental evidence that child benefits improve physical health for boys and men-
tal health scores for girls. Aizer et al. (2016) study the long-run impact of the Mothers’
Pension Program (1911-1935), a US state-funded welfare program with cash transfers to
low-income families. They find that receiving cash transfers increased men’s longevity.
Akee et al. (2018) examine the impact of unconditional cash transfers on children. Draw-
ing on the longitudinal dataset of the Great Smokey Mountains Study, the authors show
that extra household income leads to a decrease in behavioral and emotional disorders,
while, at the same time, childhood personality traits are improved. The children with the
worst outcomes experience the largest gains, supporting the hypothesis that parents have
a preference to equalize outcomes. As a potential mechanism, the authors report improved
relationships between parents and children.
Since I find positive health differentials for children born under the more generous leave
scheme, any of the previously discussed channels could be at play, as the reform improved
children’s environment in these contexts. However, because of the study’s long-term na-
ture and the lack of data on these mediating outcomes, this study cannot assess which
mechanism is responsible for the downstream effects I observe.
54Recent literature has also been focusing on the associations between socioeconomic status and func-
tional brain development (Tomalski et al., 2013). In order to evaluate the causal effect of economic resources
in early childhood on cognitive, socio-emotional, and brain development, the experiment ‘Household In-
come and Child Development in the First Three Years of Life’ has been established by Greg Duncan and
is running until 2022.
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1.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I analyze the impact of a ML reform on children’s long-run health outcomes.
To estimate causal effects for the length of ML, I use exogenous variation stemming from
a legislative change in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1979, in which the length of
paid ML was increased from eight weeks to six months after childbirth. I use hospital
registry data over the period 1995-2014 in order to present a comprehensive analysis of
the reform effect on important health outcomes. By following treated and untreated birth
cohorts over 20 years of their adulthood (from age 16 up to age 35), I find evidence that
the expansion in ML improves children’s health in the long-run.55 Children who were
born after the implementation of the reform are on average 1.7 percent less likely to be
hospitalized. There is strong heterogeneity by gender and age. The effects are mainly
driven by men and the health differentials get stronger for those in their late 20s and after.
Moreover, when looking into the components of hospitalizations, I observe that the decline
in hospital admissions is due to fewer diagnoses of MBDs, the most common diagnosis
type for individuals aged 15-35. Lastly, the largest effect of the ML reform on MBDs is
observed for disorders due to psychoactive substance use and schizophrenia.
An interesting point for future research is to assess whether the effects also persist for
more common diseases. The effects in the hospital registry data are likely just the ‘tip
of the iceberg’, as they resemble rather extreme health outcomes. For this reason, it may
be worthwhile to exploit health insurance data and investigate effects on health outcomes
recorded by general practitioners.
From a policy perspective, this study suggests that a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis
of leave schemes requires an understanding of the implications of ML on various aspects
of child development. The primary reason for policymakers to extend the length of ML
was to safeguard maternal well-being after childbirth. The results from this analysis show
that the 1979 ML reform additionally led to positive health effects on children, but was
only realized three decades later. This is an important takeaway for the assessment of such
schemes. First, if the time horizon for assessing impacts is too short, certain consequences
that develop only in the long-run may not be detected. Second, some benefits may not only
materialize until later, but could also manifest in different areas than what policymakers
had in mind initially. Therefore, if the vast effects on children’s long-run health outcomes
are not accounted for, cost-benefit analyses could come to wrong conclusions.
55As discussed in the paper, one caveat of the analysis is that the data only allows the reporting of ITT
effects. The infeasibility to exclude unaffected individuals (e.g. foreign-born or born in the GDR) does
not compromise the results but merely attenuates the ITT estimates. This dilution effect implies that the
impact on treated children is greater than the reported ITT effects.
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A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Potential Threats to Identification and Validity of the Design
In the following, I discuss two threats to the empirical strategy. First, I examine potential
self-selection into the treatment group by postponing delivery or strategic conception.
Second, I consider threats along the distribution of birth months, which may result from
seasonal and age of school entry effects.
Threats at the Threshold
Behavioral responses with respect to the forcing variable, the birth date of the child, could
potentially jeopardize the validity of the identification strategy. Typically, gestation length
is a normally distributed random variable with mean of 40 weeks and 2 weeks standard
deviation, from the beginning of the last menstrual cycle (Ekberg et al., 2013). However,
parents may influence the time when their child is born in two ways.
First, parents may be incentivized to get strategically pregnant in response to the more
attractive ML leave scheme. However, it is unlikely that children in my sample were con-
ceived due to this reason. The draft bill was only proposed four months before the threshold
birth date and the widest specification includes children who were born on October 1979,
the month in which the earliest possible birth date could be. However, it is plausible that
the topic increased public awareness due to media coverage even before the draft bill was
initiated. For that reason, Dustmann and Schönberg (2012) conduct a literature search
for articles regarding the reform. Subsequently, their results show that the earliest articles
were published two months prior to the cutoff date.
Second, mothers with due dates close to the cutoff date on May 1, 1979 could have timed
their child’s date of birth by postponing induced births and cesarean sections.56 Gans
and Leigh (2009) find that during the introduction of a $3.000 ‘Baby Bonus’ in Australia,
parents postponed the birth by as much as a week in order to be eligible for the benefits:
The data shows a sharp decline in the birth rate before the threshold, followed by a huge
increase on the first day after the cutoff.
It is possible that there are similar distortionary ‘introduction effects’ in the context of
the 1979 ML expansion. In other words, even though the announcement period does not
allow for a strategic conception, parents may have been incentivized to delay the delivery
of their child due to the reform.57
To check for such potential behavioral responses, I investigate the number of births around
the cutoff. I follow the example of Gans and Leigh (2009) closely to show that there are no
peculiarities in the fertility distribution. In the analysis, I use daily births from the federal
states of Baden-Württemberg and North Rhine-Westphalia over the window of 1977-1990.
56Shifting a planned birth before the threshold is unlikely because this behavior potentially destroys
mothers’ eligibility for a more generous leave scheme.
57The scope of this effect is much smaller because the C-section or induced birth rates in the FRG around
1980 were significantly lower than in Australia in 2004. To be precise, Gans and Leigh (2009) report a
C-section rate of 30% in Australia in 2004 while Selbmann and Thieme (1988) document a frequency of
C-sections of 12.4% in Bavaria in 1982. As national numbers are not available for that time period, I use
the second-largest state as a proxy for the federal level.
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These two states are representative of the former FRG, as they accounted for almost 36% of
all births in 1979. In the analysis, I limit the sample to a time window of one month before
and after the cutoff date. Panel A of Figure A.1 shows the (unadjusted) daily number of
births for April and May 1979. Over the time window, a strong weekly pattern with more
births on weekdays and fewer births on weekends is observed. On May 1, which fell on a
Tuesday, there was an unexpected drop in the number of births. If parents delayed the
time of birth, one would expect a rise in the number of births right after the cutoff date.
However, May 1 was a national public holiday (Labor Day), during which birth rates have






































































































Figure A.1. Daily number of births around the ML expansion
Notes: The figure plots the number of births around the cutoff date May 01, 1979 for the ML expansion
from two to six months after childbirth. Panel A shows the raw data, i.e. the actual number of births per
day (unadjusted). Panel B, however, plots the difference between the raw and expected number of births
when accounting for day of year, public holiday, and year×day of week fixed effects. For the expected
number of births I use data in the same time window (one month before and after the threshold) for the
years 1977-1990, except for the year in which the reform took place.
Source: Birth registry data from North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-Württemberg. Taken together,
both states account for almost 36% of all births in the former Federal Republic of Germany in 1979.
Panel B of Figure A.1 shows the time series after removing any variation in the timing
of births stemming from year, day of week, day of year, and public holidays. To do so, I
estimate the following equation on all years, except April and May 1979:






i + εi (1.3)
I regress the number of children born on day i, Birthsi, on a series of dummies: year inter-
acted with day of the week, day of the year, and a dummy for public national holidays.58
Parameters are left out for better readability. Panel B plots the residuals (Births− B̂irths)
58For public holidays I use Good Friday, Holy Saturday, Easter Sunday, Easter Monday, Labor Day,
Ascension Day, Whit Sunday, Whit Monday, and Corpus Christi.
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from the calibrated model. In contrast to Gans and Leigh (2009), I do not observe system-
atically fewer births prior to the reform, or more births right after the policy change came
into effect. These results suggest that there is no evidence that parents delayed births to
after the cutoff date.
Table A.1 presents estimates of the effect of the ML expansion on fertility outcomes, for
different estimation windows.59 Irrespective of whether the number of births or the log
of the number of births is used, there is no evidence suggesting that parents deliberately
postponed births until after the threshold date. On the contrary, the point estimates are
negative throughout all specifications and become significantly different from zero with
increasing estimation windows. Furthermore, the magnitude of the estimates is constant
across estimation windows, which is a counterintuitive result if parents shifted births from
the week prior to the reform to the week after the reform. If such behavior were present,
one would expect point estimates to decrease in absolute value as the estimation window
is enlarged.
Threats Along the Whole Distribution of Birth Months
As discussed in section 1.4, I cannot directly compare children born before and after the
1979 ML reform cutoff as birth months may affect outcomes directly (Buckles and Hunger-
man, 2013, Currie and Schwandt, 2013). Age-based cutoff rules at school entry are an
important example in this respect (Black et al., 2011). As the data is only available on
the birth month level, I exploit a DiD design with different estimation windows around the
cutoff, with a maximum bandwidth of six months on both sides of the threshold. Under the
assumption that the treatment and control cohort share the same seasonality effects, the
DiD design can isolate the reform impact from seasonality and age of school entry effects.
There is no formal test to investigate whether the assumption of time-invariance of season-
ality is met. However, the parallel trends for pre-threshold-born children in treatment and
control group (Figures 1.2 and 1.4) provide evidence in favor of the assumption, suggesting
that the cohort born in the year prior to the reform may be used as counterfactual.
The parallel trends cannot indicate whether post-threshold season of birth effects, such
as discontinuities caused by school entry rules, may jeopardize the study design’s validity.
In West Germany, the cutoff date for school entry was June 30 and, consequently, falls
into the post-threshold group of the 1979 ML reform (Jürges and Schneider, 2011).60 If
there were time-varying unobserved differences between children born around the school
entry cutoff, the resulting DiD estimates would be biased. This may happen when treated
children are affected differently by the school-based entry rules than control children. To
check whether school entry rules or other forms of season of birth effects pose a threat to
the identification, I run two robustness checks.
Exclude School Entry Discontinuity.—First, I limit the post-threshold group to chil-
dren born before July (i.e. May and June). This way, school entry discontinuities are
not part of the estimation. Figure A.2 shows estimates with varying bandwidths for the
pre-cutoff side by gender and age group. The first estimate per panel, shown in green, rep-




i + εi, with the
dummy IReformi , which equals one for days after the cutoff in 1979. The results remain qualitatively the
same if IPublic Holidayi is interacted with I
Day of Week
i .
60The school entry rule dictates that children who turn six before to cutoff date, June 30, are admitted
to primary school in that year. Children born after the threshold are admitted one year later.
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Table A.1. Birth rate effects of the 1979 ML reform
Estimation window
(1) (2) (3) (4)
±7 days ±14 days ±21 days ±28 days
Panel A. Dependent variable is number of births
ML reform -30.46 -30.23∗ -33.32∗∗ -32.78∗∗∗
(30.31) (17.73) (14.08) (12.37)
Observations 196 392 588 784
R2 0.856 0.842 0.832 0.817
Panel B. Dependent variable is ln(number of births)
ML reform -0.0448 -0.0440∗ -0.0477∗∗ -0.0476∗∗∗
(0.0425) (0.0247) (0.0197) (0.0173)
Observations 196 392 588 784
R2 0.855 0.844 0.833 0.819
Notes: The table shows regression estimates of the impact of the 1979 ML
reform on fertility. The sample comprises daily births within the relevant
estimation window in the federal states of Baden-Württemberg and North
Rhine-Westphalia from 1977-1990. Panel A uses the number of births as de-
pendent variable, whereas panel B shows results with the log of the number of
births as dependent variable. All specifications control for day of year, public
holiday, and year×day of week fixed effects. The estimation window is refer-
ring to the number of days before and after May 01. For instance, the ± 7
day window includes the last week in April and the first week in May across
all years. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Source: Birth registry data from North Rhine-Westphalia and Baden-
Württemberg. Taken together, both states account for almost 36% of all
births in the former Federal Republic of Germany in 1979.
resents the baseline estimate as shown in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. The pre-threshold estimation
window contains half a year before the cutoff (Nov-Apr) in the widest specification and
shrinks to two months before the threshold (Mar-Apr). The overall conclusions from the
results section remain unaffected. The largest effects are found for the oldest age bracket
(32-35 years) and males. The DiD estimates are of similar magnitude and mostly signif-
icant across the estimation windows. The only difference to the main results is that the
effects for the age bracket of 27-31 years disappear.
Additional Control Cohort.—Second, I show estimates when using the additional con-
trol group born two years before the reform (i.e. born around May 1977, see column 5
of Table 1.6) for different bandwidths. If systematic month-of-birth patterns (including
school entry discontinuities) varied over the cohorts, the estimates from this robustness
check should differ from the baseline results. Figure A.3 presents estimates from this ro-
bustness check for various bandwidths. Once again, the estimates are of similar magnitude
and significance compared to the baseline results. The reductions in hospitalizations are
more pronounced in the older age brackets and for men. Related to this robustness check, it
is worthwhile to point to the discussion on a potential violation of the stable unit treatment
value assumption due to spillover effects on older siblings (see section 1.5.4). To refute this
concern, I present estimates when using control cohorts from different birth years. The
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fact that the estimates have roughly the same magnitude irrespective of the control group
does not support the idea that month-of-birth patterns are different through the years.
Overall, the additional robustness tests demonstrate that the main results are driven by
the 1979 ML discontinuity and not by season of birth effects, such as school entry effects.
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A.2 Figures










Length of maternity leave after childbirth
length of job protection
benefits: full replacement
benefits: 750 DM
Figure 3. BlaFigure A.4. 1979 reform in ML legislation in the Federal Republic of Germany
Notes: The figure describes the legislative change in the length of job protection and ML, which took
place in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1979. The reform increased post-birth ML from eight weeks
to six months, while keeping the initial structure of the period from six weeks before until eight weeks
after childbirth unchanged (mother protection period).
Source: The figure is based on information from Dustmann and Schönberg (2012), Ondrich et al. (2002),

























0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-25 25-30 30-35
Injury, poisoning; other consequences of external causes Mental & behavioral disorders
Diseases of the respiratory system Diseases of the digestive system
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases Remaining diagnoses
Figure A.5. Five main diagnoses of inpatients aged 0 to 35 in 2014
Notes: The figure shows the incidence distribution across different age brackets of the top five diagnoses
for inpatients aged 0 to 35 in 2014. Diagnoses associated with pregnancy, childbirth, and the puerperium
are not taken into account in this representation. The large remainder in the age bracket ‘0-5’ consists
mostly of conditions that originate in the perinatal period.


























1996 [17] 2000 [21] 2004 [25] 2008 [29] 2012 [33]
year
psychoactive substances schizophrenia affective
neurosis personality other
Figure A.6. The top five subcategories of mental and behavioral diagnoses
Notes: This figure plots the yearly number of diagnoses for the treatment cohort (i.e. the individuals
born between November 1978 and October 1979). The subcategories are ordered by their occurrence in
2014 (from the most to the least frequent diagnosis), which also coincides by chance with the ordering in
the ICD-10 classification system. The five most frequent subcategories - as shown here - comprise more
than 95% of all MBDs.
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(a) Region boundaries (b) Population density
Figure A.7. Labor market regions in Germany
Notes: The map on the left shows the labor market regions (LMR) used in the analysis. The areas with the red
background depict the area of the former Federal Republic of Germany (‘West Germany’), while the white areas
indicate the area of the former German Democratic Republic (‘East Germany’). The area of West Germany is
used throughout the paper, the regions of East Germany only in a robustness check (triple-differences model). The
baseline specification aggregates to level of West and East Germany, yet there are some specifications that aggregate
to the regional level (red borderlines). There are in total 245 LMR, with 204 in the area of the FRG and 41 in
the area of the former GDR. The black outlines indicate federal state boundaries and the red dots represent the
corresponding state capitals. The map on the right presents the regional variation of population density across
German regions. Labor market regions are labeled as urban if their population density exceeds the median value of
all regions.
Source: Own representation with data from the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and
Spatial Development (BBSR).



































































































Figure A.8. Life-course approach for all chapters
Continued on next page
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1996 [17] 2002 [23] 2008 [29] 2014 [35]
Year [age of treatment cohort]
Notes: This figure plots intention-to-treat estimates (along with confidence intervals) across the main diagnosis
chapters for the entire life-course. The outcomes are defined as the number of cases per 1,000 individuals (births).
The point estimates are coming from a DiD regression as described in section 1.4, with a bandwidth of six months,
month-of-birth fixed effects, and clustered standard errors on the month-of-birth level. The control group is com-
prised of children that are born in the same months but one year before (i.e. children born between November 1977
and October 1978). On the right axis, one can see the dependent mean for the pre-reform treatment children.










































































































1996 [17] 2004 [25] 2012 [33]
Year [age of treatment cohort]
Figure A.9. Life-course approach for the subcategories of mental and behavioral disorders.
Notes: This figure plots intention-to-treat estimates (along with confidence intervals) across the subcategories of
MBDs. The outcomes are defined as the number of cases per 1,000 individuals (births). The point estimates are
coming from a DiD regression as described in section 1.4, with a bandwidth of six months, month-of-birth fixed
effects, and clustered standard errors on the month-of-birth level. The control group is comprised of children that
are born in the same months but one year before (i.e. children born between November 1977 and October 1978).
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Panel A. Over entire length of the life-course
Overall -2.818 -2.148 -2.084
(4.230) (4.976) (5.848)
Panel B. Age brackets
Age 17-21 -2.870 -2.509 -3.697
(4.181) (5.162) (6.081)
Age 22-26 -1.844 -1.084 -2.049
(4.254) (5.151) (6.224)
Age 27-31 -2.083 -1.450 -0.434
(4.312) (4.919) (5.751)
Age 32-35 -4.889 -3.900 -2.173
(5.030) (5.691) (6.495)
Notes: The Table shows RDD estimates coming from the
following specification: Ymt = β0 + β1Afterm + β2X̃m +
β3Afterm×X̃m+εmt. X̃im = (Xim−c) corresponds to the
normalized birth month and β1 is the parameter of interest.
The sample includes the treatment group (individuals born
around the threshold) only. Standard errors clustered on
the month-of-birth level.
Table A.4. Number of observations per
age-bracket
Estimation window
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
6M 5M 4M 3M Donut
Age 17-21 120 100 80 60 100
Age 22-26 120 100 80 60 100
Age 27-31 120 100 80 60 100
Age 32-35 96 80 64 48 80
Notes: The table reports the number of observations
per age bracket and estimation window. It refers to the
DiD estimations shown in Panels B of Tables 1.1, 1.2,
1.4, and 1.5.
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Table A.5. Robustness—Interaction treatment with age brackets (hospitalization)
Estimation window
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
6M 5M 4M 3M Donut
Panel A. Total
Treatment × Age 17-21 -2.310∗∗∗ -2.143∗∗ -2.156∗ -2.386∗ -2.647∗∗∗
(0.729) (0.829) (1.039) (1.309) (0.715)
Treatment × Age 22-26 -0.0735 0.0501 -0.0501 -0.00689 -0.451
(0.764) (0.916) (1.149) (1.422) (0.788)
Treatment × Age 27-31 -2.187∗∗ -1.789 -2.350 -2.323 -2.644∗∗
(0.977) (1.134) (1.379) (1.696) (1.064)
Treatment × Age 32-35 -4.148∗∗∗ -4.040∗∗∗ -4.639∗∗∗ -4.620∗∗ -5.060∗∗∗
(1.021) (1.164) (1.390) (1.747) (1.015)
Dependent mean 121.1 121.0 121.5 123.3 121.9
N (MOB × year) 456 380 304 228 380
Panel B. Women
Treatment × Age 17-21 -0.879 -0.607 0.153 -0.292 -1.370
(0.992) (1.048) (1.176) (1.560) (0.946)
Treatment × Age 22-26 0.206 0.880 1.487 1.234 0.177
(0.943) (1.058) (1.278) (1.698) (0.872)
Treatment × Age 27-31 -3.083∗∗∗ -2.204∗ -1.923 -2.429 -3.404∗∗∗
(1.060) (1.119) (1.338) (1.790) (1.035)
Treatment × Age 32-35 -3.580∗∗∗ -3.401∗∗ -2.921∗ -2.239 -4.533∗∗∗
(1.191) (1.347) (1.586) (1.830) (1.153)
Dependent mean 122.3 121.9 121.9 123.8 123.2
N (MOB × year) 456 380 304 228 380
Panel C. Men
Treatment × Age 17-21 -3.738∗∗∗ -3.635∗∗∗ -4.360∗∗∗ -4.397∗∗ -3.937∗∗∗
(0.984) (1.110) (1.317) (1.561) (1.133)
Treatment × Age 22-26 -0.352 -0.751 -1.513 -1.193 -1.060
(1.072) (1.264) (1.521) (1.696) (1.212)
Treatment × Age 27-31 -1.325 -1.402 -2.759 -2.224 -1.908
(1.318) (1.585) (1.811) (1.914) (1.548)
Treatment × Age 32-35 -4.679∗∗∗ -4.648∗∗∗ -6.275∗∗∗ -6.887∗∗∗ -5.551∗∗∗
(1.311) (1.545) (1.666) (2.063) (1.440)
Dependent mean 120.0 120.2 121.2 122.7 120.7
N (MOB × year) 456 380 304 228 380
Notes: The table reports DiD estimates when using interactions of Treat×After with the age brackets
and relying on the full sample. This robustness check differs from the specification in Table 1.1 in which
there are different regressions for each age-bracket.
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Table A.6. ITT effects on the subcategories of mental and behavioral disorders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overall Age brackets [years]
17-21 22-26 27-31 32-35
MBD -0.621∗∗ 0.174 -0.008 -1.000∗∗∗ -1.906∗∗∗
(0.242) (0.257) (0.410) (0.349) (0.362)
Psychoactive substances -0.483∗∗∗ -0.074 -0.071 -0.549∗∗∗ -1.428∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.123) (0.136) (0.156) (0.270)
Schizophrenia -0.272∗∗ 0.061 0.069 -0.707∗∗∗ -0.572∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.087) (0.230) (0.155) (0.170)
Affective 0.093∗∗ -0.035 0.004 0.198∗∗∗ 0.235∗
(0.035) (0.042) (0.054) (0.068) (0.128)
Neurosis 0.066 0.001 0.108 0.213∗∗∗ -0.088
(0.040) (0.086) (0.102) (0.066) (0.054)
Personality 0.013 0.172∗∗∗ 0.005 -0.158∗ 0.039
(0.036) (0.055) (0.072) (0.086) (0.091)
N (MOB × year) 456 120 120 120 96
Notes: The table shows DiD estimates of the 1979 ML reform on subcategories of MBDs. The first
column shows the effect for the entire pooled time frame, whereas columns 2 to 5 display the impact
per age group. Each row corresponds to a different estimation with the number of diagnoses per 1,000
individuals. See Table 1.1 for additional details. Clustered standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Crime Externalities from Football
Games in Germany
2.1 Introduction
Football has grown from being a favorite sport in many parts of the world into a respected
industry, which is reflected by high attendance rates and considerable revenues.1 For in-
stance, the Bundesliga, the German top league, is a major reason for public mass gatherings
and had with 42,700 spectators the highest average attendance per match of all European
leagues in the season 2017/18. Also in economic terms, football is synonymous with big
business as the Bundesliga ranks second in Europe with generated revenues of 3.17 bil-
lion euros (Deloitte, 2019). Due to their great popularity, professional football matches
generate external effects in many regards. On the positive side, there is higher consumer
spending (e.g. merchandising, catering, and accommodation) and ultimately increased lo-
cal tax revenues. On the negative side, the games induce air and noise pollution, and a
higher frequency of accidents, among other things. Violent fan behavior is a particularly
pervasive aspect in this context and affects individuals’ health, the penal system, and the
police. In the 2017/18 season, the State and Federal Police force invested over 2.11 million
working hours to ensure the spectators’ safety at professional football matches in Germany
(Central Sports Intelligence Unit, 2018). There has been a widely noticed legal dispute
between the Federal State of Bremen and the German Football League (DFL) regarding
the reimbursement of costs for high-risk games, in which the Federal Administrative Court
(2019) declared the charges imposed by Bremen as legitimate. This study does not only
focus on football matches where social interactions lead to violence, but also deals with
the question of whether the negative externalities of football games that bring so much
prosperity should be absorbed.
The aim of this paper is to examine in detail the effects of football games on violent
behavior in the German professional football league. To assess the causal impact of football
matches on physical assaults, I employ a generalized difference-in-differences approach
that exploits the variation in the timing of the football games. I compare the level of
assaults on days with and without home games while controlling for any potential source
of heterogeneity across days of the week, month, and year, and taking into account other
1Except where otherwise noted, football refers to the sport also known as soccer.
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possible confounding variation from weather or holidays. In order to use the time-series
and cross-sectional variation in the data, I construct a panel at the municipality-day level.
I collect and match data from various sources to analyze the effect of 4,461 football games
in the period 2011-2015. First, detailed information on all matches in the first three
leagues is obtained via web scraping.2 Second, the primary outcome variable, the rate
of physical assaults, is derived from comprehensive registry data provided by the Federal
Criminal Police Office. It covers all individuals that become victims of a crime against their
legally protected rights in the sample regions. Third, data from weather monitors and a
time-series of holidays at the state level are matched to the data to account for possible
confounders. Last, population figures from the Federal Statistical Office are merged to
construct regression weights and create the outcome variable.
I find significant and robust evidence that football matches lead to an increase in the
prevalence of physical assaults. A home game increases the assault rate by on average 21.5
percent. The effects are almost entirely driven by male victims and are most pronounced in
the 18-29 age group. Moreover, a heterogeneity analysis reveals that the effects are caused
by attacks on victims with no prior relationship to the suspect and completed offenses (i.e.
no attempts). Assaults on police officers on duty account for 16 percent of the baseline
effect of the entire sample. I find no evidence that the effects of football games on the
prevalence of assaults are offset by reductions in violent acts on days adjacent to the game
day or in nearby areas. The focus on home games in the empirical framework does not pose
a threat to the identification strategy, as away games do not change the level of physical
assaults in the home district.
There are a number of theories rationalizing spectator violence. For instance, the frustration-
aggression hypothesis, proposed by Dollard et al. (1939), interprets violent behavior as an
act to rehabilitate self-esteem triggered by a frustrating event, such as the defeat of one’s
favorite team. Another prominent theory is the idea of social learning, according to which
spectators mimic the behavior displayed on the field (Bandura, 1973, 2007). In my anal-
ysis, I test whether the frustration-aggression hypothesis can serve as an explanation for
the increase in physical assaults. To do so, I use emotional cues from either emotionally
unsettling events during the game or when game outcomes do not align with pregame
expectations. In both cases, there is no evidence to support the frustration-aggression
hypothesis. In the second step, I consider the prominence of games and teams as potential
channels. In games with high rivalry, the impact on the rate of physical assaults is three
times higher. This larger effect may be related to the mutual dislike of opposing fan groups
or to the social learning theory, as high-rivalry matches are characterized by more intensity
on the field. Furthermore, I find larger effects for the highest division of the league system,
which attracts the most viewers. Ultimately, I cannot pinpoint the one channel at play, but
there is suggestive evidence that spectators mimic the behavior of the players, that violent
viewers select into specific matches, and eventually a mechanical agglomeration effect.
Back-of-the-envelope calculations based on my estimates indicate that the crime external-
ities of football games are substantial. In the season of 2014/15, for example, football
games in the top three leagues of the German football league system explain 17.7 percent
of assault reports and lead to 18,770 additional assaults in the sample regions. Glaubitz
2This includes, but is by no means limited to the time and location of the games. Furthermore, I exploit
betting odds that reflect pregame expectations.
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et al. (2016) estimate the social cost of an assault at 5,067 euros (in 2020 prices), which
implies an annual social cost of 95 million euros.3
This paper complements the literature on sporting events and their effects on different
dimensions of crime. Studies in the US American context demonstrate that American
college football games lead to a higher incidence of rape (Lindo et al., 2018), physical
assaults, vandalism, disorderly conducts, and alcohol-related offenses (Rees and Schnepel,
2009). Furthermore, it has been documented that intimate partner violence is linked to
unsettling defeats in professional American football games (Card and Dahl, 2011). In the
European setting, studies have shown that professional football games increase property
and violent crimes (Marie, 2016), and shift offenses both temporally (Montolio and Planells-
Struse, 2016) as well as spatially (Montolio and Planells-Struse, 2019).
The empirical analysis in this paper contributes to previous literature in many regards. I
compile a unique data set from various sources to comprehensively characterize the impact
of football matches on criminal behavior in the top three German professional football
divisions. Using the universe of criminal offenses, I show that almost one in five physical
assaults can be attributed to professional football games. In addition to the overall effect, I
show effect heterogeneity by victim and crime characteristics. When investigating channels,
I find no support for the frustration-aggression hypothesis, but evidence for the social
learning theory and a selection story in which violent fans self-select into specific matches.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides information
about football games, their relationship with violent spectator behavior, and previous lit-
erature. Section 2.3 explains the data and the variables. Section 2.4 contains a description
of the empirical framework. Section 2.5 reports results, validity checks, a discussion on
potential channels, and robustness tests. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 The German Football League System
The three fully professional divisions in the German football league system are managed
under the jurisdiction of the German Football Association (DFB) and the German Football
League (DFL). While the top two leagues, Bundesliga and 2. Bundesliga, are organized
by the DFL, the third division, 3. Liga, is run by the DFB itself. Teams can be promoted
or relegated from one league to another. The top two divisions consist of 18 teams playing
17 home and away games in one season. The third league contains 20 teams playing 19
home and away games.
The empirical approach of this paper exploits the variation in the scheduling of matches.
Since 2006, the match schedules for the Bundesliga and the 2. Bundesliga are created with
a software that uses integer linear programming.4 The software outlines the rough details
3The estimated social costs of Glaubitz et al. (2016) are conservative compared to estimates from other
countries. In the United States, the social costs of an assault range from 17,300 to 68,000 euros (Miller
et al., 1996, Cohen et al., 2004). In New Zealand the social costs are estimated at 6,400 euros (Roper and
Thompson, 2006), and in Great Britain the estimated costs are 2,300 euros (Dubourg et al., 2005). All
costs are in 2014 prices.
4For details on how the match schedules are created, please refer to https://www.bundesliga.com.
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such as the matches per gameday. The exact date and time, however, are determined in
the course of the season. The later exact scheduling makes it possible to take into account
guidelines from local authorities, security bodies, the Central Sports Intelligence Unit (ZIS),
international football associations (FIFA/UEFA), fans, clubs, and stadium operators. In
addition to obvious restrictions such as the fact that home games of neighboring clubs
should be scheduled at different times, the DFL has to consider public holidays, other
major events, or match dates of international competitions.
2.2.2 Football and Violent Crime
Spectator violence has a long tradition in the context of professional football in Germany.
The change in names for football fans illustrates that spectator behavior has changed
considerably (Pilz, 2005). In the 1960s and 1970s, the peaceful fan base was refereed to as
camp-followers, while one decade later the first problems of spectator violence emerged with
the so-called football rowdies. In the 1980s, spectator violence was omnipresent, mainly due
to the hooligan movement. Since the late 1990s, a new group has appeared in the stadiums,
the ultras. Originally from Italy, the ultras are dedicated to fighting the commercialization
of football and to revitalizing traditional football culture. Over the last years, the number
of violent fans has been increasing. The police distinguish between three types of football
fans. Category A includes peaceful fans, category B consists of fans inclined to violence,
and category C contains fans who actively seek violence (violent criminals). Originally, the
ultras were predominantly assigned to category A and occasionally to category B. Recently,
however, a substantial share of the ultras has been classified as members of categories B and
C. In the season 2017/18, for instance, the Central Sports Intelligence Unit (2018) identified
13.633 individuals in the top three leagues who were either prone to violence or seeking
violence. With more potential agitators, police officers report more aggression directed at
them (Feltes, 2010). However, it is not only the growing number of violent fans that is
a problem, but also the fact that the event character of violence during football games is
increasing (Pilz, 2005). Violent actions are less and less connected with the events on the
playing field. In fact, violence serves as an opportunity for identification in the search for
one’s identity. Some violent fans find self-assertion by joining like-minded individuals to
discover their strength. The question is how to address the challenges posed by hooligans
and ultras. Poutvaara and Priks (2009) investigate the impact of anti-hooliganism policy in
the Swedish context. They find that the assignment of other duties to the Sport Intelligence
and Tactical Unit was accompanied by an increase in violent crime by hooligans. Feltes
(2010) emphasizes the concept of ‘balanced policing’, which acknowledges that risks from
spectators are dynamic and require quick responses to either escalate or deescalate.5
There are a number of theories rationalizing spectator violence.6 First, the higher number
of assaults could be a merely mechanical effect resulting from increased social contacts
and a change in the way interactions take place (Montolio and Planells-Struse, 2019). For
5Depending on the types of violent fans the police are confronted with, the officers have to adjust their
behavior accordingly (Feltes, 2010). On the one hand, a zero-tolerance policy must be applied to hooligans
and any failure to take drastic measures is seen as an invitation to act out violent desires. On the other
hand, ultras should be given some leeway to allow self-regulation.
6Theoretically, football games can also lead to a decrease in the assault rate. This may happen if
individuals with a higher propensity for violent behavior attend the matches. Dahl and DellaVigna (2009)
find a similar effect for violent movies and refer to this as the ‘self-incapacitation effect’. However, this
effect can only be demonstrated with hourly data. As my analysis draws on daily data, I focus on theories
as to why the rate of violence increases due to football games.
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instance, the Bundesliga has the highest average number of spectators per match of all
European major football leagues (Wicker et al., 2017). In the 2014/15 season, an average
of more than 42,000 spectators attended a game of the highest division of the German
league system. This aspect is particularly relevant for smaller municipalities, which attract
thousands of spectators per game (Lindo et al., 2018). Second, spectator violence may be
the result of physiological arousal (Branscombe and Wann, 1992). Potential determinants
of physiological arousal include increased heart-rate, blood pressure, and respiration, which
may influence affect, cognition, and (anti-)social behavior. Third, Dollard et al. (1939)
propose the idea of the frustration-aggression hypothesis.7 If the favorite team suffers a
defeat, this may precipitate aggressive fan behavior (see, for instance, the results of Card
and Dahl (2011)). Fourth, Bandura (1973, 2007) postulates the notion of ‘social learning’
or mimetic behavior. Regardless of the outcome of the match, the mere observation of the
game suffices to trigger violent actions.
Alcohol plays a crucial role in the context of spectator violence in German football stadi-
ums. Cook and Durrance (2013) describes the pharmacological effects of alcohol consump-
tion on aggression and cognitive functions. Alcohol consumption is associated with a loss
of inhibition and impaired judgment. Furthermore, experiments have shown that partici-
pants exhibit more aggressive behavior after drinking. The 2018 edition of the Police Crime
Statistics specifies that more than one in four assaults (26.2 percent) were committed un-
der the influence of alcohol. While in some countries alcoholic beverages are prohibited
on the premises (e.g. in Brazil since 2003), the rules in German stadiums are somewhat
ambiguous. The DFB’s security guidelines stipulate that the sale of alcoholic beverages
is forbidden before and during games in the stadium. Nevertheless, with the approval of
the responsible local security bodies, the hosting clubs can deviate from the regulations,
on their own responsibility. Only in the case of high-risk games, the clubs are urged to
comply with the ban.8 The clubs, however, have a strong incentive to deviate from the
ban as more than one-sixth (538 million Euros in the 2017/18 season) of the Bundesliga
clubs’ earnings are generated by matchday revenues (e.g. tickets and catering) and the
sale of alcoholic beverages is a substantial part of this (Deloitte, 2019). For this reason,
alcohol and its potential side effects are very present in German football arenas.
2.2.3 Previous Literature
The paper relates to previous literature that investigates the impact of large scale sporting
events on various types of criminal behavior. Studies in the US American context often
use offense reports from the National Incident Based Reporting System to investigate the
impact of American (college) football games on crime. Rees and Schnepel (2009) exploit
within agency variation to study the effects of Division I-A college American football
games on various offense categories for the years 2000-2005.9 They find an increase in
assaults, vandalism, arrests for disorderly conduct, and alcohol-related offenses in hosting
municipalities on game days. Larger effects are associated with unexpected game outcomes,
defined as when lower ranked teams win against higher ranked teams. The effects of away
games are not significantly different from zero. Lindo et al. (2018) examine the effect
of college party culture in the context of Division 1 American football games on sexual
7Berkowitz (1989) provides a helpful overview of the frustration-aggression hypothesis.
8For details, please refer to: https://www.sueddeutsche.de.
9Almost all of the following studies exploit within law enforcement agency variation over time while
controlling for weather, holidays and other sources of heterogeneity over time.
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assaults. They show that the daily reports of rape victimization among 17-24-year-old
women increase by 28 percent on games days. The effects are larger for home games,
prominent matches, and games involving teams playing in the better ranked subdivision
of Division 1. Furthermore, they show that game outcomes matter: unexpected wins lead
to a strong increase in the number of rapes. Card and Dahl (2011) analyze the impact
of emotionally unsettling events associated with wins and losses of professional American
football teams on family violence for the years 1995-2006. They find a ten percent increase
in intimate partner violence in the event of unexpected losses (when the home team was
expected to win). There are no effects for unexpected wins or when the game expectations
predict a close match. The effects of intimate partner violence of men against women are
pronounced around the end of the game and are larger for higher-profile games.
In the European context, researchers focus on football matches to estimate the effect of
large scale sporting events on crime. Marie (2016) investigates the effect of football matches
on crime in London using hourly offense data from the Metropolitan Crime Statistics
System. His results show that property crimes increase (decrease) by 4 percent (3 percent)
for every additional 10,000 spectators attending a home (away) game. Violent crimes are
only affected by derby matches. Montolio and Planells-Struse (2016) study the temporal
impact of football matches on criminal behavior in Barcelona (2007-2011). They match
reports of registered crime with football matches played by the Football Club Barcelona
(FCB) to see whether the games lead to temporal shifts in criminal activity. They employ
a panel approach comparing crime rates during the same time window on the same day
of the week with and without FCB games. Their results indicate temporal shifts for
criminal activities of thefts, criminal damage, robberies, and gender violence. Moreover,
instances of gender violence increase after home defeats. In a follow-up study, Montolio and
Planells-Struse (2019) investigate the spatial dimensions of crime externalities associated
with football games. Their findings show that, in the event of a home game, theft rates
(mainly pickpocketing) increase in the entire city. The impact is larger for regions in close
proximity to the stadium. During away games, by contrast, the number of thefts occurring
near the stadium is relatively smaller. The effects of football matches on assaults are
analogous to thefts. In fact, on days with home matches, there are relatively more physical
assaults in areas close to the stadium.
2.3 Data
The data set used for the analysis covers the time window from 2011 to 2015 and contains
regions in which professional football games take place. The analysis is conducted at the
municipality level, the smallest territorial division in Germany. I combine various data
sources to examine the impact of professional football games on violent behavior.
2.3.1 Crime Data
The crime data is derived from the German Police Crime Statistics, which is provided by the
Federal Criminal Police Office.10 It includes the universe of individuals who were victim to
10Many aspects of the data preparation are inspired by Hener (2019) who uses the same data to examine
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Panel D: Assaults across days of the year1
Figure 2.1. Distribution of assaults across time
Notes: The figure shows the distribution of assaults across hours of the day, days of the week, across
months (adjusted for the number of days per month), and across the days of the year in the Federal
Republic of Germany.
1: The figures in panel C and D are solely based on the year 2014. Please consult the appendix for
figures from the other years.
a crime against their legally protected personal rights between 2011 and 2015. However, as
the data is not reported until after police procedures are completed, only data from January
2011 to May 2015 is used to avoid problems with lags between the occurrence of the crime
and the time of reporting. Besides, the month of June is excluded from the analysis as
there are generally no matches during that time of the year. In addition to the time and
place (municipality level) of the crime, the date include the crime type code, the victim’s
age and gender, information on how the attack was carried out (attempt/completed act,
usage of a firearm, lone operator/crime was committed by a group) and information on
the relationship between victim and suspect.11 Roughly 40 percent of victims are female,
the average age is 32 years, and 40 percent of the victims had no prior relationship with
the suspect.
The micro-data is aggregated to the municipality-day level and the main outcome, the
assault rate, is defined as the number of assaults per million population. Assaults are
defined as actions involving physical violence. For that purpose, I use the crime type
code ‘simple willful bodily harm’ (Vorsätzliche einfache Körperverletzung, § 223 StGB).
There are roughly 120 types of criminal offenses (recorded in 6 digit codes), with the vast
majority of cases classified by only a handful of codes.12 Figure B.1 in the Appendix shows
11The relationship between victim and suspect is retrieved in two ways. On the one hand, formal
relationships are recorded (such as types of kinship or acquaintance). On the other hand, relationships
are defined in spatial-social terms (for instance living in the same household, or being in an educational or
care relationship).
12The top 10 of the most prevalent crime keys account for more than 90 percent of the cases.
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the distribution of cases per crime key for the twenty most common offense types in 2014.
‘Simple willful bodily harm’ is by far the most common offense, contributing to about 45
percent of all cases. Due to its prevalence and its association with aggression, I choose this
offense type as the main outcome variable in the analysis.
Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of assaults over time. Panel A displays the variation of
assaults per hour of the day.13 The number of assaults increases during the day and peaks
around midnight. To assign the cases that occur in the early morning hours to the day on
which they originate, I define a day as beginning at 6:00am and ending at 5:59am. Panel
B shows the distribution of assaults by day of the week. There are relatively more assaults
on Fridays and Saturdays, whereas the other days exhibit slightly smaller assault rates.
Panel C shows that the number of assaults has a strong seasonal pattern, with the highest
value recorded in May and the smallest in August.14 Panel D confirms this impression by
plotting the daily number of assaults. New Year’s Eve is a particularly impressive outlier.15
2.3.2 Football Data
The data on football matches is self-collected and is obtained via web scraping from www.
kicker.de and www.transfermarkt.com. All matches played in the first three leagues of
the German football league system in the period from January 2011 until May 2015 are
recorded. The data contains detailed match and table standings parameters, e.g. time and
place of the match, number of spectators, pregame point difference, goals, penalties, cards,
referee characteristics, among others. Furthermore, there is comprehensive information on
the individual teams, such as team size, average age, market value, and the number of
foreign players. The stadiums where the matches take place are geographically encoded.
Figure 2.2 depicts a map with all 69 stadiums included in the data set.
Figure 2.3 illustrates insights into key variables. Panel A shows the number of matches per
day of the week and league. The vast majority of matches takes place between Friday and
Sunday. Games of the lower leagues occasionally also take place during the week. Such
games are held only in the evenings. In contrast, matches on weekends usually take place in
the afternoon. The inclusion of day-of-week fixed effects in the baseline specification helps
to account for the higher share of games played on weekends, which are associated with
higher levels of criminal behavior. Spectator number vary substantially across the three
professional leagues, as depicted in Panel C. The Bundesliga attracts the most spectators
with an average of 44,000 viewers per game, followed by the second league with an average
of 17,000 fans per match, and the lowest league attracts slightly less than 6,000 fans per
game on average.
When investigating channels of how football games may affect assaults, I exploit betting
odds obtained from www.oddsportal.com via web scraping. The betting odds give an idea
of pregame expectations. I translate the odds of the three game outcomes to probabilities
13Roughly 15 percent of the observations do not contain hourly information. This has no consequences
for the main analysis, as I examine daily variation in the assault rate.
14Panel C shows the monthly number of assaults while adjusting for the number of days per month.
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Panel C: Attendance across leagues
Figure 2.3. Football matches
Notes: The figures show key aspects of football games in the data set. Panel A shows how the number
of matches vary over the course of a week, Panel B plots the distribution of matches over the course of
a day, and Panel C shows kernel densities for the number of spectators (in thousand) across the three
leagues.
which are the inverse of the betting odds. The probabilities serve as suitable predictors for
game outcomes, as shown in Appendix Figure B.3.16
2.3.3 Weather Data
The weather data is derived from Germany’s National Meteorological Service (Deutscher
Wetterdienst). In order to construct the weather control variables, I use those weather
monitors which measure the relevant weather variables in the sample period.17 From this
set of monitors, I choose the weather monitor with the closest proximity to a stadium.
The assigned monitor-stadium pairs can be found in Figure 2.2. There is a high quality
of the matches between weather monitors and stadiums, as the average distance between
stadiums and monitors is 15 kilometers. Few of the weather variables have missing data,
which are filled in by propagating forward from the last valid observation to the next valid
observation (i.e. ‘forward fill’).18
16Panel A of Figure B.3 shows the close relationship between the realized score differential and the
probability spread. Panels B and C demonstrate that the probability of winning increases the higher the
probability spread.
17I use daily averages of the following weather variables: daily average, minimum and maximum air
temperature, minimum ground temperature, vapor pressure, air pressure, cloud cover, air humidity, pre-
cipitation, hours of sunshine, snow depth, and wind velocity.
18The weather variables with missing data are (with the share of missing data in parenthesis): Cloud
cover (<1.2 percent) and snow depth (<0.6 percent).
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2.3.4 Holidays
In order to capture any variation in the crime rate between ordinary and special days, I add
controls for public and school holidays, which may differ at the state level.19 Furthermore,
I add a dummy variable for peculiar days (New Year’s Eve and the days surrounding
Carnival), which are not holidays, yet certainly shift the crime rate.
2.3.5 Regional Database
The Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder provide a database
of detailed statistics by various subject areas at a very granular spatial level. Thus, I am
able to create a panel at the municipality-year level containing comprehensive information
on topics such as territory, population, labor market, election results, housing, economic
sectors, and public budgets. The information is used to construct weights for the regression
analysis or to determine assault rates.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
In order to identify the causal effect of football matches on criminal behavior, I exploit
within-region variation over time. To be precise, I compare the regional assault rate on a
game day to the expected assault level conditional on the day of the week, month, and year,
while additionally accounting for other possible confounding variation due to weather and
holidays. In other words, the counterfactual regional assault rate (what would be expected
on a game day in absence of the game), e.g. a Saturday in April 2012, is obtained by using
the regional assault rate on other Saturdays in April 2012 with no games scheduled.
The identification strategy is based on a generalized difference-in-differences approach to
study the impact of football matches on violent behavior. Let Assaultsrdmy denote the
assault rate in region r, on day-of-the-week d, in month m and year y. The assault rate is
defined as the number of assaults per million population and is given by:
Assaultsrdmy = α+ β (Gamedayrdmy) + ϑr + γd + ηm + θy︸ ︷︷ ︸
datedmy
+λXrdmy + εrdmy. (2.1)
Gamedayrdmy is a binary variable that equals one when there is a home game, and zero
otherwise. Region fixed effects ϑr capture time-invariant differences between regions and
ensure that the identification is driven by within instead of between region variation over
time. The vector datedmy contains fixed effects for the day-of-the-week (γd), month (ηm),
and year (θy). This way, the model flexibly controls for day-of-week specific heterogeneity,
seasonal effects, and long-run time trends. I expand the baseline model by adding interac-
tions of region fixed effects with all elements of datedmy, i.e. region-by-day-of-week fixed
effects, region-by-month fixed effects, and region-by-year fixed effects. The interactions ac-
count for systemic changes in the degree of violent behavior over the year for each region.
19The data on school holidays comes from ‘The Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and
Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany’ (Kultusminister Konferenz ). The data
on public holidays is collected from https://www.schulferien.org/deutschland/feiertage/.
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The vector Xrdmy includes school and public holidays and weather controls.20 I compute
two-way cluster-robust standard errors to capture arbitrary correlation at the region-year
and year-month levels. Observations are weighted with the population figures from the
Federal Statistical Office.
The implicit assumption for interpreting the parameter of interest β as the causal effect of
a home game on violent behavior is that the location and the time of a football match are
orthogonal to the number of assaults, conditional on the covariates. However, displacement
effects may pose a threat to identification. On the one hand, this refers to spatial displace-
ment effects, which may occur when (violence-prone) people from distant regions visit a
game. On the other hand, this includes temporal displacement effects, which happen when
assaults are shifted from adjacent days to game days. In both cases, the parameter would
overestimate the impact of a football match on violent behavior as the offense would have
been committed regardless, but at a different time or place. To rule out the possibility
that displacement effects compromise the validity of the identification strategy, I investi-
gate the effect of football games on neighboring regions and on days adjacent to game days
in section 2.5.2. I find that the main results, namely an increase in violent behavior in
regions where football games take place, are not neutralized by a decrease in the number
of assaults in surrounding regions or on days adjacent to game days.
Given the design of the empirical approach, there could be another potential threat to the
validity of the identification strategy. By focusing on home games in the main analysis,
the counterfactuals may be biased downwards as days with away games are part of the
control group. This control group problem may be due to violent fan groups traveling with
their team to away games, potentially leading to a decline in the assault rate in the home
region. To address this concern, I perform the analysis again, differentiating between home
and away games. When considering distinct effects for home and away games, I find that
away games do not significantly affect the assault rate in the home region.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Main Results
Before presenting the regression results, Figure 2.4 gives an intuitive preview of the main
findings. Using the same data as in the main analysis, it shows the assault rate across the
days of the week.21 The daily rates are presented for days with and without home games.
The average daily assault rate is higher for weeks when a home game is played than when
no game is played. The difference in means is statistically significant for all days except
20Public holiday controls include binary variables (at the level of the Federal States) for All Saints’ Day,
Ascension Day, Assumption Day, Christmas, Corpus Christi, Epiphany, Easter, German Unity Day, Good
Friday, Labor Day, New Year’s Day, Penance Day, Pentecost, and Reformation Day. Moreover, it contains
dummy variables for Carnival and New Year’s Eve.
Weather controls (at the regional level) include average air temperature, maximum air temperature, mini-
mum air temperature, minimum ground temperature, steam pressure, cloud cover, air pressure, humidity,
average precipitation, hours of sunshine, snow depth, and wind speed.
21Appendix Figure B.4 shows the same scheme using the raw number of assaults across days of the week

















Figure 2.4. The average assault rate on gamedays and days where no game takes place
Notes: The figure shows the daily average number of assaults per million population for regions that
host games of a football team from the top three leagues. The daily rates are shown for weeks in which
a game is played and for weeks in which no game takes place.
Tuesdays and Wednesdays.22 The empirical model exploits the variation in the number
of assaults across the days of the week, and in particular how the pattern varies between
weeks with and without games.
Table 2.1 reports estimates corresponding to equation 2.1 when continuously adding more
controls. The dependent variable is the assault rate, which is defined as the number of
offenses per million population. In column 1, I include region, day-of-week, month, and
year fixed effects. In column 2 weather controls are added. Holidays fixed effects are
included in column 3. In column 4, I control for region-specific date fixed effects. Note
that although the estimates vary marginally across columns, I use throughout the paper
the model presented in column 4 for the analyses that follow. The estimate from the
preferred specification in column 4 suggests that a home game increases the assault rate
by an average of 2.677 assaults per million population. This corresponds to an increase of
21.5 percent compared to the level without games.
Having established that football games lead to more assaults, I now shed light on the
victims of these additional offenses. Panel A of Table 2.2 shows the effect of football
games on the assault rate by victim characteristics. First, columns 1 and 2 show the effect
heterogeneity by gender. Although the estimates for women and men are statistically
different from zero, the vast majority of additional victims are male. Male victimization
rates increase on average by 2.432 offenses per million population. The increased assault
22The average assault rate on Thursdays with games is very high compared to Thursdays without games.
This may be the result of very few games take place on a Thursday. In my sample, only 18 (0.4 percent)
of all games take place on a Thursday.
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Table 2.1. Effects on assault rate
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Game day 2.740∗∗∗ 2.766∗∗∗ 2.813∗∗∗ 2.677∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.312) (0.313) (0.284)
Effect size [%] 22.00 22.21 22.59 21.50
Observations 88,028 88,028 88,028 88,028
Region FE X X X X
Date FE X X X X
Weather Controls - X X X
Holiday FE - - X X
Interact FE - - - X
Notes: Estimates are based on the model shown in equation 2.1. The specifi-
cations use daily data (excluding June) spanning the time window 2011-2015
for regions that host games of a football team from the top three leagues of the
German football league system. The outcome variable is defined as the num-
ber of assaults per million population. Population-weighted coefficients show
the change in the outcome variable due to a home game. Days are defined
to run from 6:00am until 5:59am the following day to accommodate the fact
that offenses committed in the early morning hours have their origin in the
preceding day. The effect size corresponds to the percent change of the assault
rate due to a football game in relation to the mean when no game takes place.
Control variables shown as Date FE include dummies for day-of-week, month,
and year. Weather controls include air temperature (average, maximum, and
minimum), minimum ground temperature, vapor pressure, air pressure, cloud
cover, air humidity, precipitation, hours of sunshine, snow depth and wind
velocity. Holiday FE are dummy variables for public and school holidays, as
well as for other peculiar days. Control variables shown as Interact FE consist
of interactions of region dummies with all elements of the date fixed effects.
Two-way clustered standard errors at region-year and year-month level are
reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
rate for males accounts for more than 90 percent of the effect found for the entire sample.
Figure 2.5 shows the age profile of the impact of football games on the assault rate for
each gender. For women, the point estimates are small in magnitude and not significantly
different from zero. Women aged 40-49 are the only exception. In contrast, the effects for
adult men are throughout significant. The largest effect for males is found in the 18-29
age group and decreases thereafter. Second, I explore effect heterogeneity according to the
relationship between victim and suspect. Columns 3 and 4 distinguish the relationships
from a formal perspective, such as kinship or acquaintance. Although both estimates are
positive and statistically significant, the majority of additional assaults involves victims
with no prior connection to the suspect. The victimization rate of strangers to the suspect
increases by on average 1.939 assaults per million population. This implies that almost
three out of four additional cases involve this type of victim-suspect pairing. Column 5
considers spatial-social relationships, namely whether victim and suspect live in the same
household. A football game increases the number of domestic assaults by on average
0.096 assaults per million population. This implies that only few (13 percent) victims
who know the suspects also live in the same household with them. Third, the effect of
the victim’s occupation is investigated. Column 6 shows the impact of football games on
violent behavior directed at police officers on duty. The victimization rate of police officers
increases on average by 0.434 assaults per million population. Thus, almost 16 percent of
the additional assaults resulting from football games are attributed to attacks on police
officers. In short, the additional victims are young males with no prior relationship to the
2.5. Results 71
Table 2.2. Effect heterogeneity by victim and crime characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Victim characteristics
Gender Victim-suspect-relationship Occupation




Game day 0.245∗∗∗ 2.432∗∗∗ 1.939∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.232) (0.207) (0.116) (0.045) (0.078)
Effect size [%] 4.99 32.27 40.43 9.64 5.40 96.98
Observations 88,028 88,028 88,028 88,028 88,028 88,028
Panel B: Crime characteristics
Timingc Assault execution
Spring Summer Fall Winter Attempt Completedact
Game day 2.817∗∗∗ 1.482∗∗ 2.478∗∗∗ 2.849∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 2.310∗∗∗
(0.404) (0.484) (0.372) (0.535) (0.060) (0.238)
Effect size [%] 21.00 13.40 20.71 22.51 56.21 19.58
Observations 27,140 14,632 21,476 24,780 88,028 88,028
Notes: The estimates are based on the model shown in equation 2.1 and use the same outcome and controls
as column 4 of Table 2.1 (including region and date fixed effects, their interactions as well as holiday and
weather controls). See Table 2.1 for additional details. Two-way clustered standard errors at region-year and
year-month level are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
a: covers formal relationships (e.g. types of kinship or acquaintance).
b: covers spatial-social relationships (whether victim and suspect live in the same household).
c: spring (Mar-May), summer (Jul+Aug), fall (Sep-Nov), winter (Dec-Feb).
suspect. Hence, the victims and the people who usually gather in and around football
stadiums are similar in demographic terms (PwC, 2016).
In the next step, I consider effect heterogeneity by crime characteristics. Columns 1-4 in
Panel B of Table 2.2 show the heterogeneity of the effect by the time of the offense. The
impact of a football game on the assault rate is smallest in summer months, with 1.482
assaults per million population, representing an increase of 13.4 percent. The football
season starts in the summer months (July and August). At this point, the results of the
games are not yet so important. The estimates are higher (but not significantly different
from each other) at other times of the season. Columns 5 and 6 consider effect heterogeneity
by assault execution (attempt/completed offense). I find that the effects of football games
on the assault rate are mostly driven by completed offenses with on average 2.310 additional
assaults per million population. The share of attempted assaults also increases, but at a
smaller rate of 0.367 additional attempted assaults per million population on average.
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Figure 2.5. The age profile of the impact of football matches on the assault rate
Notes: The figure shows estimates and 95% confidence intervals across age brackets and by gender. To estimate
the effect, I use the model shown in equation 2.1 in its richest specification with all covariates and population
weights. The outcome variable is defined as the number of assaults per million population.
2.5.2 Potential Threats to Identification and Validity of the Design
In this section, I consider the possibility that my results do not reflect additional assaults
due to football games, but merely shifts in offenses. Furthermore, I test the sensitivity of
the main results by additionally including away games in the model.
Previously, I have presented evidence that football games increase the assault rate. How-
ever, it is possible that I only capture an effect that shifts offenses. For example, the
increase in violent behavior may be offset by a decline in assaults in other areas or at dif-
ferent times (Lindo et al., 2018). In other words, the assault would have been committed
regardless, but at a different time or location. One explanation may be different population
flows around days on which games take place.
In order to estimate spatial displacement effects, I investigate the impact of football matches
on neighboring regions. A neighboring region is a municipality that shares a border with
a region in which a stadium is located.23 Figure 2.2 shows a map of the selected regions.
The sample of neighboring regions exhibits a considerably higher number of observations.
This is owed to the fact that a region with a stadium has on average slightly more than 11
neighboring municipalities. Panel A of Table 2.3 shows the estimates of the impact of a
home game on these neighboring regions. In comparison to the baseline effects, the spatial
spillover coefficients are small and not significantly different from zero. Consequently, the
results do not suggest offsetting spatial spillover effects.
In the next step, temporal displacement effects are considered. To capture these effects, I
include a one-day lead and lag of the game day indicator. Panel B of Table 2.3 contains
the estimates when including the temporal spillover components in the baseline model.
The estimates of the game day itself are not significantly different from the baseline model.
Almost all of the coefficients for the day before and after the game are small in magnitude
and not statistically significant. The only exception is the estimate for the day before
the game in column 4, which implies that a football game leads to an average increase of
0.352 assaults per million population on the day before a game. The positive coefficient,
23If two municipalities share a border and each of the regions contains a stadium, both regions will not
serve as neighbor regions and they are dismissed from the set of spatial spillover candidates.
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Table 2.3. Displacement effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Spatial displacement
Game day 0.144 0.153 0.170 0.210
(0.146) (0.146) (0.147) (0.154)
Effect size [%] 2.58 2.74 3.04 3.75
Observations 960,848 960,848 960,848 960,848
Panel B: Temporal displacement
Game day 2.777∗∗∗ 2.810∗∗∗ 2.857∗∗∗ 2.770∗∗∗
(0.346) (0.338) (0.336) (0.300)
Day after game -0.105 -0.076 -0.065 0.279
(0.189) (0.190) (0.192) (0.182)
Day before game 0.287 0.318 0.339 0.352∗
(0.241) (0.238) (0.229) (0.206)
Effect size [%] 22.34 22.60 22.98 22.28
Observations 87,438 87,438 87,438 87,438
Region FE X X X X
Date FE X X X X
Weather Controls - X X X
Holiday FE - - X X
Interact FE - - - X
Notes: Estimates are based on the model shown in equation 2.1. Panel A contains specifications that
use daily data (excluding June) spanning the time window 2011-2015 for regions that share a border
with a distract in which a stadium is located. Panel B shows specifications that use daily data (excluding
June) spanning the time window 2011-2015 for regions that host games of a football team from the
top three leagues. The outcome variable is defined as the number of assaults per million population.
Population-weighted coefficients show the change in the outcome variable due to a home game. Days
are defined to run from 6:00am until 5:59am the following day to accommodate the fact that offenses
committed in the early morning hours have their origin in the preceding day. The effect size corresponds
to the percent change of the assault rate due to a football game in relation to the mean when no game
takes place. The estimates are based on the model shown in equation 2.1 and use the same set of
controls as column 4 of Table 2.1 (including region and date fixed effects, their interactions as well as
holiday and weather controls). See Table 2.1 for additional details. Two-way clustered standard errors
at region-year and year-month level are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
however, does not suggest temporal displacement effects, which would require a negative
estimate. Rather, it indicates additional assaults due to activity on the day preceding
important games.
As discussed above, the baseline model considers the effect of football matches, but only
for home games. This restriction may compromise the validity of the design. When away
matches are not accounted for, they end up in the control group. The control observations
might be biased downwards if the most devoted (and possibly violent) fans leave their home
municipality to accompany their local team to an away game. The resulting decrease in
the assault rate at home due to the absence of local agitators imply that days with away
matches can no longer function as control units. To address this concern, I investigate
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Table 2.4. Effect of football games on the assault rate, distinction








Home game day 2.910∗∗∗
(0.335)
Away game day 0.325
(0.213)
Effect size [%] 21.22 21.97
Observations 61,172 61,172
Notes: The specifications use daily data (excluding June) spanning the time
window 2011-2015 for regions that host games of a football team from the top
two leagues. The estimates are based on the model shown in equation 2.1 and
use the same set of controls as column 4 of Table 2.1 (including region and date
fixed effects, their interactions as well as holiday and weather controls). See
Table 2.1 for additional details. Two-way clustered standard errors at region-
year and year-month level are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1: Effect size corresponds to the coefficient of Home game day.
the effect of home and away matches separately. To analyze the effect of away matches,
the design of my data set must be modified. In the baseline version, the football data
is merged with other datasets at the match level (the region ID of the home team serves
as the identifier). In this case, I use the football data at the table standings level. In
other words, both the home and away teams are matched with a region. This approach
leads to ambiguity regarding the treatment status of individual regions.24 For instance,
the treatment status of regions with more than one team is ambiguous when there is a
home and an away match on the same day. To alleviate this concern, I exclude the third
league from the sample and focus exclusively on the first two leagues.25 This approach
helps considerably to clarify the treatment status of a region. Table 2.4 shows the results
when home and away matches are examined separately. To compare the estimated effects,
column 1 shows estimates retrieved from the baseline model (home matches only) when the
sample is adjusted as described above. Column 2 presents the estimates that incorporate
the impact of home and away games on the assault rate. The effect of a home game is
sizable, leading to an average increase in the assault rate of 2.910 assaults per million
population. The coefficient is not significantly different from that in column 1. A negative
and significant estimate of an away game would compromise the identification strategy.
However, the estimate of an away game is small in magnitude and not significantly different
from zero. Thus, the results suggest that focusing exclusively on home games does not
render the identification strategy invalid.
24When only considering home games, the treatment status is not a problem. This is due to the fact
that local authorities do not allow two home games on the same day.
25Some ambiguities remain, but they are solved as follows: 12 percent of the matches still include a
duplication of two teams per region playing on the same day, either one home and one away game, or




This section investigates potential mechanisms through which football games may cause
additional assaults. I consider emotional cues and the prominence of games as potential
channels.
First, I consider emotional cues. This is motivated by the findings of Card and Dahl (2011)
who demonstrate that unexpected defeats of local football teams trigger family violence.
The results can be best explained with the frustration-aggression hypothesis, first proposed
by Dollard et al. (1939), which predicts aggressive behavior in the event of frustrating
events. Rees and Schnepel (2009) similarly show that there are more violent offenses when
the local college football team suffers a defeat. For this reason, I analyze in Table 2.5
whether visceral factors may be the reason for the additional assaults. In column 1 I
investigate whether an emotionally upsetting event during a game leads to a higher assault
rate. To answer this question, I create an index that equals one for games that include at
least one of the following potentially troubling events: a penalty is awarded (20 percent of
all games), a player receives a red card (10 percent of all games), or the referee receives an
insufficient grade (15 percent of all games). The index shows that 35 percent of all games
involve at least one upsetting episode as defined in the previous categories. The estimates
in column 1 do not suggest that emotional cues trigger more violent behavior since the
estimates for games with and without upsetting events are not significantly different. In
the second and third column, I show estimates following the approach of Card and Dahl
(2011). I examine the impact of game outcomes relative to their pregame expectations.
Pregame expectations are included in the analysis as matches with contrasting predictions
may be very different from each other. By including predicted outcomes, I can estimate the
effect that results from the defeat of a team that was expected to win, and vice versa. Using
data from oddsportal.com, I define a game as unpredictable when the absolute probability
difference between winning and loosing is smaller than 20 percentage points.26 When the
spread’s value exceeds the threshold, a win or a loss of the home game is expected. Around
45 percent of the games are expected to be close, another 45 percent are expected to be
won, while 10 percent of the games are expected to be lost. The significantly larger share of
expected victories may be attributed to the home-advantage. In column 2, I first examine
the effects of matches with distinct predicted match outcomes. The estimates do not
suggest that the effect of games with different predicted outcomes vary systematically from
each other. In column 3, I additionally include interactions between expected and actual
game outcomes. The estimates are relatively small in magnitude and not significantly
different from zero, implying that unexpected wins/losses do not cause additional assaults.
Altogether, there is no evidence that emotional cues drive violent behavior in the context
of professional football games in Germany.
Second, I examine game and team prominence as potential channels. For many sports
fans, the affection for their football team plays a central role (Wann and Branscombe,
1993). Almost as important is the cultivation of animosities against rivals. Resentment
and hatred is likely to lead to violent actions (Nassauer, 2011). To test the hypothesis
that the additional assaults are the result of hostile feelings, I compare the impact of
matches played between known rival teams to regular matches. The game day indicator
from equation 2.1 is replaced by an interaction with a dummy variable that equals one for
high-rivalry matches. Local derbies (games between two competing teams that are based in
26Similar results are obtained when I define different threshold values and when I deviate from the
symmetry around the origin.
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Table 2.5. Effect of emotional cues
(1) (2) (3)








Upset event (Index) 2.717∗∗∗
(0.406)
No upset event (Index) 2.655∗∗∗
(0.289)
Expected to lose 3.495∗∗∗ 3.376∗∗∗
(0.722) (0.836)
Expected to win 2.752∗∗∗ 2.907∗∗∗
(0.366) (0.356)
Expected to be close 2.437∗∗∗ 2.369∗∗∗
(0.321) (0.383)
Expected to lose and won 0.599
(1.554)
Expected to be close and lost 0.194
(0.610)
Expected to win and lost -0.792
(0.667)
Observations 88,028 88,028 88,028
Notes: The gameday indicator is replaced by an index that captures unsettling events. The upset event
index in column 1 is defined as a dummy variable equal to one if one of the following events take place:
a penalty is awarded (20% of all games), a red card is being issued (10% of all games), or the referee
receives a non-sufficient grade (15% of all games). In columns 2 and 3, I use data from oddsportal.com
to classify games as expected to win/lose/be close. The estimates are based on the model shown in
equation 2.1 and use the same set of controls as column 4 of Table 2.1 (including region and date fixed
effects, their interactions as well as holiday and weather controls). See Table 2.1 for additional details.
Two-way clustered standard errors at region-year and year-month level are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
regions of close geographical proximity) constitute high-rivalry matches.27 The estimates
are shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.6. Games that are classified as high-rivalry matches
lead to an average increase of 8.320 assaults per million population. This corresponds to
more than three times the baseline effect. Although the standard errors are relatively large,
considering that only 2.5 percent of the games are classified as high-rivalry matches, the
effect is significantly different from that for regular matches. The higher rate of physical
assaults during high-rivalry matches could also be rationalized by the social learning theory,
according to which spectators mimic behavior seen on the field. For instance, the number
of yellow and red cards is significantly higher in high-rivalry matches.28 Finally, the mere
prominence of teams/games might attract more (violent) people. As shown in Figure
2.3, the number of spectators varies substantially in the various divisions of the German
football league system. Columns 3-5 shows the effect of games by the league in which the
27Appendix Table B.2 gives an overview of high-rivalry matches.
28The number of cards in derby matches is 4.324 (s.e.=0.174), while the number in regular matches is
3.906 (s.e.=0.029).
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Table 2.6. Effect of game and team prominence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Rivals/derbies League
High-rivalry Regular League 1 League 2 League 3
Game day 8.320∗∗∗ 2.387∗∗∗ 3.530∗∗∗ 1.878∗∗∗ 1.569∗∗∗
(1.746) (0.275) (0.460) (0.318) (0.350)
Effect size [%] 66.81 19.17 28.35 15.08 12.60
Observations 88,028 88,028 88,028 88,028 88,028
Notes: The estimates are based on the model shown in equation 2.1 and use the same set of
controls as column 4 of Table 2.1 (including region and date fixed effects, their interactions
as well as holiday and weather controls). See Table 2.1 for additional details. The gameday
indicator is replaced by interactions with dummy variables for rival matches and league affili-
ation. Two-way clustered standard errors at region-year and year-month level are reported in
parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
teams play. The largest effect can be found for the highest league, the Bundesliga, in which
one game leads to an increase in the assault rate by on average 3.530 assaults per million
population. The impact of first division matches is significantly larger than the effect of
matches in the other two leagues. Summing up, there is evidence that the prominence of
games is a crucial determinant of the effect size of football matches on the assault rate,
with high-rivalry matches and top league games leading to more assaults.
2.5.4 Robustness Tests
I perform several sensitivity and placebo tests to assess the robustness of the findings. The
results of these checks are reported in Table 2.7. Overall, the sensitivity tests demonstrate
that the main results are robust to alternative specifications and estimations, indicating
that football games do indeed lead to more assaults.
Alternative Econometric Specifications.—First, I show that the results are not sen-
sitive to alterations in the sample. Adjustments to the sample may be necessary as some
of the games are played on different days than originally planned. Deviation from the orig-
inal match schedule may pose a risk to the allocation of games that is plausibly random.
For this reason, I exclude the set of rescheduled games from the analysis. The results are
almost identical to the baseline results.29 Second, I show the effects of omitting population
weights from the regressions. The effect of football matches without considering population
weights is considerably larger: a home game leads to an increase in the average assault rate
by 5.342 assaults per million population. The higher coefficient compared to the baseline
specification indicates that the effects of rural areas must be larger, as they become more
relevant when population weights are omitted. Third, I show that my results are robust to
a different estimation procedure and an alternative measure of the dependent variable. In
the following, I use the raw number of assaults as the outcome variable. Given the discrete
29Of the 4,461 games in the sample, 2.24 percent are rescheduled. The vast majority of rescheduled
matches (95 percent) take place in league three.
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Table 2.7. Robustness tests: Impact on assault rate




Baseline 2.677∗∗∗ (0.284) 21.50 88,028
Econometric specification
Drop delayed games 2.699∗∗∗ (0.288) 21.67 87,928
No population weights 5.342∗∗∗ (0.566) 42.90 88,028
Poisson model1 1.483∗∗∗ (0.238) 28.55 87,475
Other forms of violence
Broadly defined assaults 5.417∗∗∗ (0.529) 27.76 88,028
Threats 0.216∗∗∗ (0.079) 5.44 88,028
Resistance to enforcement 0.775∗∗∗ (0.103) 45.50 88,028
Notes: The specifications use daily data (excluding June) spanning the time window 2011-2015
for regions that host games of a football team from the top three leagues. The outcome variable
is defined as the number of assaults per million population. Except where otherwise noted, the
specifications use population-weights. Days are defined to run from 6:00am until 5:59am the
following day to accommodate the fact that offenses committed in the early morning hours
have their origin in the preceding day. The effect size corresponds to the percent change of
the assault rate due to a football game in relation to the mean when no game takes place. All
specifications use region and date fe, their interactions, weather controls, and holiday FE. Two-
way clustered standard errors at region-year and year-month level are reported in parentheses.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
1: number of assaults is dependent variable.
nature of the dependent variable and the fact that there are many cells with zero reports,
I employ a Poisson model. The corresponding regression specification reads as follows:




β (Gamedayrdmy) + ϑr + datedmy + λXrdmy
)
. (2.2)
Due to the nonlinearity of the model, the coefficient in Table 2.7 shows average marginal
effects of a home game on the number of physical assaults.30 A home game is predicted to
lead to an average increase of 1.483 assaults. This represents a 28.55 percent increase in
the number of assaults.
Other Forms of Violence.—Next, I investigate the robustness of the findings when con-
sidering at other forms of violence. First, a broader definition of assaults is considered. In
addition to offenses coded as ‘simple willful bodily harm’, I further include negligent, dan-
gerous, and grievous bodily harm as well as brawls. Appendix Table B.1 illustrates which
offenses are included in the expanded definition of assaults and how the penal codes of the
German Criminal Code (StGB) are translated into the offense keys of the Police Crime
Statistics. The effect size of 5.417 assaults per million population is significantly larger
than the baseline coefficient. This indicates that football games also lead to an increase
in other forms of physical violence. Second, I investigate the effect of football games on
30In nonlinear models, coefficients cannot be interpreted as marginal effects. The partial effect for a
Poisson model is given by ∂E[Assaults|X]
∂xj
= βj exp(x
′β). In order to present a single response value, I follow
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Figure 2.6. The effect of placebo games
Notes: The figure shows the effect of placebo games. Panel A presents the distribution of the coefficients
(along with a normal density) after 10,000 iterations. Panel B shows the distribution of the t-statistics and
the resulting ranges of significant coefficients, with a level of significance α = 0.05. Panel C shows the fraction
of significant estimates across the number of iterations.
threats, which can be regarded as a precursor of physical violence. The effect size of 0.216
threats per million population is relatively small. The estimate represents a 5.4 percent
increase. Third, offenses coded as resisting law enforcement officers are examined. I find
that football games lead to on average 0.775 offenses per million population. Overall, the
results of these robustness checks indicate that other forms of violence are also affected by
professional football games. This suggests that there is no substitution of different types
of crime, but that additional violent offenses are committed.
Placebo Games.—I estimate the impact of placebo games on the assault rate to test
whether the previous results are only due to chance.31 The actual matches take place on
about five percent of the days in the sample. To estimate the effect of placebo games, I
drop the affected days with the actual matches and randomly assign dummy indicators with
the same frequency of the real matches. Subsequently, I estimate the model as shown in
equation 2.1. This procedure is carried out 10,000 times and the results are shown in Figure
2.6. Panel A displays the distribution of the coefficients. As expected, the coefficients are
centered around zero. Panel B illustrates the distribution of the t-statistics. The red area
below the kernel density indicates significant estimates for a significance level of α = 0.05.
Note that the t-statistics of the preferred specification in Table 2.1 (2.677/0.284=9.43) is
almost 2.5 times higher than the largest observed value in any of the 10,000 simulations.
Panel C shows that with 10,000 iterations, 6.57 percent of the estimates are significantly
31Unfortunately, there are no offenses that can function as placebo outcomes. This is because most of
the offenses covered in the PCS are potentially affected by football games.
80 Chapter 2. Crime Externalities from Football Games
different from zero. At a significance level of α = 0.01, there are 3.06 percent significant
estimates. The low levels of significant coefficients confirm that the previous results are
not due to chance.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the impact of professional football games on violent behavior.
To estimate the causal effects of football games on physical assaults, I use a generalized
difference-in-differences approach that exploits variation in the timing of matches. I com-
pare regional assault rates on days with and without matches, conditional on the day of the
week, month, and year while additionally accounting for potential confounding variation
coming from weather and holidays. I match web-scraped information on 4,461 football
matches with data on local assault rates, weather, holidays, and population figures to con-
struct a panel at the municipality-day level for the period 2011-2015. I find that a home
game increases the average assault rate by 21.5 percent. Male victimization rates drive
the results and are particularly high for the 18-29 age group. Besides, the the effects are
larger for victims with no prior relationship to the suspect and for completed offenses.
There are no offsetting reductions in assault rates on days adjacent to game days or in
nearby regions. In examining potential channels, I find no evidence that emotional cues
are responsible for the increase in assaults on game days. Although there is no evidence
supporting the frustration-aggression hypothesis, I find large effects for prominent games
and teams. In fact, this set of results suggests that spectators mimic player behavior, select
into specific matches, or that the mere agglomeration of fans leads to an increase in the
assault rates on game days.
I find the external effects of football games on violent behavior to be large in magnitude and
economically relevant. For instance, professional football games explain 17.7 percent of all
assault reports in the regions in which professional football clubs are located. Back-of-the-
envelope calculations indicate that football games in the top three leagues of the German
league system precipitate an additional 18,770 assaults in the 2014/15 season,32 which
translate into annual social cost of 95 million euros.33 The Coase (1960) theorem states
that market failures resulting from externalities can be solved without public intervention
(taxpayers do not have to pay for police operations) under the following conditions: clearly
defined property rights, complete information, and low/no transaction costs. The question
is whether the negative externalities would be internalized in absence of state action. To
this end, the football clubs must (i) have an incentive to prevent violence at the events and
(ii) be able to implement the incentive effectively (Daumann, 2012). As for the former,
the clubs have a credible interest in maintaining a peaceful atmosphere. Otherwise fans,
sponsors, and media might choose to avoid the matches. Moreover, clubs can either employ
private security companies or reimburse the costs of police operations to effectively prevent
violence in and around the stadiums. Therefore, it should be in the clubs’ own interest
to provide funding for security. Critics might argue that this procedure is incompatible
with the constitution, as public safety is a sovereign right and obligation. However, from
32These calculations are based on an estimated reduction in assaults per million population per day,
335 days of the football season, and a population of 20,93 million in the affected regions. The number of
prevented assaults for the 2014/15 season is: 2.677× 335× 20,930,000
1,000,000
= 18, 770.
33To calculate the annual social cost, I use an estimated cost of 5,067 euros (in 2020 prices) for one
assault (Glaubitz et al., 2016).
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an economic perspective, it is helpful to distinguish between stadium grounds and public
space when discussing the reimbursement of costs for police operations (Mause, 2020).
On stadium grounds, a football match can be considered a private good.34 Accordingly,
consumers and producers should pay to ensure security. In contrast, socialization of police
costs is justifiable in the public domain as all members of the society benefit equally. This
regulation, the assumption of police costs on the club premises, is consistent with the
statutes in France, Switzerland, and Great Britain. From the point of view of welfare
economics, both positive and negative externalities need to be considered and it must be
analyzed whether football matches increase social welfare. However, many positive effects
of football matches are not externalities in the strict sense as they have already been
internalized.35 Therefore, an interesting task for future research is to assess all relevant
externalities, positive and negative alike, and evaluate whether professional football games
generate a positive social net utility.
34The attendance of a football match can be regarded as a private good as both conditions of rivalry
(each seat can only be sold once) and excludability (the host can deny some people access) are satisfied.
35Many economic agents have to pay a fee to be included in the value chain of professional football, such
as television companies that pay fees to be allowed to broadcast the sporting events.
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Figure B.1. The types of criminal offenses
Notes: The figure depicts the frequency distribution of the most common criminal offenses in the Federal
Republic of Germany in 2014. The most common offense type is simple willful bodily harm (224000), followed
by threats (232300), and two forms of dangerous and serious bodily injury (222110 & 222010). These four
offense types together comprise around 75% of all criminal offenses.
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Figure B.2. The stadiums
Notes: This map shows the stadiums used in the analysis over the seasons 2010/11 until 2014/15. The black
outlines indicate federal state boundaries.
Source: Own representation with data from the Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and
Spatial Development (BBSR).
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Figure B.3. Pregame probability spread and actual game outcomes
Notes: Panel A shows the relationship between realized score differential versus the pregame probability spread. The
realized score differential is defined as the home team’s minus the guest team’s final score. The plotted regression
line has an intercept of -0.020 (s.e. =0.29) and a slope of 2.328 (s.e. = 0.095). Panel B presents the fraction of
actual game results by predicted outcome classifications. Panel C shows the probability of winning a game as a
function of the probability spread. The curve is obtained from a regression using a third-order polynomial.
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Figure B.4. Average number of assaults on gamedays and days when no game takes place
Notes: The figure shows the daily average number of assaults for regions that host games of a football team from
the top three leagues of the German football league system. The daily rates are shown for weeks in which a game
is played and for weeks in which no game takes place.
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B.2 Tables
Table B.1. Coding of various offenses
(1) (2)
offense key § StGB
Broadly defined assault
Simple willful bodily harm 224000 223
Negligent bodily harm 225000 229
Dangerous bodily harm 222010,222110 224
Grievous bodily harm 222020,222120 226
Brawls 222030,222130 231
Resistance to enforcement officers 621021,621029 113
Threatening commission of serious criminal offense 232300 241
Notes: The table shows how the keys of the Police Crime Statistics are translated into the corresponding
paragraphs of the German Criminal Code (StGB).
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Table B.2. High-rivalry matches
(1) (2) (3)






















Rostock St. Pauli Derby
Notes: The table shows prominent matches between teams that
are known rivals. The above mentioned fixtures make up almost
2.5% of all matches in the sample.
Source: Spiegel (2020), 90min.de (2020), derbys.org (2020)
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Chapter 3
The Power of Youth: School Strikes
for Climate and Electoral Outcomes∗
3.1 Introduction
While the scientific case for mitigating climate change is clear, the political will for bold
action remains limited. One pathway out of this dilemma is for voters to no longer accept
the risks of climate-related problems and demand political change. Nevertheless, because
of the long-term character of climate change risks and the likely delay before mitigating
policies will pay off, the support for decisive action against climate change can differ sub-
stantially across generations. Indeed, as opposed to older generations, today’s young are
typically much less likely to accept the status quo as they will experience the brunt of
projected mid-century impacts of climate change (Hersch and Viscusi, 2006). Children
and youth, in particular, have often been at the forefront of demanding adaptive measures
against climate change. Already in 1992, during the UN Climate Conference in Rio de
Janeiro, the then 12-year old Severn Cullis-Suzuki addressed delegates by stressing that:
“You must change your ways; [. . . ] losing my future is not like losing an election
or a few points on the stock market.”
Since then, the consequences of human-caused climate change have become ever more
visible, as evidenced by new temperature records almost every year, the melting of the
polar ice caps, and the appearance of more extreme weather phenomena. Tellingly, over the
course of 2019, Greta Thunberg, the Swedish teen climate activist, has inspired especially
young people around the globe to stage some of the largest environmental protests in
history. For instance, on Friday, September 20, 2019, roughly four million protesters in
more than 150 countries demanded action to fight climate change during the Global Week
for Future.
Against this background, our aim is to examine whether school strikes that recently set
the tone for environmental protest action worldwide (Fridays For Future, henceforth FFF)
led to political and economic change. In economics, an extensive literature examines
∗This chapter is based on joint work with Helmut Rainer and Maria Waldinger.
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the transmission of values and attitudes from adults to children and its consequences
for children’s behavior (Bisin and Verdier, 2001, Figlio et al., 2019). By contrast, our
hypothesis centers around a reverse intergenerational transmission mechanism: youth’s
participation in environmental protests may raise environmental awareness among their
parents’ generation and society as a whole. This, in turn, may trigger consumption changes
towards more environmentally-friendly products, cause adjustments in mobility and travel
behavior, and lead to higher demand for ‘green politics’ aimed at mitigating the adverse
effects of climate change.
The specific question we attempt to answer in this paper is: Did the mobilization of young
people to the climate cause have a discernible impact on electoral outcomes in general and
on the demand for green politics in particular? We strive to shed light on this question
by studying the spread of FFF climate strikes in Germany. Inspired by Greta Thunberg’s
Skolstrejk för klimatet in front of the Swedish parliament in August 2018, FFF quickly
turned into a large social movement of school students who skip classes, mostly on Fridays,
to participate in mass strikes over climate change inaction. In Germany, the first few
climate strikes took place in mid-December 2018, and the FFF movement then gained
significant momentum throughout 2019, staging thousands of local climate strikes across
the country. The strike activity reached its peak during the Global Week of Climate action
in September, when roughly 1.4 million individuals participated in climate protests.
In the first part of the paper, our core contribution is to develop a time-varying, municipality-
level measure of youth’s propensity to participate in climate strikes. This is a non-trivial
challenge due to the geography of mass protests: while strikes are often organized in some
central location (e.g., the main city of a region), its participants typically originate both
from within and outside that location (e.g., neighboring or more distant municipalities).
We tackle this challenge in three steps. First, based on information we collected from police
forces, city councils, municipal authorities, and social media, we build up a database con-
sisting of more than 2,300 climate strikes in over 330 German cities during 2019. Second,
exploiting cell phone-based tracking data consisting of daily counts of journeys between
260,000 origin-destination pairs, we compute the excess mobility between locations by tak-
ing residuals from regressions of the number of journeys between origin i and destination
j on day t on a rich set of fixed effects and controls. Third, merging the daily origin-
destination mobility residuals with our strike database, we obtain a measure of protest
participation that proxies for each strike the geographic distribution of its participants.
Crucially, this measure allows us to trace out how protest participation in support of FFF
evolved across time and space in Germany. We perform several sensitivity tests to assess
the robustness of our strike participation measure and validate our approach for identifying
the geographic distribution of individuals attending mass events by examining professional
soccer games.
In the second part of the paper, we use time-series and municipality-level variation in our
protest participation data to study the role of youth environmental activism in adults’
voting behavior. Over the course of 2019, Germany saw four elections: a nation-wide
EU election in spring and three federal state elections spread out over the second half of
the year. In all four ballots, and especially in the nation-wide EU election, voter turnout
increased substantially compared to previous elections. In three out of the four elections,
this increase was accompanied by a sharp rise in the vote share of the Green Party. In
particular, during its EU election campaign, one of the Green Party’s main objectives had
been to label the ballot as a climate election. On the night of the election day, Michael
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Kellner, the party’s Secretary-General, announced that he was delighted that his party
was able to turn the election into a ‘Sunday for Future’. Against this background, we
investigate two municipality-level electoral outcomes: voter turnout and the share of votes
cast for the Green Party. To purge unmeasured municipality-level, time-invariant factors
that may determine a general tendency to vote ‘green’, we implement a first-differences
strategy that compares electoral results in different years (2015 vs. 2019).
Our first set of results shows a positive, large and significant correlation between youth’s
propensity to participate in climate strikes and voter turnout. In terms of magnitude, a
one standard deviation increase in our strike participation index is associated with roughly
eight percent of a standard deviation higher voter turnout. Putting this further into
perspective, in the context of the elections we study, the estimated correlation corresponds
to 3.5 percent of the average increase in voter turnout between 2015 and 2019.
For our second set of results, we establish that in municipalities where youth were highly
active in climate protests, the Green Party witnessed larger vote gains compared to previous
elections than in municipalities with a lower degree of youth environmental activism. In
quantitative terms, we find that a one standard deviation increase in our strike participation
index maps into a five percent of a standard deviation higher vote share for the Green Party.
For the elections we study, the estimated correlation amounts to roughly 2.5 percent of
the Green Party’s average vote gains between 2015 and 2019. Taken together, we interpret
this evidence as suggesting that youth’s protest participation in support of FFF played a
non-negligible role in (i) encouraging adult voters to take to the polls and (ii) their demand
for green politics.
Our paper touches upon several strands of literature. First, while a substantial part of the
literature in economics has highlighted how older generations transmit preferences, norms,
and beliefs to younger generations (Bisin and Verdier, 2001, Fernández et al., 2004, Fer-
nández and Fogli, 2009, Figlio et al., 2019), there only exist a few studies, mostly outside
of economics, that has looked into the reverse intergenerational transmission. This body
of work has established, inter alia, that younger generations influence their parents’ atti-
tudes towards a variety of controversial topics, including unhealthy consumption behaviors
(Flurry and Burns, 2005), the use of modern technology (Baily, 2009), and views on sexual
orientation (LaSala, 2000). A particularly relevant subset of studies has explored whether
children can foster climate change concerns among their parents. Based on a controlled
trial in the Seychelles, Damerell et al. (2013) show that adults exhibit more comprehensive
knowledge of wetlands and improved water management behavior when their child has
received wetland-based environmental education. In a similar vein in the United States,
Lawson et al. (2019) present an experimental evaluation of an educational intervention
program designed to build climate change concern among parents through their middle
school-aged children, finding that parents of children in the treatment group expressed
higher levels of climate change concern than parents in the control group.
Second, our paper has antecedents in a small but insightful literature that examines the
impact of social and political movements. Studying the Tea Party protests in the United
States, Madestam et al. (2013) establish that the movement has caused a shift to the
right in policymaking, both directly through incumbent politicians’ decision-making and
indirectly through voters’ selection of politicians in elections. Using daily variation in the
number of protesters during Egypt’s Arab Spring, Acemoglu et al. (2018) show that more
intense protests are associated with lower stock market valuations of firms connected to
politicians in power relative to unconnected firms. In addition, several papers have studied
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the determinants of protest participation (Finkel and Opp, 1991, Finkel and Muller, 1998,
Cantoni et al., 2019, Bursztyn et al., forthcoming). An interesting but not directly related
phenomenon is described by Depetris-Chauvin et al. (2020): collectively shared experiences
of the type induced by mass sports events—in particular, international football games in the
context of Sub-Saharan Africa—can shape identities in ways that can help build national
sentiment at the expense of ethnic identification.
Finally, our work relates to studies that use cell phone data to examine economically
and socially important phenomena. A large part of this literature centers around the
investigation of social network patterns (Onnela et al., 2007, 2011, Kovanen et al., 2013).
Beyond this, cell phone records have recently been used to predict the spatial distribution
of urban economic activity from commuting choices (Kreindler and Miyauchi, 2021) and
to assess the contagion externality of mass events (Dave et al., 2020). We instead exploit
cell phone-based tracking data to measure the spread of a major social movement across
time and space.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide background
information on the Fridays for Future movement. Section 3 contains a description of the
data we use. In Section 4, we lay out our methodology for measuring youth’s climate
protest participation across time and space. In Section 5, we explore the role of youth
environmental activism in adults’ voting behavior, discussing our empirical strategy before
presenting the results. The final section concludes.
3.2 Background
Fridays for Future is a global social movement consisting to a large extent of school students
that claim comprehensive, fast, and efficient measures for climate protection. The students
skip school, mostly on Fridays, to lay emphasis on their key demand: to adhere to the
targets set in the 2015 Paris Agreement to lower global carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions in
order to limit the associated increase in global warming to 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial
levels. Parts of the scientific community (Scientists for Future) have stood in solidarity
with FFF, declaring the concerns as justified and expressing support for the demands put
forward by FFF (Warren, 2019, Hagedorn et al., 2019). The movement is organized in local
chapters that plan weekly school strikes for the climate and regular large-scale coordinated
marches (Smith and Bognar, 2019). In 2019, there have been four large-scale global climate
strikes in March, May, September, and November. For instance, alone for the third global
climate strike in September 2019, FFF organized 6,000 protests in 185 countries, which
mobilized 7.6 million participants (De Moor et al., 2020). The exact dates of the global
climate strikes and other relevant events are presented in the timeline in Panel (a) of Figure
3.1.
The Role of Greta Thunberg.—The movement received its initial impulse from Greta
Thunberg, the then 15-year old Swedish teenager, who started her Skolstrejk för klimatet
(school strike for climate) in front of the Swedish parliament in August 2018. Her ac-
tions quickly received media attention around the world. Greta Thunberg soon started
to advocate her goals at important international events such as the 2018 Climate Change
Conference in Katowice, the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2019, in front





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































94 Chapter 3. Climate Strikes and Electoral Outcomes
ference in Madrid in December 2019. She sailed across the Atlantic to deliver her famous
speech at the UN Climate Action Summit in New York in September 2019 (‘how dare
you?’). The movement’s success is tightly related to her, not only on the world stage
but also on a more local, personal level. A ‘Greta Effect’ has been documented in many
dimensions: it ranges from increases in carbon offsetting projects (The Guardian, 2019b)
to a reduction in the number of airline passengers due to ‘flight-shaming’ (The Economist,
2019). Most importantly, Greta Thunberg acted as a role model for many young people’s
decision to take part in the climate strikes. During the first global climate strike on March
15, roughly 45 percent of German students stated that Greta Thunberg influenced their
decision to participate in the event (Sommer et al., 2019). The effect of Greta Thunberg
as a role model has been more pronounced for girls than for boys. Greta Thunberg’s com-
mitment to fighting for climate change mitigation was acknowledged by various prestigious
honors and awards such as the Right Livelihood Award (promoted as the ‘Alternative No-
bel Prize’), being the youngest ‘Time Person of the Year’ in 2019, and two consecutive
nominations for the Nobel Peace Prize (in 2019 and 2020).
The German Context.—In Germany, the first strikes started in mid-December 2018
in a handful of cities.1 By mid-January 2019, there were already 25,000 protesters in 50
places, according to the organizers of FFF. The movement gained momentum in March
due to Greta Thunberg’s visits in Hamburg and Berlin on March 1 and 29,2 and the
first global climate strike on March 15. On that day, there were an estimated 300,000
protesters on German streets, and almost 1.8 million protesters participated worldwide.
The second global climate strike took place just before the 2019 elections for the European
Parliament in order to allow a significant impact on electoral outcomes (Smith and Bognar,
2019). FFF had declared the 2019 EU election as the ‘climate election’ (#voteforclimate)
and green parties obtained historically good results all across Europe. In Germany, there
were 218 events (more than in any other country) and different election surveys indicated
that environmental issues and the topic of climate change affected voters in the election
(Time, 2019). The first international climate strike took place in Aachen on June 21. The
strike activity culminated in the Global Week of Climate Action in September. During
that week on September 20, the day of the third global climate strike, the largest climate
strikes in world history were reported (The Guardian, 2019a). While more than 7.6 million
individuals participated in climate strikes globally, the numbers amounted to 1.4 million
protesters in 550 cities in Germany (alone in Berlin there were almost 300,000) (De Moor
et al., 2020). The strikes were timed to increase pressure to take action mitigating climate
change ahead of the UN Climate Action Summit in New York. On September 20, the
German government also announced a 54 billion climate change package, which included
the introduction of a price per ton of emitted CO2. The fourth and last global climate
strike in 2019 happened on November 29, again just days before the UN Climate Change
Conference started in Madrid. The estimated strike participation had declined and about
630,000 individuals joined the strike in Germany (Zeit Online, 2019).
Who Are the Participants?—The results from surveys conducted at strikes allow draw-
ing a profile of FFF participants (Sommer et al., 2019, De Moor et al., 2020). During the
first global climate strike in March 2019, almost three out of four protesters were students
(school or university), and 60 percent of participants were female. Roughly 70 percent of
1The following information on the German context stems, except where otherwise noted, from Sommer
et al. (2019).
2The two strikes that were vistited by Greta Thunberg in March 2019 attracted large populations.
According to the organizers, there were 10,000 students in Hamburg and 25,000 people in Berlin.
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the respondents located themselves at the center-left of the political spectrum which is far
above the value for the general population. Many participants come from upper-middle-
class households, as indicated by high levels of (parental) educational attainment. The
share of mothers (fathers) with a university degree was 45.8 (49.4) percent, values that are
twice as high compared to the population average. The protesters are on average largely
inexperienced with demonstrations (40% no experience, 42% attended few demonstrations)
and were mobilized through either social media (37%) or interpersonal channels (31.5%),
such as friends and schoolmates.
The Importance of (Social) Media.—The media coverage on the topic of FFF was
crucial for the movement’s success. The first coverage in Germany started already in
the late autumn of 2018. While the initial coverage was centered around the violation
of compulsory school attendance, it soon reported more on the contents of the demands
made by FFF. Panel (b) of Figure 3.1 shows the share of articles covering FFF in German
print media over the year 2019. The data is obtained via webscraping from Genios that
provides an archive containing almost 300 daily and weekly outlets in Germany. There
are clear spikes in media coverage around each of the global climate strikes in March,
May, September, and November. The maximum share of articles is attained during the
Global Week of Climate Action: more than 3.2 percent of all print articles in Germany
were reporting on FFF. The same tendency holds for social media. Panel (c) of Figure
3.1 shows the weekly number of favorites and retweets of Greta Thunberg’s tweets. Again,
the attention in Greta Thunberg’s tweets culminates with the global climate strikes. The
Appendix gives further insights into the content of Greta Thunberg’s tweets.3
Public Opinion.—Related to the increase in media coverage is a rapid shift in public
opinion on environmental issues (Smith and Bognar, 2019). The Institute for election
research (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V.) has been conducting the survey Politbarometer
(2019) for more than 40 years, which regularly polls attitudes with regard to political
parties, current issues, and delivers projections for upcoming elections. One question in
the survey asks about respondent’s opinion on the two most pressing current issues in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The large graph in Panel C of Figure 3.1 shows that the
share of respondents who report that the environment as a high-priority issue is increasing
significantly from around 10 percent to almost 60 percent over the year 2019. The small
graph plots the long-run development since 2000 (the year 2019 is highlighted in green).
Before the year 2019, an average share of four percent reported that the environment
is among the top two pressing issues.4 Respondents also reported that they expect the
climate strikes and the associated sudden spike in environmental awareness would lead to
political changes (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen e.V., 2019). While 37 percent of respondents
expected an impact on politics in April 2019, the share was already 51 percent at the end
of June.
3Figure C.1 gives an overview of the most widely used words, hashtags, and mentions. Figure C.2
displays information on the sentiment and the length of the tweets. Figure C.3 plots the weekly number
of favorites of influential German climate activists, such as Luisa Neubauer.
4Before 2019, a maximum share of 14.5 percent of respondents reported the environment as a top issue.
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3.3 Data
Our main sample uses data from 2019 and contains all German regions, either on the
county (Kreise, N = 401) or municipality (Gemeinde, N = 10, 719) level. We combine
six sources of data to residualize journeys and to investigate associations between climate
strike participation and electoral outcomes.
3.3.1 Cell Phone-Based Tracking Data
The cell phone-based tracking data is obtained from Teralytics, which draws on the universe
of customers from the Telefonica O2-network. The mobile network provider had a market
share of 31 percent in 2019 (Statista, 2020) and is a popular carrier among young peo-
ple.5 Teralytics uses machine learning-based technology to transform mobile signals into
a number of journeys between two locations.6 The data reports the daily number of trips
between origin-destination pairs, which is the unit of observation in the first part of the
empirical analysis. Over the year 2019, the data contains 64.4 billion trips in total. Due to
data privacy regulations, Teralytics cannot report journeys if there are fewer than five trips
for a given origin-destination pair per day, resulting in missing observations. The spatial
level of aggregation mostly coincides with county borders. Only for larger metropolitan
areas, there are regions with smaller clusters. For this reason, the data set provides us
the number of journeys for 513 different geographies, which result in more than 260,000
possible origin-destination pairs.7 The vast majority of trips (92.7 percent) do not exceed
30 kilometers.8 For larger distances, the data can distinguish between different modes of
transportation.
3.3.2 Climate Strike Data
Our data on climate strikes is self-collected and comes from local authorities, social media,
and the website of FFF Germany. All public gatherings such as rallies and demonstrations
must be registered in Germany. The registration usually happens at the police, the city
council, or other regulatory agencies. The large bulk of our database is retrieved by
contacting the respective authorities and requesting a list of all climate strikes that took
place in their jurisdictions in 2019. Consequently, we obtained information on the exact
location and time of nearly 2,000 strikes. In the next step, we used social media postings
(Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram) to fill up missing information for the 20 largest cities
that were missing in the database. Searching for information on social media channels
gave us almost another 400 climate strikes and ensured that we do not miss any large-
scale climate strike. In the last step, we enriched our database with information on almost
1,600 strikes retrieved from the website of FFF Germany. Using the internet archive of
www.web.archive.org, we could restore snapshots with information on climate strikes for
5To obtain representative mobility patterns, Teralytics extrapolates to the entire population with the
help of regional market shares.
6There is a required minimum time between individual movements so that they count as a completed
journey, depending on the mode of transport: It is 30 minutes by car, 60 minutes by train, and 120 minutes
by plane.
7For 355 counties, the geographies overlap with the county borders. The remaining 46 counties are split
into subclusters, with a maximum of five subclusters for the largest metropolitan areas.
8The distance refers to the linear distance between the centroids of two geographies.
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Figure 3.2. Locations of climate strikes in 2019
Notes: The map shows the climate strikes (red dots) in our data base over the year 2019. The bold
white lines indicate state boundaries and the thin white lines represent county boundaries.
some weeks. After combining the information from the different sources, the locations
where the climate strikes took place were geographically encoded. Figure 3.2 shows a map
with all strikes contained in our database. There is considerable variation in the strike
behavior across the year as depicted in the maps in Appendix Figure C.4. The same
impression is obtained from Figure 3.3, which presents the daily number of strikes across
the three sources. The highest number of strikes is reported on the global climate strike
events (March, May, September, and November). Furthermore, it is visible that the strikes



























Figure 3.3. Number of strikes across sources
Notes: The figure shows the daily number of strikes per source. The indicated dates above
the spikes mark the four global climate strikes.
from the FFF website are only available in 19 weeks when the domain was archived. The
other sources, however, exhibit more continuity in how they report the number of strikes.9
3.3.3 Electoral Data
For the European Parliament election, we use data provided by the Federal Statistical Office
and the statistical offices of the Länder. For the state elections in Brandenburg, Saxony,
and Thuringia, we draw on data from the State Returning Officers (Landeswahlleiter) and
the statistical offices of the Länder. In our analysis, we use the municipality-level voter
turnout and the vote share for the Greens (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) as our dependent
variable.10 The vote share is defined as the number of votes for the Greens divided by the
total number of valid votes cast. In addition to the vote shares at the four elections in
2019, we also look at first-differences that use the corresponding counterparts in 2015. In
our sample, the average vote share for the Greens is 19.68 percent. Table 3.1 shows that
there is substantial heterogeneity across elections.
3.3.4 Weather Data
The weather data is derived from Germany’s National Meteorological Service (Deutscher
Wetterdienst). To construct the weather controls, we aggregate weather information to the
9Because of the extreme volatility of the strikes from the FFF Germany website - no information in
most instances vs. detailed regional resolution on others-, we first focus on strikes for which there is more
continuous information, i.e. strikes obtained from the authorities and social media.
10Our analysis excludes municipalities (around 5 percent) that were subject to territorial reforms between
the elections 2015-2019.
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Table 3.1. Vote share for the Green Party and voter turnout across elections
Greens ∆ Greens Turnout ∆ Turnout
(2019) (2019-2015) (2019) (2019-2015)
Election Obs. Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd Mean Sd
EU 10,719 20.76 7.54 9.73 3.86 59.18 7.31 13.06 5.81
Brandenburg 413 10.17 5.12 4.31 2.19 56.31 8.81 9.72 6.42
Saxony 414 4.94 1.91 1.31 0.91 65.32 6.83 16.90 4.22
Thuringia 645 5.32 3.41 -0.57 0.97 61.11 6.62 11.85 3.82
Total 12,191 19.68 8.23 9.11 4.33 59.33 7.42 13.05 5.82
Notes: The Table reports the number of municipalities per election (column 2) and population-weighted
means and standard deviations for the Green’s vote share in 2019 (columns 3 and 4) and the first-
differenced vote share for the Greens (columns 5 and 6). Columns 7 through 10 report the corresponding
values for voter turnout.
county level using the weighted average (inverse distances) of the values from the individual
weather monitors within a certain radius to the county’s centroid.11 We use daily averages
of the following weather variables: hours of sunshine, precipitation, and maximum air
temperature.
3.3.5 Holidays
To account for differences in the number of journeys between origin-destination pairs on
regular and special days, we include state-level controls for public and school holidays.
The data on school holidays is derived from ‘The Standing Conference of the Ministers of
Education and Cultural Affairs of the Länder in the Federal Republic of Germany’ (Kultus-
minister Konferenz ). The data on public holidays is collected from www.schulferien.org.
Additionally, we include dummy variables for peculiar days (New Year’s Eve and Carnival
season), which shift the expected number of journeys between origin-destination pairs.
3.3.6 Other Regional Variables
The Federal Statistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder provide a database
(Regionaldatenbank) of detailed statistics by different subject areas at very granular spatial
levels. We draw on this database for various purposes. First, we extract municipality-level
population figures that are used to construct the strike participation index and to weigh
the observations when analyzing the associations between strike participation and electoral
results. Second, we collect municipality-level information on topics such as per capita
income, unemployment rates, and demographic characteristics that are used as controls.
11The maximum radius depends on the weather variable. It is 30 km for precipitation, while it is 50 km
for hours of sunshine and maximum air temperature.
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3.4 Granular Measurement of Strike Participation
3.4.1 Residualize Journeys and Combine with Strike Data Base
In the first part of the empirical analysis, we exploit the cell phone-based tracking data to
measure local strike participation. To determine how many participants attend a climate
strike and where they come from, we residualize the number of movements between origins
and destinations. We exploit a rich fixed effects model to remove the predictable variation
in the number of journeys based on the origin-destination pair, date characteristics, holiday
fixed effects, and weather controls. Let journeysijt denote the number of journeys between
origin i and destination j at time t, which in our baseline model is given by
journeysijt = α+ ϑij + ϕd + ηw + ψm︸ ︷︷ ︸
γt
+λXijt + εijt. (3.1)
Origin-destination fixed effects are captured by ϑij and account for time-invariant mobility
patterns between origin-destination pairs (mostly on the county level with few subclusters).
They ensure we use within instead of between origin-destination pair variation over time.
The time fixed effects vector γt contains binary variables for the day-of-the-week (ϕd), the
week-of-the-year (ηw), and the month (ψm). It allows to flexibly control for weekly and
seasonal mobility patterns. The vector Xijt includes public as well as school holidays and
weather controls, both at the origin and destination geography.12 The model explains a
high proportion of the variance in the number of origin-destination journeys as the adjusted
R2 = 0.9696.
To obtain the number and origin of people participating in climate strikes, we calculate the
difference between the observed number of journeys and the predicted number of journeys
conditional on the variables described above eijt = (journeysijt− ̂journeysijt). The residuals
eijt capture the excess mobility net of the variation stemming from the baseline covariates.
We match the daily origin-destination-level residuals with our strike database in the next
step. The climate strike database contains the precise time and location for the set of
destinations j ∈ {1, ..., J} in which a strike takes place on t ∈ {1, ..., T} (mostly Fridays).
Consequently, eijt indicates how many people are coming from origin i to a strike in
destination j happening on day t.
Figure 3.4 shows intuitively how the resulting strike participation measure looks like for two
exemplary strikes in Hamburg and Berlin. Both of the climate strikes were visited by Greta
Thunberg and attracted large populations. A darker shade of green indicates that more
people in that geography were coming to one of the two strikes (locations marked in red) net
of the variation stemming from the controls discussed above. The color scale classification
is obtained by applying the Fisher-Jenks natural breaks algorithm. The algorithm searches
for natural breaks in the data by minimizing the variance within clusters and maximizing
the variance between clusters (Jenks, 1967). In both instances, strike participation is a
relatively local phenomenon. The highest excess population flows are coming from adjacent
geographies.
12State-level public holiday controls contain dummy variables for All Saints’ Day, Ascension Day, As-
sumption Day, Christmas, Corpus Christi, Epiphany, Easter, German Unity Day, Good Friday, Labor Day,
New Year’s Day, Penance Day, Pentecost, and Reformation Day. Furthermore, it contains binary variables
for Carnival season and News Year’s Eve. County-level weather controls include air temperature, hours of
sunshine, and precipitation.
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Figure 3.4. Strike participation for selected strikes
Notes: The maps show residualized movements (in thousand) for two exemplary strikes. The two strikes
were both visited by Greta Thunberg and attracted large populations. A darker shade of green indicates
that more people were coming to the climate strike conditional on the controls discussed in the text.
The color scale classification is obtained by using the Fisher-Jenks natural breaks algorithm. The red
dots mark the strikes’ location, gray areas indicate missing data (censored), bold gray lines show state
boundaries, and thin gray lines represent the regions defined by Teralytics.
We perform several sensitivity tests to assess the robustness of our local strike participa-
tion measure. Figure 3.5 shows maps for the climate strike in Hamburg using alternative
participation measures.13 First, we expand the baseline specification by including inter-
actions of ϑij × γt in Equation 3.1, i.e. origin-destination-by-day-of-the-week fixed effects,
origin-destination-by-week-of-the-year fixed effects, and origin-destination-by-month fixed
effects. The interactions have the advantage of allowing for systematic changes in the
origin-destination-level mobility patterns over the year. The top row maps illustrate dif-
ferent versions of included interactions when estimating the equation with OLS. Panel A
displays the baseline specification as already shown in Figure 3.4. Panel B adds interac-
tions of the origin-destination fixed effects with week and month fixed effects. We refrain
from also interacting the origin-destination fixed effects with the day-of-the-week fixed ef-
fects because the interaction would likely absorb the average strike participation in regions
where climate strikes happen every Friday. For completeness, we show a fully interacted
version in Panel C. Second, we test the robustness of the strike participation measure by
estimating Equation 3.1 with a Poisson model to account for the discrete nature of the
dependent variable. We do so by also showing the different interaction specifications dis-
cussed in the OLS case. Throughout all specifications emerges a picture of remarkable
consistency. The models identify roughly the same set of regions where strike participants
come from, irrespective of the modeling choices. The levels might be different, but this
will not be an issue as we use standardized versions of the strike participation measure.
13The corresponding maps for the climate strike in Berlin can be found in Appendix Figure C.5.
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Figure 3.5. Alternative participation measures for the climate strike in Hamburg
Notes: The maps show residualized movements (in thousand) for the climate strike in Hamburg (March, 1).
Column 1 uses the baseline specification in Equation 3.1, column 2 further adds ϑij×ηw and ϑij×ψm, and
column 3 presents a fully interacted version (plus also including ϑij×ϕd). The top row uses OLS to estimate
Equation 3.1, while the bottom row shows results when using Poisson. A darker shade of green indicates that
more people were coming to the climate strike conditional on the controls discussed in the text. The color scale
classification is obtained by using the Fisher-Jenks natural breaks algorithm. See Figure 3.4 for additional
details.
Throughout the paper, we focus on the baseline specification but also present results for
the alternative strike participation measures discussed above.
As a further check, we validate our approach to identify the origin of people attending
other large-scale public events by investigating the catchment areas for soccer games. In
that respect, Figure C.6 presents results for matches happening in Munich, Dortmund, and
Freiburg (an example of a large, medium, and small city). Reassuringly, the maps look
similar to those depicting climate strikes and illustrate that the catchment areas lie around
the matches’ location. However, in comparison to the climate strikes, the catchment areas
are a bit more extensive and contain the guest teams’ origin.
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3.4.2 Construction of a Municipality-Level Participation Index
After identifying the origin of strike participants, we want to account for the intensity of
local participation rates over time. The idea is to differentiate between regions with contin-
uous and sporadic strike involvement. In this section, we incorporate these considerations
by constructing a cumulative measure of strike participation at the municipality-level. We










where Participation Indexmt̃ is a cumulative measure of relative strike participation in
origin municipality m up to a specific point in time t̃ (for instance when an election takes




j=1 eijt indicates the cumulative strike
participation in county i up to time t̃.14 We sum over destinations j to account for the
fact that individuals residing in i are going to climate strikes in more than one destination.
Furthermore, we sum over all days up to and including t̃ in which county i appears as an
origin for a strike in any destination j. The weights wmi allocate the strike participation
from the county to the municipality level. They are defined as the share of children (aged
0-17) living in municipality m in relation to other municipalities in county i. The weights
reflect the notion that strike participation should be higher in municipalities with many
young people relative to municipalities with few young people. We restrain our weights
to minors, i.e. the population share that is not allowed to vote, with the purpose to
not generate associations with electoral outcomes by construction. Finally, we take the
number of cumulative strike participants in municipality m at time t̃ and divide it by the
municipality’s population figure to obtain a relative measure.
3.5 Strike Participation and Electoral Outcomes
3.5.1 Empirical Strategy
Our approach to investigating the relationship between strike participation and electoral
results is based on a fixed-effects model, which exploits within-state and within-election
variation of local strike participation rates. We estimate the following model:15
Share Greensme = θs + τe + β · Participation Indexme + µX1m + ξme, (3.3)
where Share Greensme is the Greens’ vote share in municipality m for election e, which we
define as the number of votes for the Greens relative to the total number of valid votes
cast. We regress the dependent variable on state and election fixed effects (θs and τe). The
Participation Indexme captures the cumulative relative strike participation up to the time
when election e takes place. For some specifications, we also include a set of municipality-
level controls X1m, such as income, unemployment, and demographic characteristics.
14We only select non-negative residuals to obtain positive values of strike participation.
15For many aspects in this section’s empirical approach, we found inspiration in the study of Cantoni
et al. (2020) who investigate the municipality-level relationship between the support for Germany’s Nazi
party in 1933 and the likelihood to vote for the ‘Alternative for Germany’, an increasingly right-wing
populist party.
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To eliminate unobserved time-invariant municipality specific effects, such as a general ten-
dency to vote for the Greens, we employ a first-differences strategy in which we examine
the change in the vote share. Let ∆(Share Greensme,2019−2015) denote the change in the
Greens’ vote share from 2015 to 2019 in municipality m for election e, which is given by
∆(Share Greensme,2019−2015) = θs + τe + β · Participation Indexme + µX2m + ξme. (3.4)
Although first-differencing removes time-invariant municipality specific effects, we still in-
clude in some specifications a set of controls X2m (potentially different to X1m in Equation
3.3) to allow for time-varying effects of covariates.
In both Equations 3.3 and 3.4, all variables, dependent and explanatory alike, are stan-
dardized. β is the parameter of interest and captures the relationship between local strike
participation rates and the (change in the) greens’ vote share. The parameter reports the
change in the outcome variable in standard deviation units due to a one standard devia-
tion increase of the participation index. Observations are weighted by population figures
from the Federal Statistical Office. For analyses at the municipality level, we calculate
sandwiched standard error estimates allowing errors to be correlated across municipalities
corresponding to the same county—i.e., clustered at the county level. For regressions at
the county level, we use robust standard errors.
3.5.2 Main Results
Before presenting regression results, we show descriptive evidence on the variables of inter-
est. Figure 3.6 contains maps displaying geographic patterns by grouping municipalities
into quintiles according to the variables’ distribution. Panel A shows the regional varia-
tion in the Green Party’s vote share in the 2019 European elections. The Greens achieve
their best results in urban areas of Western Germany, and with the exception of Berlin
and three urban areas, the Greens are significantly less successful in Eastern Germany.
The illustrated East-West divide is in line with official statistics. In West-Germany, the
Greens obtained on average 22.31 percent of the votes, whereas an average 10.35 percent
of voters elected the Greens in the East. Panel B shows the geographical variation of the
change in the Greens’ vote share between the 2015 and 2019 EU elections. Regions with
the largest gains in votes can be found in the West and North of Germany as well as in
large metropolitan regions. Panel C presents the spatial distribution of the standardized
participation index at the time of the 2019 EU election. There is extensive regional varia-
tion with generally higher values in urban centers. The bivariate map in Panel D shows the
correlation between changes in the Green Party’s vote share and the protest participation
index. To obtain the bivariate distribution, we divide municipalities into terciles of the
two variables, resulting in a 3×3 matrix of possible outcomes (being in the lower, middle,
or upper tercile, per variable). Intuitively, we assemble the bivariate map by overlaying
the two univariate maps with the respective color scales, representing the terciles of the
variable of interest. A more intense tinge of red indicates larger increases in the Green
Party’s vote share, whereas a more intense tinge of blue indicates higher protest participa-
tion rates. Geographies depicted in colors from the diagonal of the color matrix support
the notion that electoral results are positively correlated with participation rates. For in-
stance, low participation rates and small or even negative changes in the vote share of the
Green Party are prevalent in Eastern Germany (light purple). In contrast, high levels of
strike participation and large increases in vote shares for the Green Party are common in
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Figure 3.6. Spatial correlation of the vote share of the Greens and strike participation
Notes: The maps show, at the municipality level, (A) the vote share for the Greens in the 2019 election, (B) the
first-difference of the vote share for the greens (2019-2015), (C) the strike participation index at the time of the EU
election (standardized), and (D) the bivariate distribution of the first-differenced vote share for the greens and the
participation index. The color scales in panels A-C correspond to quintiles. To generate the bivariate color scale in
panel D, we blend the two univariate scales (in terciles, ∆ Greens in red and participation index in blue) into one.
Bold lines indicate state boundaries, thin lines represent municipality borders.
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Table 3.2. Strike participation and the Greens’ vote share
(1) (2) (3)
Greens ∆ Greens ∆ Greens
2019 2019-2015 2019-2015
Participation Index [std.] 0.1306∗∗∗ 0.0537∗∗ 0.0799∗∗
(0.0341) (0.0270) (0.0300)
Observations 12,189 12,189 455
Adjusted R2 0.569 0.754 0.826
State FE X X X
Election FE X X X
Notes: The specifications use election results from the 2019 elections for the EU and the
federal states of Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia. The dependent variable is defined
as the Greens’ vote share, i.e. the number of votes relative to total votes cast. The ex-
planatory variable is the participation index at the time of the elections. As all variables
(dependent and explanatory) are standardized, population-weighted coefficients show the
change in the outcome variable (in standard deviation units) due to a one standard devia-
tion increase of the participation index. Columns 1 and 2 show results on the municipality
level, while column 3 presents county-level results. All regressions include state and elec-
tion fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the county level (number of clusters
= 401) in columns 1 and 2. Robust standard errors are reported in column 3.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
North-Western Germany and Baden-Württemberg (dark purple). Areas with just a red or
blue tinge are consequently not in line with our hypothesis.
Table 3.2 presents results from estimating Equations 3.3 and 3.4. In column 1, we esti-
mate the relationship between cumulative FFF participation levels and the Green Party’s
vote share in 2019 at the municipality level. State-level fixed effects control for time-
invariant factors that may have affected FFF participation or the Greens’ vote share, such
as political, economic, or cultural differences leading to different susceptibility levels for en-
vironmental topics between states. Election fixed effects account for the fact that electoral
outcomes may vary across ballot types. For instance, individuals may choose to vote for
different parties depending on the type of election. Our results indicate that participation
in FFF climate strikes is predictive for the demand for green politics. To be precise, we
find that a one-standard-deviation increase in our cumulative strike participation index is
associated with an increase in the Green Party’s vote share by .13 standard deviations. To
eliminate unobserved time-invariant municipality specific effects, we estimate the relation-
ship between our participation index and the change in the Greens’ vote share between
2015 and 2019. Column 2 contains the estimate of this estimation and represents our
preferred specification. A one-standard-deviation increase in the participation index is as-
sociated with an increase of .054 standard deviations. This increase in the standardized
beta coefficient corresponds to an average gain of a quarter percentage point or 2.55 per-
cent of the overall increase in the Green Party’s vote share between 2015 and 2019. Finally,
in column 3, we estimate the same specification as in column 2, but at the county level.
Unlike the municipality-level measure of protest participation, the county-level measure
has the advantage to not depend on weights (see section 3.2). Reassuringly, the coefficient
is very similar to our preferred specification in column 2.
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Table 3.3. Inclusion of controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Income Unemployment Demographics
Participation Index [std.] 0.0537∗∗ 0.0439∗∗ 0.0560∗∗ 0.0422∗
(0.0270) (0.0217) (0.0269) (0.0256)
Observations 12,189 12,185 12,066 12,189
Adjusted R2 0.754 0.798 0.755 0.778
State FE X X X X
Election FE X X X X
Notes: The dependent variable is defined as the standardized change in Greens’ vote share from 2015 to
2019. The baseline specification in column 1 corresponds to the specification in column 2 of Table 3.2.
Each column adds a different set of control variables. Column 2 adds the logarithm of per capita income,
column 3 adds the unemployment rate, and column 4 controls for population density (dummy: median
split) and the age structure of the population. Clustered errors are reported in parentheses. See Table
3.2 for additional details.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
3.5.3 Additional Control Variables
Figure 3.6 displays considerable spatial variation in the Greens’ vote share and participation
in climate strikes, especially between East and West Germany. Therefore, one might be
concerned that underlying factors, such as economic differences or differences in the age
structure, which may explain the variation in both, the vote share of the Green Party and
the participation in climate strikes, may confound the associations described above. For
instance, municipalities with a high share of young people have a larger propensity to be
more actively involved in school strikes for the climate and to vote ‘green’. To check for
the presence of potential confounders, we show results when including additional control
variables to our preferred specification in Table 3.3. We include the logarithm of per capita
income (column 2), the unemployment rate (column 3), and the age structure as well as
population density (column 4).16 It is reassuring to see that the coefficient size remains
very similar throughout all specifications. The significance levels decrease slightly but
remain below or just above the five percent level.
3.5.4 Voter Turnout as a Potential Mechanism
So far, the results have shown that the Green Party’s vote share increased more in munici-
palities with higher levels of cumulative protest participation. The question arises whether
this increase results from more people going to the ballot or a shift of votes from other par-
ties to the Green Party. Concerning the former explanation, it is likely that the labeling of
the European elections as ‘climate election’ may have mobilized additional voters who had
abstained in previous elections. To probe this hypothesis, we investigate the relationship
between strike participation and voter turnout in Table 3.4. Although voter turnout is not
significantly correlated with climate strike participation, we find that the change in voter
turnout is positively and significantly related to climate strike participation levels. We
find that a one standard deviation increase in the participation index is associated with an
16Population density is an indicator variable that equals one for all municipalities with above-median
population density.
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Table 3.4. Strike participation and voter turnout
(1) (2) (3)
Turnout ∆ Turnout ∆ Turnout
2019 2019-2015 2019-2015
Participation Index [std.] 0.0140 0.0787∗∗∗ 0.1055∗∗∗
(0.0325) (0.0181) (0.0219)
Observations 12,189 12,189 455
Adjusted R2 0.270 0.499 0.785
State FE X X X
Election FE X X X
Notes: The specifications use election results from the 2019 elections for
the EU and the federal states of Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia. The
dependent variable is defined as the voter turnout, i.e. the number of votes
relative to total votes cast. See Table 3.2 for additional details. Standard
errors are clustered at the county level (number of clusters = 401) in columns
1 and 2. Robust standard errors are reported in column 3.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
increase of voter turnout by .08 standard deviations. This corresponds to half a percent-
age point increase in voter turnout, or equivalently to 3.5 percent of the increase in voter
turnout from 2015 to 2019. We obtain similar results when estimating the specification at
the county level.
Robustness Tests
We perform several sensitivity tests to assess the robustness of the findings. Overall, the
sensitivity tests demonstrate that the main results are robust to other specifications of
measuring climate strike participation, indicating that protest participation levels indeed
correlate with electoral outcomes.
Cutoff Distances for the Climate Strike Participation Index.—In the process of
constructing the climate strike participation index, we tried to be as flexible as possible.
In principle, we allow every region to be a potential place of origin for any climate strike in
Germany. In practice, however, participants are likely to come from nearby municipalities.
This is also what we see in our data (see for instance Figure 3.4). In the first robustness test
shown in Figure 3.7, we try to accommodate the insight about the locality of catchment
areas for the individual strikes. To be precise, we limit the set of origin geographies based on
the proximity to the strikes’ location. The figure reports estimates and confidence intervals
when estimating Equation 3.4 with the additional restriction of using only origins that are
within a certain radius to the destination. The results show that choosing any cutoff of
more than 20 kilometers will lead to positive and significant estimates that are similar to
our baseline results presented earlier. Coefficient sizes decrease when using cutoffs that
can realistically be seen as too small, i.e. of less than 17 kilometers. There is no significant
correlation between strike participation and changes in the Greens’ vote share when using
these smaller distances.
Alternative Participation Measures.—The climate strike participation measure used
throughout this paper is the residualized number of movements between origin-destination
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Figure 3.7. Cutoff distances for origins
Notes: The figure reports estimates and confidence intervals of Equation 3.4 (vertical axis) for different
cutoff distances ranging from 0 to 80 kilometers (horizontal axis). The cutoff distance refers to the
maximum distance until when counties are considered to be potential origins for a given strike. Gray
bars represent 95% confidence intervals, while blue bars represent 90% confidence intervals, both arising
from clustering standard errors at the county level.
pairs. We residualize journeys by removing the predictable variation using fixed effects for
origin-destination pairs, the day of the week, the week of the year, and the month, as well
as additional controls, such as weather and holidays. In Table 3.5, we show results when
using even more stringent definitions by interacting origin-destination fixed effects with
week- and month-fixed effects (column 2) and with week-, month-, and day-of-the-week
fixed effects (column 3). Panel A shows results when using OLS, and Panel B presents
estimates when using a Poisson model to account for the discrete nature of the dependent
variable. The coefficient sizes remain similar to the baseline specification in column 1,
while the standard errors increase slightly.
3.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies whether school strikes for climate, also known as Fridays for Future,
have an impact on electoral outcomes in four elections in Germany in 2019, the peak of
the FFF movement. To do so, we develop a novel strategy to identify the origin of climate
protest participants exploiting cell phone-based tracking data. In a first step, we extract
the excess number of journeys between origins and destinations, conditional on a large
set of fixed effects and other controls. The residualized movements are matched with a
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Table 3.5. Alternative participation measures
(1) (2) (3)





Participation Index [std.] 0.0537∗∗ 0.0520∗ 0.0483∗
(0.0270) (0.0272) (0.0292)
Observations 12,189 12,189 12,189
Adjusted R2 0.754 0.754 0.754
State FE X X X
Election FE X X X
Panel B: Poisson
Participation Index [std.] 0.0541∗∗ 0.0469∗ 0.0501∗
(0.0251) (0.0257) (0.0300)
Observations 12,189 12,189 12,189
Adjusted R2 0.754 0.754 0.754
State FE X X X
Election FE X X X
Notes: The dependent variable is defined as the standardized change in Greens’
vote share from 2015 to 2019. The column header indicates how the process of
residualizing journeys is varied. Column 1 uses the baseline specification pre-
sented in Equation 3.1. Column 2 further includes interactions of ϑij×week and
ϑij×month. Column3 presents a fully interacted version (plus also including
ϑij×day-of-the-week). Panel A (B) contains estimates when estimating Equa-
tion 3.1 with OLS (Poisson). See Table 3.2 for additional details.
Significance levels: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
self-constructed strike database, containing information on the exact time and location of
more than 2,300 climate strikes. Consequently, we know for each strike the number of
participants and the geographic distribution of their origins. In the second step, we find
that this measure of local climate strike participation is related to electoral outcomes. To
be precise, our results suggest that municipalities with higher strike participation rates have
a larger propensity to vote for the Green Party. Furthermore, voter turnout is rising with
increasing levels of climate strike participation. Our results survive a couple of sensitivity
tests and are robust to including economic and demographic characteristics.
The results presented in this paper suggest that participation in climate protests may
influence environmental awareness and political priorities. Previous literature in economics
examines the transmission of values and political beliefs from parents to children. Our
study presents first indications for a reverse transmission mechanism. The setting studied
in this paper is interesting in this regard because the FFF movement is predominantly
attended by school children, whereas parents are eligible to vote. The youth’s participation
in environmental protests may spark parents’ concerns about climate change. While we
do not have direct information on child-to-parents value transmissions, our results are
indicative that children transmit their increased environmental awareness to their parents.
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Figure C.1. Most widely used words, hashtags, and mentions in Greta Thunberg’s tweets
Notes: Panel a displays a word cloud of Greta Thunberg’s tweets in 2019. The larger a word is depicted, the more
frequent it is used by Greta Thunberg in her tweets. The lowercased keywords are from the subset of words after
removing urls, hashtags, mentions, digits, punctuation, and stopwords. Panels b, c, and d show the frequency of the
most common words, hashtags, and mentions. The people behind the Twitter accounts are: @_NikkiHenderson,
@Sailing_LaVaga, @elayna_c (sailors), @KevinClimate (Professor of energy and climate change), @Luisamneubauer
(German climate activist), @AnunaDe (Belgian climate activist), @GeorgeMonbiot (British writer and political ac-
tivist), @jrockstrom (Director of Potsdam Institute), @SKAVLANTVShow (Scandinavian talk show), @MichaelE-
Mann (Professor of Atmospheric Science).
Source: Own representation with data from Twitter.
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Figure C.2. Sentiment and length of Greta Thunberg’s tweets
Notes: The two top panels show the conditional distribution of the tweets’ sentiment. Greta Thunberg’s tweets
tend to be more positively formulated (polarity values larger than zero), with the right balance between objective
and subjective language. Her tweets contain on average 135 characters and a bit more than 20 words.
Source: Own representation with data from Twitter.
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Figure C.3. The twitter feed of influential German FFF activists
Notes: The figure plots the weekly number of likes [in thousand] of influential German climate activists and groups
over the year 2019.
Source: Own representation with data from Twitter.
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Figure C.4. Strikes in 2019, variation across months
Notes: The maps show the climate strikes (red dots) in our data base over the year 2019. The bold white lines
indicate state boundaries and the thin white lines represent county boundaries.
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Figure C.5. Alternative participation measures for the climate strike in Berlin
Notes: The maps show residualized movements (in thousand) for the climate strike in Berlin (March, 29). Column 1
uses the baseline specification in Equation 3.1, column 2 further adds ϑij×ηw and ϑij×ψm, and column 3 presents
a fully interacted version (plus also including ϑij×ϕd). The top row uses OLS to estimate Equation 3.1, while the
bottom row shows results when using Poisson. A darker shade of green indicates that more people were coming
to the climate strike conditional on the controls discussed in the text. The color scale classification is obtained by
using the Fisher-Jenks natural breaks algorithm. See Figure 3.4 for additional details.
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Figure C.6. Validation: Attendance at soccer games
Notes: The maps show residualized movements (in thousand) for soccer matches in Munich, Dortmund,
and Freiburg. A darker shade of green indicates that more people were coming to the soccer matches
conditional on the controls discussed in the text. The color scale classification is obtained by using
the Fisher-Jenks natural breaks algorithm. The red dots mark the games’ location, gray areas indicate
missing data (censored), bold gray lines show state boundaries, and thin gray lines represent the regions
defined by Teralytics.
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